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Abstract 
 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century a burgeoning global private military 
sector is increasingly involved in areas of defence and security that, up until 
recently, were popularly thought of as being within the monopolistic preserve 
of the nation state. Finding itself at the vanguard of profound political and 
economic change, today’s Royal Navy is increasingly reliant on relationships 
with the private sector that only thirty years ago would have seemed 
unimaginable to many commentators. As naval shipbuilding, dockyard 
refitting, logistics, training, and even warship ownership and manning, move 
from a unitary state to an increasingly self-organising private sector bounded 
by a differentiated and decentered polity, this thesis is concerned with 
boundaries of elite discourse on legitimacy in the political economy of Royal 
Navy and British naval sea power and their implications for New Public 
Management theory. At its core, the study presents original research into the 
attitudes of fifty elite opinion formers directly concerned with the discourse of 
Royal Navy modernisation and profiles their ideational boundaries concerning 
the political economy of force and violence.  
 
The thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by presenting 
empirically and framing theoretically the ways in which elite naval attitudes to 
the political economy of legitimated force have changed and are evolving. The 
research is important because it challenges what many commentators have 
come to believe to be an a priori function of the nation state, namely, the 
monopoly use of force, with the actual views of those opinion formers who 
currently hold positions of power and influence in and around one of its core 
‘ideal type’ institutions: the Royal Navy. The research is also significant 
because in attempting to clarify the conceptual boundaries of this elite 
discourse, it also presents a powerful critique of New Public Management with 
reference to the problematic dimensions of time, economic complexity and 
socio-political power. 
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  1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to Thesis 
 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century a burgeoning global private military 
sector is increasingly involved in areas of defence and security that, up until 
recently, were popularly thought of as being within the monopolistic preserve 
of the nation state. Finding itself at the vanguard of important political and 
economic changes, the Royal Navy is increasingly reliant on a range of 
partnerships with the private sector that only thirty years ago would have 
seemed unimaginable to those holding a Weberian outlook. As naval 
shipbuilding, dockyard refitting, logistics, training, and even warship 
ownership and manning, move from the state to the private sector, this thesis 
focuses on the boundaries of elite discourse towards Royal Navy 
modernisation and its implications for the paradigm of New Public 
Management theory. 
 
At its core, the study presents original research into the opinions of fifty elite 
opinion formers concerned with the discourse surrounding Royal Navy 
modernisation and identifies the conceptual boundaries of their opinions 
concerning the political economy of legitimated force. In doing so, it asks the 
key research question:  
How do influential opinion formers in and around Weber’s nation-state 
monopoly now conceptualise legitimacy in political economy and what 
are the implications for New Public Management theory?  
 
In asking this question, the thesis challenges what many academic and 
military theorists have long believed to be a core function of the nation state 
with the actual views of those who hold positions of power and influence in 
and around one of its main services dedicated to the production of force and 
violence. It makes an original contribution to knowledge because in detailing 
empirically and framing theoretically the ways in which elite attitudes to the 
political economy of legitimated force have evolved, it clarifies boundaries of 
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discourse with reference to the problematic dimensions of time, economic 
complexity and socio-political power. 
 
In examining the history of privateering, the rise of the modern private military 
sector and the work of those free marketeers who champion, what they term, 
military ‘demonopolisation’, there is a gap in the literature that this thesis aims 
to fill. For in analysing key themes in political economy that at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century represent ‘punctuated shifts’ in elite attitudes towards 
the role of the state and its use of force, the thesis not only challenges the 
traditional paradigms of public management and administration, but it does so 
with reference to the opinions of those agents who actually hold elite positions 
of power and influence in and around one of the world’s oldest military 
institutions, and therefore an ‘ideal type’ representative of Weber’s nation-
state monopoly: the Royal Navy. The research presented is, by its nature, 
challenging, complex and ethically sensitive.  
 
 
1.2 Implications and Structure 
  
It is with this in background mind that Chapter II elaborates on the study’s 
aims and objectives, explains the relevance of Royal Navy outsourcing, 
public/private partnerships and privatisation to Weber’s concept of the 
monopoly use of force, and locates Royal Navy modernisation within the 
theoretical framework of New Public Management theory and the wider 
context of privatisation, differentiated polities and the ‘hollowing out of the 
state’. In detailing the transition from ‘government’ to a world of ‘governance’ 
and formal and informal policy networks, it goes on to focus on the key issue 
of the temporal dimension and draws upon the history of privateering to inform 
its understanding of political economy in the production of naval sea power 
and notions of legitimation in the area of force and violence.   
 
Chapter III builds on this work by examining the broader history of private 
warfare and charting the rise of the modern global private military sector. In 
doing so, it not only details UK naval policy between 1979 and 2013, 
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highlighting key milestones along the way, but it focuses on modern Royal 
Navy outsourcing, public private partnerships and privatisation: theoretically 
framing their evolution, development and relevance in the context of the 
‘compass of political economy’ and the shifting sands of governance. 
 
Whilst it is not within the remit of this study to suggest market-oriented 
arrangements could develop into a full-blown market (however defined) in 
naval sea power, it is methodologically important to review the ideas and 
writings of a collection of authors who have long promoted a world in which 
states are proactively hollowed out only to be replaced by societies based on 
idealised free markets. Informing an ideal type construct on markets in naval 
defence and security, their literature aids the development of a theoretically 
oppositional political economy to that of Weber’s nation-state monopoly and 
the world of ‘government’. Building on the framework of the compass of 
political economy presented in Chapter III, Chapter IV asserts that in terms of 
the research, it is only when an ‘ideal type’ opposite has been constructed 
concerning concepts of legitimate force and violence in political economy that 
robust strands of ideation can be analysed. Chapter IV makes the point that it 
is only by comparing and contrasting elite opinions towards an ‘ideal type’ 
NPM-market and an ideal type PA-state that the real boundaries of elite 
discourse surrounding contemporary perspectives on political economy, 
governance and legitimacy can be researched. 
 
In this context, Chapter IV provides a literature review of those free 
marketeers who champion private military demonopolisation, particularly in 
the area of naval defence and security. In so doing, it analyses the literature 
and ideas of the subject’s informers, who include: Gustave de Molinari, 
Herbert Spencer, Auberon Hebert, P. E. De Puydt, Benjamin Tucker, Murray 
Rothbard, David Friedman, Bruce L. Benson, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Brian 
Micklethwait and Ian Whitehouse. Providing an analysis of those authors who 
have long expounded private market provision in defence, security and naval 
sea power, it brings together for the first time, a body of knowledge that not 
only represents historic forms of discourse on the private production of force 
and violence, but, when it comes to the problematic dimensions of time, 
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economic complexity and socio-political power, juxtaposes and contributes 
conceptually to the research and data presented in Chapters V and VI. 
 
Chapter V reviews the methodology and presents the research that lies at the 
heart of the thesis. In comparing and contrasting elite opinions towards ideal 
type states and markets it not only presents the boundaries of elite discourse 
surrounding contemporary perspectives on legitimacy in political economy, 
but it provides a strong framework for empirical examination rooted in notions 
of market and state failure amongst British naval opinion formers. Focused on 
the question, ‘how do influential agents in and around Weber’s nation-state 
monopoly now conceptualise legitimacy in political economy and what are the 
implications for New Public Management theory?’, the research examines the 
attitudes of fifty elite opinion formers (as defined in section 5.2.6 below), 
involved with the discourse surrounding Royal Navy modernisation and the 
wider political economy of British naval sea power. In clarifying the boundaries 
of discourse surrounding notions of market and state failure in relevant areas 
of naval sea power and Royal Navy modernisation, it not only compares and 
contrasts elite opinions towards ‘ideal type’ NPM market and PA state models, 
but it provides original insights into the boundaries of discourse surrounding 
contemporary perspectives on legitimacy, governance and outcomes in the 
political economy of force and violence. The chapter also links its research 
findings to New Public Management theory and the wider world of public 
administration, management, decentering and governance. 
 
Whilst chapters II, III and IV explore the ideas, practice and theoretical 
constructs surrounding the private sector’s involvement in the production of 
British naval sea power, and make it clear that such involvement is no longer 
fanciful or illusory, Chapter V makes it clear that almost as if ‘returning to the 
future’, the Royal Navy and modern British naval sea power are once again 
increasingly reliant on forms of institutional nexus and governance that echo 
seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth century forms of political 
economy. At a time when the Royal Navy and British naval sea power finds 
itself at the cutting edge of a potential ‘hollowing out’ of the ‘core state’ 
through privatisation, policy networks, differentiation and decentering, the 
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research presented in this chapter not only clarifies boundaries of elite 
discourse but it builds the bridge to Chapter VI in which a powerful critique of 
NPM, PA and governance are presented with reference to the problematic 
dimensions of time, economic complexity and socio-political power. 
 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis by demonstrating that what might have been 
thought a fanciful idea to many only thirty years ago, the idea of major 
elements of British naval sea power becoming increasingly reliant on private 
sector investment, management and ownership, has now rapidly gained 
currency in contemporary opinion forming circles. Having located such 
developments in a broader historical, literary and research context, the 
chapter concludes the thesis by arguing that the production of British naval 
sea power oscillates over the centuries between the cyclical peaks and 
troughs of the commercial private market and the tax-funded world of public 
and private governance. It also argues that from an historical and ideational 
perspective, there is less that is genuinely ‘new’ in the so-called world of New 
Public Management, Public Administration and ‘governance’ than is often 
appreciated by their supporters and detractors.  
 
In presenting the opinions and attitudes of influential agents in and around 
one of Weber’s ideal type monopoly-state institutions, the study concludes 
that Royal Navy outsourcing, public private partnerships and privatisation are 
more powerfully viewed through the prism of ‘back to the future’, than any 
perspective that purports to suggest they represent a profound or 
revolutionary departure from historic forms of practice or thought. Through this 
study, we ultimately learn that what is happening in today’s Royal Navy is not 
only far from ‘new’ but that many of its elite opinion formers have already 
moved beyond early twentieth century notions of Weberian legitimation. To 
many directly involved in Royal Navy policy discourse, the modern democratic 
nation-state’s ‘quintessential function and signifier of being’ is no longer 
rooted in the certitudes of a democratically legitimated state monopoly. 
Instead, by progressively legitimating private sector action and involvement in 
the production of force and violence at sea, institutional actors in and around 
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the core state are clearly open to the ideas associated with varying degrees of 
its ‘hollowing out’ in favour of more differentiated and decentered approaches.  
 
The evidence for this is clear from the research. Rooted in a dynamic and 
complex economy, elite opinion formers in and around the Royal Navy 
increasingly find it difficult to distinguish between a world socio-politically 
legitimated by the ideal type constructs of voter-led public goods, and a world 
socio-economically legitimated by customer-led private goods. Under 
analysis, the seemingly opposed paradigms of the state and the market are 
perceived in terms of reflecting each other both in terms of consequences and 
outcomes.  
 
While today’s opinion formers believe ideal type state and market constructs 
ultimately lead to similar types of failure, success and outcome, they also 
believe that the traditional legitimating rubrics of the nation-state’s monopoly 
use of force no longer offer certitude in what they experience as an 
increasingly relativistic age of political economy, governance and legitimation. 
Neglectful of the complexities and symmetries across the dimensions of time, 
property rights and differentiated power, the study concludes that the NPM 
and the PA paradigms invariably underestimate the consequential similarities, 
for good and/or bad, of both systems consequential realities. While PA views 
government as the primary owner, driver and/or motivator of reform, and NPM 
stresses the market, this study has shown that both perspectives fail to 
adequately acknowledge the degree to which core statecraft and governance 
as defined by the production of force and violence is rarely, if ever, a matter 
for either an idealised ‘state’ or ‘free’ market. Instead, force and violence are 
invariably organised within a spectrum that compresses and conjoins varying 
degrees of differentiated and decentred governance with varying degrees of 
differentiated polity and market. 
 
It is in this context that government and governance, centralisation and de-
centralisation, unity and fragmentation, all denote constantly evolving, path 
dependent realities that not only speak volumes about the contingency of the 
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human condition but the limitations of the language of ‘the market’ and ‘the 
state’ in political economy. It is for reasons of complexity and similarity, that 
today’s opinion formers find it so difficult to articulate clear, consequential and 
epistemological differences between notions of market and state failure in 
areas of naval sea power and therefore specify and codify legitimacy in the 
political economy of force and violence. It is because each system ultimately 
mirrors the other in more profound and surprising ways than is popularly and 
linguistically recognised, that the Royal Navy once again finds itself 
modernising back to a future rooted in older forms of discourse in the areas of 
public management, administration and governance. A century on, we are all 
increasingly living with a highly corporatist and mixed political economy that 
Weber did not fully appreciate or foresee.  	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Chapter II  
From Weber to New Public Management Theory:  
The Relevance of the Private Sector to  
British Naval Sea Power and the Royal Navy 
 
 “Tomorrow’s serving officers and recruits may one day be part of a 
 different funding regime…I’m willing to bet that within twenty five years 
 there’ll be at least some form of semi-privatisation of the Armed 
 Forces. After all, it was mostly all private until the 17th century and 
 three hundred and fifty years isn’t long enough to establish an 
 unassailable precedent.” (Whitehouse, 2002a) 
 
“One of the reasons why the Dutch East India company flourishes, and 
 is become the richest and most powerful of all others we know of, is its 
 being absolute, and invested with a kind of sovereignty and 
 dominion…[it] makes peace and war at pleasure, and by its own 
 authority; administers justice to all; …settles colonies, builds 
 fortifications, levies troops, maintains numerous armies and garrisons, 
 fits out fleets, and coins money.” (Tracey, 1990: 196)  
 
 
This chapter outlines the study’s aims and objectives, explains the relevance 
of Royal Navy outsourcing, public/private partnerships and privatisation to 
Weber’s concept of the monopoly use of force, and locates Royal Navy 
modernisation within the theoretical framework of New Public Management 
theory and the wider context of privatisation, differentiated polities and the 
‘hollowing out of the state’. In detailing the transition from ‘government’ to a 
world of formal and informal policy networks and ‘governance’, it goes on to 
focus on the key issue of the temporal dimension and draws upon the history 
of privateering to inform its understanding of political economy in the 
production of naval sea power and notions of legitimation in the area of force 
and violence.   
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2.1 Background, Aims and Objectives 
 
This thesis critically examines Royal Navy outsourcing, public private 
partnerships and privatisation in the context of their implications for New 
Public Management Theory (NPM) (Hughes, 2003; Adams, 2000: 498-499; 
Barzelay, 1992; and Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). As a body of knowledge 
concerned with the efficient and effective delivery of public goods and 
services, the NPM paradigm suggests that when it comes to areas of critical 
infrastructure (electricity generation, gas production, telecommunications, 
water supply, agriculture, heating, public health, transportation, financial 
services, and defence and security), there are a host of private sector 
management tools, structures and incentives that should be examined by 
policy makers (Boston, et al., 1996).  
 
While the more traditional paradigm of Public Administration (PA) views 
government as being the inevitable product of disparate social and cultural 
forces (Terry, 1998: 194-200; Cohen and Eimicke, 1995: 96-108; Clay, 1994: 
236-252), it is the primary aim of this thesis to demonstrate that both these 
schools no longer provide adequate explanatory frameworks. For while they 
view government as the primary a priori driver and motivator of reform, it is 
the contention of this study that both these schools fail to adequately 
acknowledge the degree to which the core state, as defined by the politically 
legitimated monopoly use of force, is itself giving way to new settlements of 
political economy under the rubric of customer-led uses of force and that 
these developments have historical precedence that pre-date the modern 
democratic nation-state.  
 
At a time when the Royal Navy is at the cutting edge of reform, the research 
focuses on the complex issues of political economy involving the private 
production of naval sea power. Concentrating on the historic and 
contemporary evolution of Royal Navy political economy and governance, it 
not only presents an examination into the attitudes of elite opinion formers 
concerned directly with the discourse surrounding the service’s 
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modernisation, but it presents an empirical analysis of ideational political 
economy that charts a profound shift away from Weber’s conceptualisation of 
the modern nation state and its legitimate monopoly over the use of force 
(Weber, 1919).  
 
In addressing the ways in which elite opinion formers concerned with Royal 
Navy modernisation actually think about such economic notions as market 
and state failure in naval sea power, and what the political economy of public 
goods now mean to them, the study presents original data and research into 
the views of those who hold relevant, influential and key public policy 
positions in and around an institution of the core and democratic nation-state: 
the Royal Navy. It is in this context that the thesis contributes to knowledge 
because in clarifying the conceptual boundaries of elite discourse concerning 
political economy, it not only presents a critique of NPM, but it does so with 
reference to the problematic dimensions of time, economic complexity and 
socio-political power. Moreover, its originality and contribution to knowledge is 
enhanced by the fact that its data is derived from actors in and around a core 
institution of Weber’s ‘ideal type’ monopoly state. This is the first time that the 
opinions and discourse of those who actually oversee and influence naval 
policy have been explored in such a manner. Never before has the research 
question been put to such an audience: how do influential agents in and 
around Weber’s nation-state monopoly now conceptualise legitimacy in 
political economy and what are the implications for New Public Management 
theory? 
 
 
2.2 From Weber to a Changing World 
 
Since the time of Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, 2011), scholars have examined 
the role of force in statecraft. However, in the twentieth century it was Max 
Weber who argued that a monopoly on legitimate force and violence formed a 
central part of modern statehood. In ‘Economy and Society’ (Weber, 1922) 
Weber defined the state as the political organisation whose:  
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“Administrative staff successfully uphold the claim to the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its orders” 
(Weber, 1922: 29, translation). 
 
While this definition seems to be clear, for Weber, it has two separate 
elements. First, the use of force is not the sole means by which the modern 
state ‘realises its orders’. Instead, the monopoly of force represents the last 
resort, when all other means fail. Of all the social actors and institutions in a 
modern society, only the state is formally legitimated to use physical force as 
a ‘means’. For Weber therefore, all forms of non-state violence are ultimately 
illegitimate and can be prosecuted and punished according to statute 
(Milanes, 1999: 21-32).  
 
Second, Weber argues that there will only ever be varying degrees of 
monopoly for the state. Writing from an early twentieth century and European 
perspective, he argues that the state is only successful or effective in its claim 
to uphold its monopoly, so long as it does not ignore instances of violence, be 
they domestic, communal or engendered by a mafia. Therefore, to maintain 
its claim to monopoly, it is compelled to view every instance of violence as a 
challenge and as a threat. 
 
It is in this context that there exists an intimate relationship between the state 
and violence, what Clark terms an “essentialist relationship” (Clark, 2003: 
184). Yet, the corollary between the state and force is neither inherent nor 
automatic. For as Mandel points out: “the contemporary organisation of global 
violence is neither timeless nor natural. It is distinctly modern” (Mandel, 2000: 
3). While in previous centuries, the use of private armies, privateers and 
mercenaries were commonplace, it was only with the incidence and cessation 
of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), and the subsequent signing of the 
Peace Treaty of Westphalia, that the modern state system first emerged. In 
essence, modern statism is distinguished from earlier polities by the 
formalisation two key properties. First is the right to monopoly of force within a 
bounded space. Second is the concept of absolute sovereignty enabling 
territorial integrity and the right to non-intervention.  
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By the twentieth century, the institutionalisation of the state and this system 
established a clear division between legitimate and illegitimate forms of 
violence. This is the starting point from which Weber constructs his ‘ideal type’ 
conceptualisation of the modern nation-state and the basis upon which he 
asserts: “one can define the modern state only in terms of the specific means 
peculiar to it…namely the use of physical force” (Weber, 1946: 77). 
Significantly, Weber not only saw the state’s coercive capacities being a core 
property but also a core function of its being. 
 
It is through the state’s security shield from both ‘local racketeers and outside 
marauders’’ that it provides consolidation and performs its primary function(s). 
While Tilly (Tilly, 1987: 171) argues that the state first comes to be accepted 
because it provides an internal “security racket” for those under its jurisdiction, 
Weber argues that in modernity it is extended to encompass a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of force. For him, any re-emergence of private protection 
association represent a fundamental failure of the modern nation state as 
such organisations inherently undermine its “quintessential function and 
signifier of being” (Small, 2006: 12). 
 
Consonant with the Westminster model which displayed “strong cabinet 
government based on majority rule; the importance attached to constitutional 
conventions; a two-party system based on single member constituencies; the 
assumption that minorities can find expression in one of the major parties; the 
concept of Her Majesty’s loyal opposition; and the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy, which takes precedence over popular sovereignty except during 
elections” (Verney 1991: 637), today, a century on from Weber, numerous 
forces are arguably conspiring to create a complex range of challenges to the 
authority and legitimacy of the Weberian twentieth-century nation state (Small, 
2006). While new economic and security pressures are encouraging the 
unbundling of many of the state’s basic functions, so a growing range of 
private sector actors and groups are emerging in uneven and semi-legitimate 
ways. Finding it difficult to provide both international and domestic security as 
a public good, ‘core’ state institutions such as the Royal Navy are again 
 19 
partnering private sector investment, management and expertise in significant 
and often surprising ways. 
 
 
Fig.1. HMS Clyde the Royal Navy’s Falkland Island Patrol Ship. 
 
Today, a century on from Weber, and the Royal Navy’s recently 
commissioned Falkland Island’s patrol ship HMS Clyde (Fig.1) does not 
actually belong to the navy. Instead, it is leased from the private sector under 
a Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) contract (see Chapter III). This contract 
not only covers key aspects of maintenance and repair but it also makes 
provision for a proportion of the ship’s crew to remain private employees. 
  
Following the earlier contracting out of the Royal Navy’s three main dockyards 
(Portsmouth, Devonport and the Clyde) to the private sector (see Chapter III), 
in March 2008, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service (RMAS) was disbanded. 
Today, the private company Serco-Denholm delivers its services and vessels. 
As a result, the Royal Navy’s new Worldwide Support Ship (see Fig.2 below) 
is provided by the private sector.  
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Fig.2. SD Victoria the Navy’s Worldwide Support Ship. 
 
 
The largest of 29 vessels ordered by Serco Marine Services to support the 
naval service, ‘SD Victoria’ was built in Romania at a cost of £83m (Serco 
Marine, 2012). Today, it is used to support military exercises and training as 
part of Serco’s contract with the Ministry of Defence. 
 
Another major branch of the naval service, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), 
provides some of its largest vessels (Puddefoot, 2009). Together, the RFA 
flotilla includes an impressive array of supply, oil tanker and logistical landing 
ships as well as other specialised platforms. Yet recently, the government has 
been actively considering whether this part of the naval service should also be 
contracted out to the private sector (Lloyds List, 2010). Significantly, the 
RFA’s own reserve of six Point Class vessels has been privately owned and 
operated for the last ten years (Fig.3, below). Providing additional strategic 
transport for military cargoes under a 22-year charter, the Ministry of Defence 
procures these vessels from Foreland Shipping who continues to own, 
operate and crew them. When not required by the Ministry of Defence they 
are used as profitable merchantmen (Puddefoot, 2009). 
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Fig.3. MV Longstone Point. One of six Point Class ships that provide the 
RFA with its own privatised reserve.  
 
With an overall decline in the number of Royal Navy platforms and the rise of 
piracy in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, at the beginning of 2011, Lloyds 
of London took the dramatic step of announcing it was planning its own 
‘private fleet’ to protect commercial shipping in the world’s most dangerous 
waters (Costello, 2011). Under mounting pressure from commercial interests, 
in October 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron finally announced that in 
future ships sailing under a British flag would be able to carry private armed 
guards so as to protect vessels from pirates in certain parts of the world (BBC 
News, 30 October 2011).  
 
It is with these developments in mind that today’s Royal Navy increasingly 
relies on partnerships with private sector providers and works alongside a 
range of Private Military Firms (PMFs). Building on the contracting out and 
part-privatisation of naval sea power that now includes dockyards, naval 
auxiliaries and even front-line war ships, the production and financing of naval 
power is once again starting to echo the once seemingly bygone world of joint 
stock companies and privateering. As fleet servicing, catering, training and a 
host of other functions are progressively taken over by private contractors 
(see Chapter III), so historians point out that British naval sea power is 
increasingly rediscovering a political economy not so dissimilar from the 
privately sponsored mercantile and naval vessels of the sixteenth, 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Anderson and Gifford, 1991; Garitee, 
1977).  
 
The Royal Navy is important because in the early twenty-first century, the 
United Kingdom has a global expatriate community of more than 5 million 
people. Its citizens undertake more than 56 million visits abroad each year 
and the country is the sixth largest trading nation in the world (Office of 
National Statistics, 2012). As an island nation, the UK depends on maritime 
trade for its economic prosperity. In 2013, more than 95 per cent of the 
country’s economic trade by volume (580 million tonnes) traveled by sea 
(Royal Navy, 2013). With 10,500 miles of coastline, 600 ports and more than 
290 offshore oil and gas installations, the country’s reliance on imported gas 
is set to rise to 80 per cent of UK energy needs by 2020 (Royal Navy, 2013). 
In total, UK shipping contributes more than £10 billion a year to the country’s 
gross domestic product and almost £3 billion in tax revenues (First Sea Lord, 
2012: 7). As such, it is the UK’s fourth largest services sector industry.  
 
In the post-Soviet era the Royal Navy has continued to be one of the world’s 
most powerful ‘top five’ navies (First Sea Lord, 2012). Yet as politicians 
become ever more concerned with economic efficiency, so Britain’s military 
forces are coming under increasing pressure to innovatively extract value by 
streamlining structures and wherever possible, contract out services to the 
private sector. After more than thirty years of Royal Navy dockyard 
privatisation and outsourcing, and wholesale privatisation of a host of naval 
services, many opinion formers are now starting to favour the idea of key 
warships being leased from, and in part crewed by, the private sector 
(Labone, 2006). They also accept that under budgetary pressures, privately 
owned merchant vessels should make their own provision for key aspects of 
security when in some areas the world (BBC News, 30 October 2011). 
 
From a Weberian perspective such a shift in discourse is important because it 
represents an undermining of the modern democratic nation-state’s 
“quintessential function and signifier of being” (Small, 2006: 12). By 
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legitimating private sector action and involvement in the production of force 
the state is arguably undermining the core reason of its own existence. 
 
 
2.3 Theoretical Foundations of New Public Management  
 
Beyond the navy, the analysis of public administration has long considered 
questions of efficiency and effectiveness (Pollitt, 2003; Behn, 2001). Since the 
early 1990s, the literature of the New Public Management (NPM) school has 
argued that traditional public sector organisations should, whenever possible, 
be recast to emulate entrepreneurial businesses and that in adopting market-
based techniques will deliver enhanced performance (Hughes, 2003; Adams, 
2000: 498-499; Barzelay, 1992; and Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Critical of 
this approach are the more traditional Public Administration (PA) theorists 
(Terry, 1998; Cohen and Cimicke, 1995; and Clay, 1994) who hold that such 
approaches conflict with the natural role of government and the principles of 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
Over the past thirty years, the continuing shift of governmental responsibility 
to more market-based mechanisms and approaches, including privatisation 
and managed competition, remains at the forefront of public management 
reform in both academia and on the front line of policy. While Andrews and 
Moynihan (2002: 282-297) define privatisation as outsourcing or contracting a 
service to the private sector without allowing government organisations to 
compete, and they define managed competition as the establishment of 
competitive bidding processes for service provision between internal 
government providers and external private contractors, generally, the NPM 
paradigm purports to overcome the key problems popularly associated with 
government.  
 
For Pollitt these include low public confidence in bureaucracy, poor 
programme design, inefficiency and underperformance (Pollitt, 2003 pp 7-29). 
Moreover, for King, Stivers and Nank (1998), NPM aims to contend with a 
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continuing legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1975) whereby government is 
popularly perceived as being inherently wasteful and inefficient. In this 
context, NPM’s advocates argue that its functions and services must be more 
business like so as to bridge the disconnections between the state and the 
citizenry. To Hughes (2003), the NPM school contains two key arguments. 
First, the market is the most sophisticated allocator of scarce resources. 
Second, individuals are the best planners of their own welfare.  
 
Ultimately, it may be argued that NPM is the theoretical conjuncture of two 
strands of thought (Kaboolian, 1998; Hood, 1991). First, it is informed by new 
institutional economics, which is rooted in the paradigms of public choice 
theory and principal-agent theory. Derived from the work of Arrow (1963) and 
Niskanen’s work on bureaucracy (1971), institutional economics stresses 
competition, demonopolisation, consumer choice, market incentives and 
transparency. Also informed by the Austrian, Chicago and Virginia schools of 
thought, its advocates also believe it to be more epistemologically 
sophisticated than the traditional view of bureaucracy based on top down 
planning, formal hierarchies and the elimination of competitive duplication 
(Thompson and Jones, 1994; Ostrom, 1974).  
 
Second, NPM is informed by managerialism, which follows in the wake of 
scientific management (Hood, 1991: 3-19; Merkle, 1980). Stressing private 
sector management techniques, professional hands-on management and the 
numerical measurement of performance (Lynn, 1996), managers are 
recommended to have the incentives and freedom to function in the pursuit of 
measurable outputs. Crucially, public choice theorists reject the idea that 
government agents are neutral, all-knowing actors, and instead focus on 
notions of state failure. Arguing that a monopoly rooted in legislative favour 
will inherently lead to inefficiencies, public choice theorists argue that if 
contracting out and privatisation are embraced then market incentives will 
facilitate more responsive and efficient outcomes. 
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Principal-agent theorists focus on the issue of how to get a public servant (an 
agent) to act in the optimal interests of the citizenry as represented by elected 
officials (or principle). Concerned with the epistemological challenge that the 
agent often holds more expertise and information than the principal (not to 
mention different incentives), so agency, transaction, monitoring and 
compliance costs are all viewed as impeding efficient agent performance so 
as to ensure compliance with the desires of the principle. Emphasising the 
assumption that humans are economically rational, utility maximising agents 
(Buchanan, 1978), institutional economics holds that the market reduces 
transaction costs and rests on purposeful, goal-oriented action. For Kelly 
(1998: 201-209), one of the guiding principles of NPM is that administrators 
will act rationally to maximise their own choices and opportunities for 
perceived success. In this context, the public sector is composed of numerous 
principle-agent relationships both within and between entities. Moreover, the 
principle-agent paradigm suggests that administrative autonomy reduces 
democratic accountability, as officials are able to use their strategic position to 
adapt and change the plans of elected officials (Worsham, Eisner and 
Ringquist, 1997: 419-442). To principle-agent theorists, the key issue facing 
elected representatives is the requirement that their subordinates are focused 
on the goals of the citizen and not their own self-interested desires (Arrow, 
1985: 37-51).  
  
While DeLeon and Denhardt (2000) argue that the NPM school is increasingly 
permeating all areas traditionally associated with public administration, 
Eikenberry and Kluver (2004) assert that the public sector is now emulating 
the techniques and norms of the market and using it to inform public policy 
formulation, execution and management. This thesis, concerning public 
private partnerships and modernisation of the Royal Navy, not only illustrates 
this point but moreover, its research data highlights the extent to which it is 
now impacting on the inner most core of this nation’s statecraft: its naval 
defence. While the continued expansion and extension of NPM approaches 
(see sections 2.4 and 2.5 below) raise key questions for the advocates of 
public administration and all forms of good governance, its emphasis on 
business values and the economics of the market continue to be challenged 
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by numerous scholars. For example, Cohen and Eimicke (1997) point out that 
many public administration advocates are critical of NPM because they 
believe it underplays the importance of constitutional law in many areas of 
activity and the role of democracy. Such critics often argue that genuine 
entrepreneurs cannot be created in government, as market incentives cannot 
be substituted for statute law and such rubrics of legitimation as the 
redistribution of wealth and wider notions of societal and communal duty.  
 
While advocates of NPM want to encourage officials to take calculated risks 
using business strategies, opponents view such practices as an inappropriate 
challenge to democratic governance (Kelly 1998; Terry, 1998). Terry (1998) in 
particular, highlights an overt conflict between the protection of democratic 
legitimacy and market-oriented, competitively motivated, public sector 
entrepreneurs. He argues that such economistic managerial foundations 
merely encourage opportunistic, self-serving and, ultimately, deceitful 
managers and officials. Moreover, public administration advocates argue that 
the market-based model of NPM, with its emphasis on entrepreneurship and 
satisfying individual clients’ perceived self-interest is inconsonant with 
democratic citizenship and key notions of collective public interest. Crucially, 
the free market is also deemed to be amoral and therefore blind to the 
importance of social justice. Moe and Gilmour (1995) suggest that the market-
orientation of NPM rests on a fundamental miscategorisation rooted in the 
different legal foundations of the public and private sectors. Whereas 
business is inherently reliant upon contract and commercial law, the public 
sector is constrained by constitutional considerations and statutory duties. 
Similarly, Frederickson (1997) asserts that the goals and objectives of 
government and business are fundamentally incompatible, and that the 
axioms of private sector entrepreneurship often encourage perverse 
incentives and unethical behaviour. While Williams (2000) asserts that NPM 
often relies on conflicting advice reflected in heightened levels of ambiguity, 
Pollitt (2003) argues that request for performance evaluation and stakeholder 
engagement requires public sector entrepreneurs to be simultaneously 
creative and responsive, transparent and measured, and not to make any 
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decisions that could affect key groups without involving them in the decision 
makes process.  
 
Another critique of the NPM paradigm comes from the normative perspective 
of the Blacksburg school: occasionally referred to as the ‘Blacksburg 
Manifesto’. Arguing for the legitimation of a constitutionally based Public 
Administration, it stresses the concepts of social equity, broadening 
democratic participation in administration and warns against the drawbacks of 
what it perceives to be simplistic modes of positivism and pluralism (Evans 
and Wamsley, 1998). For the Blacksburg school, legitimacy of public 
organisations is founded in constitutional arrangements oriented around the 
agency perspective as the locus of public-spirited discourse. Individual 
morality is socially bound and often in part constructed by institutions that 
develop cultures that guide individual values and behaviour. They argue that 
institutional structures determine social outcomes and that atomistic personal 
responsibility is not enough to ensure the perpetuation of grounded values. As 
such, institutional responsibility is required and, so far as democratic 
government goes, it must take the public interest into account as a central 
tenet of governance.   
 
Standing in opposition to institutional economics, public choice theory and 
notions of marketisation, concern for the public interest is the key distinction 
that emerges between the public administration and business management 
perspectives. For the normative perspective of the Blacksburg school, public 
interest is the long-term ideal set within institutional boundaries of a continuing 
process. Critics of the normative perspective argue that under analysis there 
is no distinct contrast between the agency and the market. For White (1990), 
while the agency is merely the institutional container for the market overtime, 
Golembiewski (1991) argues that the normative perspective offers no practical 
sense of how to operationalise its axioms in the real world. Current views 
concerning decision-making in public administration can be traced back to the 
Wilsonian belief that public officials are able to engage in value-free decisions, 
concerned only with matters of technical expertise and implementation (Van 
Wart, 1998). It may be argued, however, that this has been replaced by more 
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sophisticated perspectives. For example Blanchard, Hinnant and Wong (1998: 
483-512) argue that modern market-based reforms represent a fundamental 
shift in the social contract between the state and individuals. Significantly, 
they refer to a “social subcontract” that now embraces citizens, government 
and the private sector. For them, market forces and state failure have 
fundamentally changed the relationship between citizens and the state and in 
so doing have blurred the notions of accountability and governance between 
citizens and customers (Blanchard et al., 1998: 483-512).  
 
 
2.4 New Public Management and the Theoretical Frameworks Around 
Privatisation, Public Private Partnerships and Outsourcing  
 
From the perspective of an analytical framework, NPM is mainly articulated 
through three distinct, yet occasionally overlapping, approaches to public 
policy. Away from nationalised, tax-funded, state owned organisations, 
privatisation involves the transference of an activity and its assets once 
owned and operated by the state sector to the private sector, through a sale, 
concession, or similar mechanism (Netter and Megginson, 2001: 321-389). 
Under privatisation, a government either eliminates direct control and 
ownership of function(s) and the delivery of service(s) (full privatisation), or it 
retains a degree of influence by holding some stock in the privatised firm. The 
intention of privatisation is that the day-to-day management, production and 
delivery of goods and services is left to private operators in a market and that 
government involvement is merely regulatory.  
 
Away from privatisation, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are popularly 
associated with those government reforms and functions that involve the 
private sector but which do not amount to a full-blown market approach. For 
example, the outsourcing of government functions, through transference to 
the private or not-for-profit sectors, is often aimed at achieving greater fiscal 
control and more efficient modes of delivery. In many ways, outsourcing is a 
manifestation of the classic make-or-buy decision and can include those key 
functions traditionally associated with government. As part of the NPM 
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paradigm, the presumption is that private vendors can provide public services 
more cheaply than government agencies (Savas, 2000), however, there is 
nothing intrinsic to outsourcing that necessarily requires partnership. Instead, 
PPPs reflect a particular and distinct mode of government acquisition, which 
contrasts with traditional forms of contracting out and outsourcing. Under a 
competitive, contracting-out approach, government dictates the terms and 
conditions for service production and delivery. A government agency as 
purchaser defines what it needs, specifies the desired product(s) and/or 
services, and issues the request-for-proposal which enables those in the 
private and/or not-profit sectors to bid for the work. Ultimately, vendors are 
invited to present proposals on the basis of public sector specifications.  
 
According to Cooper (Cooper, 2003), successful conventional contracting 
requires arm’s-length negotiations, transparency, clear specifications of the 
good(s) and/or service(s) being bought, and specific evaluation and 
performance criteria. Under this model, the public sector serves as the project 
manager or overseer, making sure the vendor supplies the goods and/or 
services promised in a timely and effective manner. The public–private 
interface is legally contractual, transparent and transactional. So far as there 
is a relationship, it is based on vendor compliance. Conflicts are resolved 
through contract renegotiations, dispute resolution and ultimately the court 
system.  
 
In contrast to outsourcing, under a PPP government defines the problem and, 
sometimes, specific performance indicators. Yet throughout there remains 
extensive interaction between the agency and potential private partners 
during pre- and post-award negotiations to determine how the goods and/or 
services might be provided. In PPPs, private operators are elevated to being 
full partners in determining the forms and approaches used to provide the 
specified quantity and quality of that which is required. Reliant on sound 
communications, respect and mutual trust, PPPs are characterised by three 
critical conceptions. First, the relationship between the relevant public and 
private sector organisation(s) has to be long term and denote more than a 
one-time relationship as might occur with conventional contracts. Second, the 
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private sector is involved from the outset in decision-making processes 
(concerning how best to provide a good and/or service) and not simply the 
production and delivery elements. Third, the relationship can involve a 
negotiated allocation of risk between the public and private sectors, and 
therefore ease the burden on government. PPP’s emergent themes take a 
variety of forms and can often involve areas more traditionally associated with 
government. Reflecting various degrees of private involvement, their formats 
can include: design, build, and operate; build, own, operate, and transfer; and 
design, build, finance, and operate (Hodge and Greve, 2005). From this 
viewpoint, PPPs reflect a unique relationship between government and private 
enterprise. While the government retains ultimate responsibility for the 
delivery of the good(s) and/or services, it becomes a partner with the private 
sector both in decision-making and delivery (Grimsey and Lewis 2004; 
Yescombe, 2007).  
 
In the UK the privatisation of public assets commenced in the 1980s under the 
government of Margaret Thatcher and have continued under all successive 
administrations. By 2001, 114 companies had been privatised with a total 
value of over £61bn (2001 values) and over the years the process of 
marketisation has been deepened and widened via the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), commenced under Major in 1992, and Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP): continued by the Blair and Brown administrations (Flynn, 
2007, 252-269). While privatisation has generally been promoted in the 
context of reducing the burden on the Treasury and ‘setting free’ reportedly 
over-staffed and under-capitalised industries, those utilities deemed to have a 
profile akin to natural monopolies have been subjected to statutory watchdogs 
and invariably complex regulatory regimes (Flynn, 2007).  
 
While such liberalising measures are sometimes equated with better 
performance, increased efficiency, greater accountability, increased access to 
capital, greater profitability, more wealth creation, and even eventual job 
creation, opponents of privatisation and ongoing marketisation argue that 
certain public goods and services should remain in the public sector so as to 
ensure accountability and that everyone in society has access to them. They 
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argue that there is a positive externality when government organises public 
goods and services, such as the production and enforcement of law and 
defence, and that although private companies might in time provide similar 
goods and/or services, they will be prone to corruption, lack accountability, 
undermine national security, cut essential services, concentrate wealth in the 
hands of a few, and increase unemployment and poverty (Dagdeviren, 2006, 
469-488). 
 
While the process of increased marketisation sometimes appears to be part of 
a broader global trend towards liberalisation and privatisation, under the early 
twentieth-century Weberian state: “One of the main reasons for establishing 
the old welfarist hierarchies was a perception of market failure in certain areas 
and the need for government to intervene. Their dismantling in recent 
decades was a result of the perception of government failure” (Massey and 
Pyper, 2005: 131). Indeed, while the process of marketisation has generally 
been promoted in terms of empowering citizens as consumers there is, as yet, 
no substantive evidence “to demonstrate that consumers are any more 
empowered under the new structures. There is no evidence to demonstrate 
that the new structures are necessarily more efficient, effective and dynamic” 
(Massey and Pyper, 2005: 131).  
 
Whilst NPM ultimately stresses hands on professional management, explicit 
standards, managing by results, value for money and, more recently, 
closeness to the customer, as a paradigm, it is generally articulated in terms 
of the ‘3Es’ of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. However, faced with 
hard questions, Hood and Dixon (2013: 114-34) argue that the overall 
evidential base for NPM is, in reality, riven by little more than assumptions 
and ‘soft facts’. Whilst Pollitt (1998: 54) argues that the empirical 
underpinnings of the claims for greater efficiency associated with NPM are far 
from complete, and in the latest edition of his and Bouckaert’s cross-national 
analysis of public management reforms they note that the “availability of 
evidence of efficiency gains is patchy and incomplete” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011: 140), Hood and Dixon conclude that when it comes to UK central 
government, there is as yet: “…little evidence of real running cost reductions 
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in the early NPM era” (Hood and Dixon, 2013: 114). They continue: 
“…contrary to stereotype, 1980s NPM…does not offer a model for the scale of 
administrative cost-cutting currently planned, and even the cutbacks of the 
1990s fell far short…The conclusion for the academic study of NPM is that 
something more than a minor revision of the received view of NPM as a cost-
cutting movement is needed…” (Hood and Dixon, 2013, 114).  
 
Given this reality check, critiques of NPM have tended to focus on three key 
strands of argumentation. First, some view NPM as a rent-seeking activity 
involving excessive reorganisation and costly management development 
(Wilson, 1980). Second, NPM is sometimes viewed as being more about 
ideology and rhetoric than any concrete or substantive process of cost 
reduction and efficiency (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Third, Dunleavy and 
Carrera (2011) argue that in concentrating managerial power, NPM has 
actually worked against the sort of effective service delivery and cost saving 
that could otherwise been drawn from the integrative and web-based 
applications of information technology.  
 
Whilst NPM has arguably delivered benefits to shareholders and some in 
society, and it has arguably facilitated more flexible and dynamic approaches 
to some forms of service delivery, it has notably done so in a period of 
increased relative poverty and social exclusion. Across the West, the wealth 
gap has widened. While the earnings of the average US chief executive has 
increased from forty-two times as much as the average manual worker in 
1980, to 660 times by 2007 (Toynbee and Walker, 2008, 44), so the capacity 
of markets to materially and conditionally include and liberate all in society 
remains a moot point. That said, in the area of defence, whilst early National 
Audit Office (NAO) reports often detailed criticisms of costly military projects 
that had overrun both in terms of time and money, more recently, the NAO 
has stressed benefits in terms of value for money, price certainty, and the 
timely delivery of good quality assets for many projects (Massey and Pyper, 
2005, 117).  
 
 33 
When it comes to the overall mapping the changing landscape of public 
management reform over the last three decades, Alford and Flyn (Alford and 
Flyn, 2013) argue that government has played both a smaller and a larger role 
in society. The public sector is smaller in that it is “now an established truth 
that public services can be delivered by a wide array of parties external to 
given public sector organisations” (Alford and Flyn, 2013: 5). Paradoxically, 
the more government “surrenders the role of producing public services to 
external parties, the more its role expands in other respects” (Alford and Flyn, 
2013: 5). For them, this is because “public agencies need to interact with 
those external entities to elicit their productive contributions” and that this 
interaction occurs through a wide variety of mechanisms, including: 
 
“…contracting, partnering, education, persuasion, incentives, 
subsidies, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulation, and enhancing service 
information and convenience – which together have important 
implications for policy making and management”. (Alford and Flyn, 
2013: 6)  
 
Whilst NPM encompasses several varieties of public sector reform that 
embrace privatisation, marketisation, corporate management, regulation and 
decentralisation, its main contextual and institutional drivers are popularly 
deemed to be globalisation, the World Bank and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Rhodes, 1997). Alan 
Murray (Murray, 1997: 51-61) characterises the main justifications of 
privatisation in the following terms. First, ‘fiscal impact’ arguments suggest 
that divestiture will help cut government expenditure and restore budgetary 
balance. Second, ‘efficiency gains’ are thought to accrue in terms of allocative 
efficiency, productive efficiency and that if this line of reasoning is accepted 
then inefficiencies may arise specifically from public intervention in one part of 
an economy yet adversely impact another, in which case privatisation may 
reduce distortions via ‘non market’ efficiency gains.  
 
Whilst non-economic factors limiting privatisation may include political and 
labour resistance, arguments surrounding welfare, the need for political 
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accountability and centralised decision making, for Wise (Wise, 2002: 555-
567), key competing drivers of public management reform beyond the purview 
of NPM include: “demands for greater social equity, humanization and 
democratization and empowerment” (Wise, 2002: 556). While these drivers of 
reform are often difficult to disentangle from each other they nevertheless 
conjoin in terms of effect. As normative drivers of administrative reform 
connect with rising expectations, and a range of broad social changes, social 
equity is advanced by policies, agreements, and laws that promote fair 
treatment and prohibit discrimination (Rawls, 1971). In promoting tolerance, 
diversity and greater inclusion these approaches are also tied to greater 
degrees of democratization and individual empowerment. The belief that 
organisations benefit from greater employee participation and less from the 
deployment of patriarchal and hierarchical management practices is also 
consonant with the “elimination of layering, more informal coordination within 
organisations, less reliance on the authority of command, and greater efforts 
to involve staff in the identification of organisational goals and objectives” 
(Wise, 2002: 557-8). 
 
Although NPM became a global phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s (Bevir, 
Rhodes and Weller, 2003: 1-17) and was set as a formal policy goal by 
international organisations like the OECD and the World Bank (OECD, 1995; 
World Bank, 1992), NPM practices were not only extensively institutionalised 
in many advanced countries (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinker, 2005: 
467-494), but arguably they contributed to the modernisation of their 
respective public sectors (Lapsley, 2009). However, as was made clear by 
Lynn and Hill in 2008 (Lynn and Hill, 2008), NPM is still far from being 
universally accepted and, in reality, there is only a partial convergence when it 
comes to practice (Lynn and Hill, 2008). 
 
Although NPM encapsulates an overall description of the way(s) in which 
public sector bodies bring their management, reporting and accounting 
approaches closer to business methods (Pollitt 1993; Dunleavy and Hood, 
1994), and it offers an influential set of management techniques that draw on 
private sector performance practices (Lapsley, 2009), Hood (1991) argues 
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that NPM was also born of four key administrative trends. First are 
government attempts to slow down or reverse growth in terms of public 
spending and staffing (Dunsire and Hood, 1989). Second is the shift towards 
privatisation, and quasi-privatisation, and a general move away from core 
government institutions (Dunleavy, 1989). Third is the development of 
information technology in the production and distribution of public services 
(Theakston, 1995). Fourth is the development of a more international and 
globalised agenda (Hood, 1991). Whilst Hood (1991) stresses the importance 
of new institutional economics (and its key ideas of contestability, user choice, 
transparency and incentive structures), and he highlights the movement 
towards more business type managerialism across much of the public sector 
(also see Pollitt, 1993), after two decades of dominance by NPM, it has 
become clear that there is increasing dissatisfaction with its somewhat limited 
and narrow focus (Lapsley, 2009).  
 
Whilst Lapsley (2009) states that NPM continues to make a positive 
contribution in some European and developing countries, other literature 
focuses increasingly on NPM’s failings and presents alternatives (Duvleavy, 
Margetts, Bastow and Tinker, 2005; Osborne, 2006; Dunn and Miller, 2007). 
Duvleavy et al., (2005) argue that the torch of leading edge change has 
already passed from NPM and that it will not return. They examine NPM from 
three different subtexts: disaggregation, competition and incentivisation and 
state that these themes have often been reversed as, in reality, they led to 
policy failures and unintended consequences (also see Pollitt, 2003). Osborne 
(2006) criticises NPM for its intra-governmental focus in an increasingly plural 
world and for its dependability on the application of outdated private sector 
techniques. Osborne suggests that NPM places too much emphasis on 
service inputs and outputs as opposed to service processes and outcomes.  
 
Although NPM arguably focuses on improving management functions by 
introducing new form of managerialism (Dunn and Miller 2007), Osborne and 
Plastrik argue that it nevertheless neglects wider governmental, political, and 
socio-cultural realities (Osborne and Plastrik, 2000). Similarly, Stoker (2006) 
argues that NPM seeks to confine politics to the role of initial input into the 
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system(s) of management and act as the final judge, whilst politics should be 
seen as a process that breathes life into wider processes (Moore, 1995; 
Smith, 2003).  
 
 
2.5 The Hollowing Out of the State? The Rise of Governance, Policy 
Networks and a Differentiated Polity  
 
In his article, ‘The Hollowing Out of the State’, Rhodes writes that: “The 
phrase “the hollowing out of the state” suggests that the British state is being 
eroded or eaten away” (Rhodes, 1994: 138). In an ‘avowedly speculative’ 
effort to make sense of such a notion, he notes that whilst things ‘erode’ from 
the outside, they can also ‘hollow’ from within. Viewed from his perspective, 
the hollowing out thesis primarily concerns a fundamental erosion of the 
centre of the state’s core. While it is not necessary to debate the tensions 
between the idea of a hollow state versus a hollow core, since the hollow 
state by definition implies a state with a hollow core, it is important to note that 
while de jure political power may still remain with a nation state, its capacity to 
project and utilise its de facto power can become significantly weakened. 
Although this may in part be due to internationalisation and risks emerging 
from the global environment, and some state capacities can be transferred to 
pan-regional, plurinational, or international bodies with broadening powers, 
other state capacities can be transferred to restructured local and/or regional 
levels of governance while others are taken over by emerging horizontal 
networks of power that by-pass central states: instead connecting localities 
and regions in several nations.  
 
While Rhode’s (1994) work on the internal or domestic front identified the 
development of a multiplicity of alternative delivery systems including 
executive and arms length agencies and their impact on the fragmentation 
and increased complexity of British government, his work also sought to 
clarify the looming threats of what he termed ‘policy catastrophe’. In 
highlighting the limitations of discretion for public servants through 
privatisation and NPM, a range of unintended consequences and outcomes 
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were identified. Whilst fragmentation was deemed to foster inefficiency 
through overlapping functions that obscure lines of accountability, complexity 
was said to compound the problem. Ultimately, the loss of accountability is 
likely to result in a further loss of political control at the centre. 
 
In the context of NPM and public administration, the term ‘governance’ is 
increasingly used to denote new processes of governing and/or changed 
conditions of orderly rule over and above the simplicities of the traditional 
Westminster model (mentioned above). In delineating an approach to reform 
that stresses self-organisation and inter-organisational networks, the concept 
of ‘governance’ broadens the traditional concept of government to include a 
multiplicity of non-state actors. Shifting the state’s boundaries to include the 
private and voluntary sectors, the state’s perimeters are increasingly opaque 
and blurred. Its need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes 
demand ongoing interactions between network members. Requiring trust and 
rules to be negotiated and agreed by participants, relationships are 
increasingly characterised by game-like interactions. Increasingly non-
accountable to the nation-state but an array of other stakeholders often cited 
in civil society, these networks become to some extent self-organising and 
semi-autonomous. With the nation state no longer occupying a preeminently 
privileged, unitary and simplistically sovereign role, Rhodes argues that it can 
only indirectly and inexactly guide increasingly powerful networks of actors 
(Rhodes, 1997: Chapter 3). 
 
In characterising the world of governance, Smith and Rhodes (Smith & 
Rhodes, 2001) argue that the Westminster system has already substantially 
transitioned from Weberian bureaucracy to self-organising policy networks 
and practitioners. Whilst the bureaucratic state displayed high degrees of 
legitimacy and control to undertake large-scale interventions in society 
through policies such as nationalisation, governance embraces a political 
economy rooted in the organisational principles of privatisation, 
decentralisation, delayering and empowerment. As such, governance points 
towards a tendency to guide the overall direction of policy rather than 
proscriptively specify or control it in detail. From this perspective, whilst all 
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governments confront an array of vested interests, and their aggregation is a 
functional prerequisite of statecraft, powerful networks of policy formulation 
and implementation represent more of an oligopoly in the political market 
place.  
 
Policy networks are important because they limit participation in the policy 
process. They also help to define the role of actors; decide which issues will 
be included and excluded from the policy agenda; define the rules of the 
game; shape the behaviour of actors; privilege certain interests by according 
them access and favouring their preferred policy outcomes, and; they 
substitute private government for public accountability. In extremis, this 
reformation of the scope and form of public administration and management 
to encompass privatisation and the transfer of functions to new service 
delivery networks, not only reduces the capacity of the centre to control, steer 
and guide policy (Rhodes, 1997), but ultimately it can be thought of as 
representing modes of operation that proactively contribute to the hollowing-
out of the twentieth century Weberian state. 
 
Whilst since 1979, government policy arguably fragmented service delivery 
and shifted control from front-line, top-down, bureaucracy to diffuse networks 
across the public, private and voluntary sectors, so the shift from government 
to governance and from bureaucracy to diffuse networks in and around civil 
and commercial society becomes increasingly clear. In a drive to deliver 
greater political and economic efficiency, large swathes of the traditional 
public sector has not only embraced numerous and significant market based 
reforms, but politically, the notion of governance is itself challenging the idea 
of Britain as a unitary state with a strong, centralising executive.  
 
Whilst early twenty-first century Britain can increasingly be viewed as a 
differentiated polity in which a complex maze of institutions gain varying 
degrees of functional autonomy, what is not clear however, is the extent to 
which such practices are truly and profoundly new, particularly when one 
considers the Royal Navy; an organisation that in terms of its political 
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economy traces its institutional and organisational roots back over a thousand 
years. 
 
 
 
2.6 Neglect of Time  
 
In 2004, Paul Pierson published his book, Politics in Time (Pierson, 2004), in 
which he argues that the social and political sciences have become 
‘decontextualized’. Arguing that they neglect an explicit theoretical treatment 
of the temporal dimension, Pierson echoes the work of scholars in sociology 
(Abbott 1997, 2001), comparative history (Thelen 2003) and political science 
(Goodin and Tilly 2006). It was the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm who 
made a similar assertion when in 1998 he wrote: 
 
“Modern social science, policymaking and planning have pursued a 
model of scientism and technical manipulation which systematically, 
and deliberately, neglects human, and above all historical, experience 
(Hobsbawm 1998: 36).”  
 
For Pierson, the neglect of time is primarily rooted in the influence of rational 
choice theories. Centered on notions of rational, utility maximising agents, 
such approaches are either context free or very limited in scope. The charge 
is that their authors assume that the model of the rational maximiser apply 
everywhere and at all times. 
 
For Christopher Pollitt in his book, Time, Policy, Management: Governing with 
the Past (2008), what Pierson says of the political and social sciences is also 
true of the public administration and public management paradigms:  
 
“The most important of these [decontextualising trends] has probably 
been the influence of generic management theories purveyed by the 
business schools, management consultancies and management 
gurus.” (Pollitt, 2008: 8) 
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Varone (2001) argues that the NPM paradigm has led to the replacement of 
longer-term administrative perspectives on time by shorter-term political 
incentives. Indeed, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s head of public service Delivery 
Unit, Sir Michael Barber, commented that when it comes to UK public 
services, “A week may be a long time in politics but five years is unbelievably 
short” (Barber, 2007: 193). In analysing the major literature across 
management theory, organisational theory, public administration and even 
public policy, Pollitt concludes: 
 
“…knowledge of how things were done in the past seems increasingly 
irrelevant….The past is left a closed, and by implication an 
uninteresting and irrelevant book.” (Pollitt, 2008: 9 and 10). 
 
From a public policy perspective, the point about a closed past is nowhere 
more poignant than in the context of the Royal Navy: an organisation that 
traces its roots a thousand years to the Saxon fleet. To ignore its history, 
evolution and policy paths is to deny a temporal dimension that can not only 
inform the present but also potentially recast the future.   
 
 
2.7 Navigating Timeships 
 
Overall, the temporal dimension in academia is essentially articulated through 
six iterations, to which we now briefly turn. First, are the traditional 
approaches to history. While McDonald argues that historians are: “historically 
self-conscious analysts reconstructing fully contextualised accounts and 
representing them in a theoretically sophisticated narrative that takes 
accounts of multiple causes and effects” (McDonald, 1996: 10), it is arguable 
that such history sets its sights on nothing more than the production of an 
accurate, credible and coherent story: 
 
“What is sought is not the testing of an elegant hypothesis drawn from a 
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general theory about how society works but rather a highly specific and 
contextualized explanatory story which allows us to understand how this 
particular set of events came about.” (Pollitt, 2008: 33) 
 
Other historians insist on borrowing ‘covering laws’ from the social sciences 
and attempt to articulate overarching theories of how society has developed 
and where it might be going. On these, Sewell points out that such: 
 
“A teleological explanation is the attribution of the cause of a historical 
happening neither to the actions and reactions that constitute the 
happening nor to concrete and specifiable conditions that shape or 
constrain the actions and reactions but rather to abstract transhistorical 
processes leading to some future historical state. Events in some 
historical present, in other words, are actually explained by events in the 
future. Such explanatory strategies, however fallacious, are surprisingly 
common in recent sociological writing and are far from rare in the works 
of social historians”. (Sewell, 1996: 247) 
 
Some historians shun theory and grand narratives instead preferring to focus 
on the indexical and unique for its own sake. Biographers often approach 
history in this manner, focusing on agency and prominent individuals. 
Nowadays, however, while the most grandiose and deterministic of rules 
governing epochs might be resisted, historians are generally open to explore 
trends, concepts and patterns. The notion that each event is unique and 
cannot be classified alongside others is no longer acceptable. 
 
The second approach to time is the path dependency (PD) framework. 
Following Kingdon’s seminal work, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies 
(Kingdon, 1995), PD explores the durability of systems, policies and 
organisations over long periods of time; despite changing environments. 
Moreover, according to Pollitt: 
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“PD offers something beyond the usual incrementalist models by 
drawing attention to the possibility of sudden, rapid moments of change 
– “punctuations” set in longer sentences of relative continuity (‘paths’)” 
(Pollitt, 2008: 42). 
 
Ultimately, PD highlights the discontinuous, non-linear change that 
contemporary complexity theorists and Austrian school economists (see 
Chapter IV below) stress: the Austrians believing economics to be a 
praxeological discipline rooted in free will and human action, not mathematics 
and the narrowly deterministic world of computer aided modeling. Hence, like 
the Austrian school, PD theorists emphasise the indexicality of context, 
including the dimensions of time, space and task (Abbott 2001, Pierson 2004). 
 
In recent years, another attraction of PD has been its concern with some of 
the continuities in public sector life, as set against the political rhetoric and 
positioning of ‘modernisation’ and the ‘new’ (Moran, 2003). Significantly, PD: 
 
“…is neither a framework, nor a theory, nor a model…[It is] an empirical 
category, an organising concept…Path dependent processes, even 
when identified require theorizing” (Kay, 2005: 554).   
 
Therefore, PD is not a theory; instead, it offers a set of concepts and ways in 
which change can be viewed.  
 
When it comes to the mechanisms of stability and change, some authors 
focus on economic concepts such as increasing costs, sunk costs, 
investments and disinvestments in administrative infrastructure, and policies 
that benefit key interest groups (Kay, 2005). Moreover, the formal and/or 
informal building of contracts with individuals further widens and lengthens the 
mechanisms of PD. They might be utilitarian and functional, and/or political 
and cultural in nature (Thelen, 2003: 218). They might also be material and/or 
ideational. Overall: 
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“They range from fairly crude calculations of short term profit to ‘softer’, 
longer run processes of socialization into a particular institutional 
environment. In this sense PD is…very open-ended.” (Pollitt, 2008: 44) 
 
Whether explicitly or implicitly, all PD authors allow for incremental changes 
within ‘path’ whilst focusing on major changes that are expected to occur at 
longer and irregular intervals: variously termed in the literature ‘punctuations’ 
and/or ‘critical junctures’. 
 
The third approach to time comes from those theorists who concentrate on 
cycles or alterations in administrative fashion. While the advocates of path 
dependency view time as being sequential, cycle theorists such as Stephen 
Jay Gould (Gould, 1988) believe some environments, such as deep geological 
time, are more powerfully examined through the prism of cycles and/or the 
concept of oscillation. While some writers in public policy and management 
use the idea of cycles and alterations (Davis et al, 1999; Talbot and Johnson, 
2007; Marcussen, 2007), to Gould, they fail to provide explanations rooted in 
clearly identifiable mechanisms and laws. Perhaps the most widely used 
notion of cycling concerns the electoral sphere of politics (Schultz, 1995). In a 
strong majoritarian system such as the United Kingdom’s, it is widely held that 
the time in a cycle to introduce radical and unpopular policies is at the 
beginning where the unpopularity can be dissipated over time.   
 
In the organisational setting, Tichy (1980) argues that there are three basic 
cycles that are inexorably tied to three central problems. These are: 
 
1. The technical design problem: how to arrange efficient production. 
2. The political allocation problem: how to distribute resources and    
power. 
3. The cultural and ideology problem: how to maintain and reinforce       
the normative glue that holds the organisation together. 
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For Tichy, none of these problems are ever fully resolved. Adjustments are 
always required with peaks and troughs occurring that denote varying 
degrees of organisational difficulty. It is when problems simultaneously occur 
in all these areas that an organisation faces a fundamental and systemic 
crisis. 
 
The fourth approach to time comes from sociological studies of time and 
management. For sociologists, notions of time are constructed by cultural and 
social contexts. Viewing time(s) as having different functions for different 
interests which “use their own forms of time as instruments with which to seek 
their own purposes” (Pollitt, 2008: 59), it soon becomes clear that the 
invention of the watch or the digital revolution adds a further twist to the realm 
of competition. In the age of global real time communication we arguably have 
supercompressed time: 
 
“At the very least, the handling of temporal complexity involves the 
following: the electronically networked temporality (instaneity, 
simultaneity, immediacy, real-time interactions, non-sequential and non-
linear discontinuous processes), which is combined with clock time 
(externalized, invariable, decontextualised, spatial, quantitative, linear 
and sequential), which, in turn, is superimposed on the time of living and 
social processes (embodied, system specific, contextual, irreversible).” 
(Adam et al, 2002: 19) 
 
In the book on organisational cultures, Cultural Consequences, Hofstede 
(2001) argues that long versus short term orientation is one of the key six 
dimensions of culture. Significantly, he concludes that on this dimension East 
Asian countries tend to have a much stronger orientation to the longer-term 
than Western countries do (Hofstede, 2001: 351-72). While in Helga 
Nowotny’s book, Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience, the clock 
established its dominance during the early machine age, more recent 
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developments have delivered a world built on what she calls an ‘extended 
present’. Described as processes through which the present eats up much of 
the future as well as some of the past (Nowotny 1994), the future is argued to 
be a broadly defined space within which the idea that progress and utopias 
can be constructed has given way to a more problematic and dangerous 
future in which control has to be exerted by planning ahead ‘now’. The 
common problems cited include new epidemics, terrorist attacks, economic 
problems, and the impact that changing demographics will have on welfare (to 
name but a few): 
 
“The future has become more realistic, not least because the horizon of 
planning has been extended…The invocation of the future, in the name 
of which political action was justified for a long time, had to be reduced 
and at least partly transferred to the present”. (Nowotny, 1994: 50). 
 
In terms of the study of public policy and management, Nowotny identifies 
time as a strategic tool and an instrument of power. While the powerful keep 
the powerless waiting, “career officials can fight an unpopular order or change 
with the oldest and most lethal weapon in the arsenal of public bureaucracy: 
delay” (Warwick, 1975: 68).  
 
The fifth approach to time comes from the paradigms of organisational 
evolution and ecology. Primarily concerned with the key questions of 
organisational mortality and survival, explanations are located within 
frameworks from which outcomes emerge through logically inter-connected 
and temporally bound sequences and events. Through this prism, 
organisations are viewed in terms of ecological interaction and replication 
(Baum and Singh 1994). Organisations not only interact with their 
environments (including other organisations) but they attempt to preserve, 
enhance and pass on information. One of the interesting findings common to 
a number of evolutionary analyses is that inefficient and/or adaptive 
organisations do not necessarily fade away and terminate after long periods 
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of time. Instead, the specter of the permanently failing organisation is raised:  
 
“Whereas mortality tends to decline with age for broad classes of 
organizations – old organizations are less likely to die than are young 
ones – what little evidence there is suggests that performance does not 
improve correspondingly with age” (Meyer and Zucker, 1989: 14).  
 
For Meyer and Zucker, permanently failing organisations have invariably been 
captured by their own managers and workers and are no longer being run for 
the benefit of owners and/or wider society. From this perspective, public 
sector organisations are viewed as being particularly vulnerable when 
compared against market-based organisations: 
 
“The public sector is different. As often as not public sector objectives 
are ill-defined and interests in and around public organizations are 
divergent from the outset. Public organizations, therefore, carry from 
their beginnings many of the liabilities that emerge only much later, if at 
all, in private firms”. (Meyer and Zucker, 1989: 136)  
 
The sixth and final approach to time comes from cognitive processes and 
relates to the biases of decision makers. A much more psychologistic and 
individualist approach than the others cited above, what its theorists tell us is 
that most of us, most of the time, make decisions that we believe ‘at the time’ 
to be a rational. Revealing biases, cognitive constraints and the inevitability of 
error, proponents also emphasise a strong temporal dimension. While one of 
the most frequently cited cognitive constraints is ‘limited time’ (Hammond, 
1996: 303), two of the most frequently cited biases are ‘availability’ and 
‘hindsight’. Typically, the phenomena identified are things that have happened 
recently and/or are emotionally salient. In short, the closer we examine stasis 
or change, the more important the foibles, biases and ex-post facto-
rationalisations become.  
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While these six timeships each stress different approaches it is possible to 
imagine them working in varying degrees of combination. Just as paths and 
cycles can co-exist, so Joseph Shumpeter believed history could also be the 
friend of theory (Shumpeter, 1949). Today, for example, there is no reason 
why historians and social scientists should not borrow from the PD framework 
in order to examine constancies and turning points in their explanations. For 
as Buthe concludes: 
 
“Social scientists interested in explaining historical processes can, 
indeed should, refuse the choice between modeling causal relationships 
and studying history…Narratives as a way of presenting empirical 
information, have distinctive strengths that make them especially suited 
for historical scholarship, and structuring the narratives based on the 
model allows us to treat them as data on which to test the model.” 
(Buthe, 2002: 481) 
 
Although some contemporary policy makers occasionally suggest that the 
privatisation and contracting out of key aspects of national defence might lead 
to greater efficiency, in reality, most military forces around the world remain 
near-complete government monopolies. As in the case of lighthouses, modern 
politicians and academics popularly cite defence as an illustration of the need 
for government provision. However, for Gary Anderson and Adam Gifford: 
“…just as in the case of lighthouses, the “monopolization” of military force 
production by the government is a fairly recent historical trend. During 
wartime, nations have long depended on hired private contractors for a 
portion of their military might” (Anderson & Gifford, 1981: 100). Echoing 
Pollitt’s point that what is often taken to be new and unique in public policy is 
actually bound by a multiplicity of temporal dimensions, Anderson and Gifford 
point out that: “At sea, until the 19th century, a significant portion of the naval 
power of many countries was provided by privateers.” (Anderson & Gifford, 
1981: 100) It is to this important and frequently overlooked history of 
governance that this thesis now turns. 
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2.8 Privateers and the History of Privately Produced Naval Power 
 
Privateers were privately owned and operated vessels that were granted state 
license to capture ships that belonged to the citizens of enemy states. They 
significantly benefited their hosts by curtailing the seaborne trade and 
communications of adversaries. In aiming to sell captured ‘prizes’ at auction 
privateers were often important determinants in the outcomes of conflict. The 
history of privateers goes back to the Middle Ages. According to Donald Petrie 
they were originally a means by which a citizen of one nation who had been 
victimized by that of another could achieve restitution for losses (Petrie, 1999: 
2-3). Armed with a permit issued by government, a defendant could arm a 
ship and go hunting for merchant vessels flying the flag of the original 
protagonist.  
 
Sechrest argues, in his paper ‘Privateering and National Defense: Naval 
Warfare for Private Profit’, the first permit – known as a letter of marquee and 
reprisal – was issued in twelfth century Tuscany (Sechrest, 2001: 6). But by 
the end of the fourteenth century they had spread to common usage the 
length and breadth of the Mediterranean. According to Jerome Garitee 
(Garitee, 1977: 5), the use of letters of marquee and reprisal in England can 
be traced back to 1243. Although initiated as a system for managing private 
restitution on the oceans of the world, privateering soon evolved into an 
instrument of war. Indeed, Elizabethan England was said to have been: 
“Almost totally dependent upon the private initiative and individual enterprise 
of its privateering establishment.” (Garitee, 1977: 5). While some naval 
historians and policy makers seek to downplay the impact that privateers had 
on history and governance, instead preferring to dwell on the deeds of publicly 
funded navies, the reality is that their contribution was often remarkable. For 
example, the American colonies of Britain commissioned 113 privateers 
during the war of 1744-1748. Again, they commissioned between 400-500 
privateers during the Seven Years’ War of 1756-1763 (Garitee, 1977: 7-8). 
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During the American Revolution both sides employed sizeable numbers of 
privateers. Despite the British having a large state-funded Royal Navy, the 
government nevertheless commissioned more than 700 privateers. According 
to Gomer Williams, 94 of these ships were built in Liverpool alone (Williams, 
1966: 257, 667-669). On the American secessionist side more than 800 ships 
went to sea in search of prizes (Stivers, 1975: 29). Similarly, the war of 1812 
saw 526 American privateers commissioned although according to naval 
historian Faye M. Kert only half this number actually set sail (Kert, 1997: 78-
89). In 1812 Thomas Jefferson underlined the significance of privateers when 
he asserted that: 
 
 “Every possible encouragement should be given to privateering in time 
 of war with a commercial nation…Our national ships are too few in 
 number…to retaliate the acts of the enemy…by licensing private armed 
 vessels, the whole naval force of the nation is truly brought to bear on 
 the foe.” (Williams, 1966: 459) 
 
For Kert, American privateers had a determining impact on the course of the 
war. She concludes: “Without the presence of the American privateers in the 
Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, the United States would never have 
been able to hold off the British Navy.” (Kert, 1997: 81) Again countering 
those commentators who tend to accentuate the statist history of formal naval 
forces, Anderson and Gifford have argued that during the period of West 
European history between 1600-1815 privateers: “Probably contributed much 
more than warships to the actual harm done the enemy.” (Anderson & Gifford, 
1981: 101). For Anderson and Gifford privateering essentially arose in 
Western Europe when the various nations of the region found themselves 
unable to maintain tax-funded navies beyond a negligible size. When at war 
they discovered that the most efficient option was to engage private ship 
owners and provide them with the sizeable incentives for the capture of 
prizes.  
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While a primary objective of war at sea is the disruption and eradication of an 
enemy’s maritime capability, for centuries this task has been accomplished 
with the full support of the private maritime sector. For even: 
 
 “…as late as the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
 Wars, the British Navy – the strongest navy in the world – could not 
 have maintained the blockade of France and her colonies without the 
 help of privateers…In several important ways during the period in 
 question, privateering vessels far outnumbered the official “navies” of 
 warring countries...” (Anderson & Gifford, 1981: 102) 
 
Employed to disrupt the ocean-going trade and military supplies of opposing 
nations, the damage privateers wrought on enemies was often substantial. 
For example, between 1688 and 1697 England reportedly lost 4,000 vessels 
to French action and most of these were seized by privateers (Anderson & 
Gifford, 1981: 102). Again, according to John Brewer, during the Spanish war 
of Succession 1701-1713, England lost more than 3,200 merchant ships: the 
overwhelming majority of which were lost to the actions of privateers (Brewer, 
1989: 197).  
 
While the owners of privateers tended not to sail with their ships they 
invariably deployed a share agreement in their contractual relationship with 
their captains, crews and the relevant licensing government. As such, 
captains and crews were given shares of the value of the prizes captured.  
During wartime, normal opportunities for commerce and trade invariably 
diminished. As such, the incentive for merchants and ship owners to maintain 
their prosperity through privateering increased with time. Garitee points out 
that as a result of the British blockade during the war of 1812, imported goods 
inbound for the US fell from $139 million in 1807 to $77 million in 1812 and 
again to $14 million in 1814. Moreover, by the autumn of 1813, vessel 
insurance rates reached some 50 per cent of the total value of a ship plus her 
cargo (Garitee, 1977: 55, 116).   
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Privateering was essentially a business that had relatively high market 
barriers of entry. For example, in Baltimore during the War of 1812, the cost of 
building, outfitting, arming and crewing a typical schooner of 200 tones was 
then more than $40,000 (Garitee, 1977: 125): approximately $2 million today. 
Similarly, for a British example the Liverpool privateer Enterprise in 1779 was 
built, outfitted, manned and operated during its first year for a total of some 
£7,000 (or $35,000) (Williams, 1966: 661-664). Given the sizeable sums 
required, ships tended to have a number of investors. Depending on the size 
of the vessel a typical American ship at this time had partners who each put in 
somewhere between $1,000 and $4,000 (Garitee, 1977: 37). Overall, 
privateering at this time offered the opportunity for much higher rewards than 
sailors could otherwise expect to receive from ordinary merchant ships. In 
America in the early years of the nineteenth century a merchant sailor could 
expect to earn $30 a month. However, as Garitee discovered in survey 
research the average value of one share at this time was some $150. With 
most men earning two to four shares the average might earn on the typical 
privateer tour of three months the equivalent of eighteen months’ income 
(Garitee, 1977: 193-194).  
 
In addition to the lure of high earnings the provision and quality of food and 
drink privateers were usually sumptuous when compared with public naval 
ships (Garitee, 1977: 123). While most owners demonstrated an active 
concern for the welfare and comfort of their crews, the owners of one late 
eighteenth century British privateer even went so far as to instruct the 
commander of the ship to: 
 
 “Take particular care that your crew be treated humanely, that every 
 one be made to do their duty with Good Temper; as Harmony, a good 
 look-out, and steady attention to the main point are all absolutely 
 necessary to be attended to, the success of the Cruise greatly 
 depending upon it.” (Williams, 1966: 24) 
 
Again, contrasting life on board a privateer with that of a vessel in state 
service Kert comments: “Compared to the relatively free and easy life of 
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privateering, life aboard a naval vessel must have seemed grim and 
oppressive.” (Kert, 1997: 121) 
 
It was of course at this time during periods of war that the British Royal Navy - 
like many others around the world - had to resort to abduction in order to crew 
its ships. Here, the state’s practice of ‘impressment’ can be contrasted with 
the captains of privately armed vessels who often advertised for seamen or 
used commercial agents to supply suitable personnel. According to Garitee 
these agents not only frequented or owned boarding houses and grog shops 
near waterfronts but they often supported seamen with personal loans, 
clothing, food and board (Garitee, 1977: 129).  
 
For Anderson and Gifford, privateers in the seventeenth, eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries had a similar strategic role to that of submarines 
throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century. While the technology 
and operational tactics might be radically different, their operational objectives 
were primarily aimed at destroying the seaborne commerce of opposing 
national powers. Additionally, Anderson and Gifford argue that the governing 
principles of privateering were often more economically efficient than 
submarine warfare because while the latter invariably aimed at sinking 
vessels the former: “…aimed at seizing and reselling the target ships and 
cargo” (Anderson and Gifford, 1981: 105). Overall, it is clear from the 
available evidence that privateering was frequently profitable. Whenever a 
state of war existed, entrepreneurs not only had incentives to supply privately 
armed ships but time and again they proved their worth on a comparative 
basis with the state sector. For example, during the war of 1812 forty-seven 
Canadian ships held letters of marquee and reprisal. Although ten of these 
captured no prizes at all, the remaining thirty-seven are said to have gained 
the proceeds from 228 American vessels (Kert, 1997: 90). Moreover, since 
many ships that were taken as prizes were frequently lost at sea or 
intercepted by privateers or naval ships of the enemy before they arrived in 
port, it is also suggested that the total number of American ships captured by 
privateers was around 600. As a result, and from an American perspective: 
“The privateers of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia provided a major incentive 
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for peace.” (Kert, 1997: 78). The most feared Canadian ship at this time was 
the Liverpool Packet. Held in such trepidation, even the rumour of her 
presence often drove commercial vessels along the northeast cost of the US 
back to their homeports. Indeed, she was so feared that towards the end of 
1812: “The American House of Representatives debated the possibility of 
cutting a canal through Cape Cod as a less costly alternative to losses 
through commerce raiding.” (Kert, 1997: 84)  
  
Turning to Europe, according to Lord Russell of Liverpool, French privateers 
had been active from the ports of St. Malo, Nantes, Le Havre, Cherbourg, 
Calais and Dunkirk since the thirteenth century (Russell, 1970: 90). In the war 
with Holland and Spain between 1672 and 1679 privateers are thought to 
have captured more than 1,300 Spanish and Dutch ships. Ten years later and 
during the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697), St. Malo sent out 
forty or fifty vessels each year. According to Macintyre these ships captured: 
“No less than 3,384 English and Dutch merchant ships and 162 escorting 
men-of-war” (Macintyre, 1975: 83). Again according to Lord Russell, during 
the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) French privateers captured or 
destroyed some 1,000 ships belonging to the English and Dutch (Russell, 
1970: 31-32).  
 
During the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) the French captured or 
destroyed more than 750 English merchant ships (Russell, 1970: 33). For 
Williams, the Seven Years’ War underlines not only the effectiveness of 
privateers but also the comparative ineffectiveness of state navies. He states: 
 
 “In the year 1757, the activity of the French privateers was 
 phenomenal…They cruised so thick around the island of Antigua that it 
 was next to a miracle for an English vessel to get in there, except 
 under convoy.” (Williams, 1966: 116) 
 
Moreover, in the first fourteen months of the conflict French privateers 
captured more than 630 British vessels (Williams, 1966: 115). According to 
Williams the reason for these French successes was rooted in a lack of effort 
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on the part of the Royal Navy. Analysing the situation he argues that many of 
the: 
 
 “Commanders of the King’s ships appear to have been shamefully 
 relax in the unpleasant duty of convoying merchant vessels, and in 
 pursuing the privateers of the enemy.” (Williams, 1966: 116) 
 
According to Lloyds of London, during the early years of the Napoleonic Wars 
- between 1793 and 1797 – the English lost more than 2,250 vessels: a 
majority of which had been captured by ‘corsairs’ (Russell, 1970: 39).  
 
While privateering was practiced over many centuries in Europe nowhere was 
it more eagerly engaged than in the United States of America, particularly 
during the war of 1812. While one Baltimore newspaper reported at the time 
that they believed more than 1,750 British ships had been captured by 
privateers Garitee estimates that the number could be anything between 
1,300 and 2,500 vessels (Garitee, 1977: 243). Commenting on the impact of 
these endeavours Gomer Williams writes:  
 
“American privateers swept the Atlantic and even penetrated within a 
few leagues of the mouth of the Mersey. The merchants and ship 
owners of Liverpool, instead of fitting out private armed vessels with 
the energy which had characterised them in former days, put their trust 
in the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and found, too late, that 
the King’s cruisers, like the modern policeman, were too often absent 
from the spot where there services were most required. The 
depredations of the American privateers on the coasts of Ireland and 
Scotland at length produced so strong a sensation at Lloyd’s, that it 
was difficult to get policies underwritten, except at enormous rates of 
premiums.” (Williams, 1966: 433) 
 
When directly comparing the record of the US Navy with the privateers during 
the War of 1812 a remarkable picture emerges. According to Fairburn, state 
warships captured or destroyed 165 British merchant ships while, as 
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mentioned above, the privateers dealt with anything between 1,300 and 2,500 
vessels (Fairburn, 1945-1955: 821). Moreover, Fairburn notes that as more 
sizeable and better-armed privateers became available in the latter stages of 
the conflict so their success rate rose. During the last eighteen months of the 
war privateers averaged two prizes each day. Indeed, US privateers took hold 
of a number of British state warships even though the American ships were 
never designed or intended for such actions. 
 
Maclay reveals overall data from the American Revolutionary War that shows 
a huge disparity between the public and private sectors. While the Continental 
Navy tallied nearly 200 British prizes, the privateers totaled more than 600. 
Moreover, as the war continued, not only did the number of active privateers 
increase from 136 in 1776 to 449 in 1781 but, over the period, the number of 
active state warships decreased from thirty-one to nine (Maclay, 1899: viii). 
Although today it is popular to caricature privateers for being similar to pirates, 
in reality, there were important differences. While both held the objectives of 
stopping and capturing merchant vessels pirates were criminals and their 
offence carried the death penalty. Privateers were legitimate because they 
had been bestowed with a license from a legitimate authority – be it a nation’s 
monarch or a parliament. As such, most privateers were guided by what one 
commentator has called: “A decent, civilized greed….Like sportsmen, 
privateers played by a code of rules.” (Petrie, 1999: 69). That said, deception 
often played an important part in their operational tactics and daily work. For 
example, privateers often used several sets of forged papers and they were 
able to deploy a number of national flags. Upon sighting a potential haul, 
privateers would often fly the national flag of the opponent so as to lure them 
into their orbit. However, despite this: “They never fired a gun under false 
colours.” (Petrie, 1999: 69) 
 
While genuine pirates violated such conventions, privateers rarely engaged in 
fighting without flying the flag of their genuine nation of origin. Beyond custom, 
law is at its core a body of enforced rules of conduct. While legislation is the 
purposeful articulation of a particular set of rules as stipulated by a 
government agency, the international law of prize (as it developed in Europe 
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and North America from 1500 onwards) was clearly the consequence of an 
essentially voluntary acceptance of legal precedent and the principles of 
arbitration. While legislation is top down, the international law of prize was 
borne and honed bottom up. Although marginally influenced by state treaties, 
the international law of prize is significant not least because it displayed 
substantive elements of what Hayek called ‘spontaneous order’ (Hayek, 
1973). During the period under discussion the laws of war regulating 
international conflicts invariably arose from custom and precedent, from 
treaties between nations, and occasionally from unilateral declarations. While 
often the primary aim of these laws was to codify the rights and obligations of 
belligerents – and in particular the rights of neutral parties – the law of war 
was far from perfect. One major problem was the legal right of neutrals to 
engage in trade with an enemy country (Anderson & Gifford, 1981: 5-9). 
Nevertheless, if the established law of war had in reality no power to govern 
the power of belligerents and their third party agents then privateers could 
easily become no better than pirates. 
 
As such, by the eighteenth century a body of law and procedure had emerged 
that carefully specified and governed the rights associated with prize taking in 
times of conflict: as well as the rights of neutral vessels. While the different 
national court systems greatly differed in terms of structure and procedure, 
the application of the international law of prize was remarkably uniform: 
 
 “One of the most usual criticisms of international law is that it lacks 
 judicial machinery for its applications and enforcement. Here is an 
 ancient body of law constantly applied by courts. The courts were 
 indeed national in origin and organization, but they lived up fairly well to 
 the tradition that they applied international law.” (Jessup & Deak, 1976: 
247) 
 
Given the efficiency, efficacy and sound governance of the historic world of 
privateers the question inevitably arises as to why this system ended? Why, 
by the middle of the nineteenth century was privateering essentially discarded 
as an archaic anachronism? 
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For Sechrest, the answer to this conundrum is essentially rooted in a public 
choice analysis (Sechrest, 2001: 29-31). As such, he argues that not only was 
privateering more effective than public navies but that it disappeared 
“precisely because it was so effective”: 
 
 “Career naval officers feared the competition it represented, and 
 those few nations with large public navies wanted to make sure that 
 smaller nations could not challenge their domination via the less costly 
 alternative of private armed ships.” (Sechrest, 2001: 30).  
 
Similarly, for Anderson and Gifford, while altered technological constraints 
certainly had an undermining impact on traditional privateers: 
 
“It is simply a fact that technological advances played absolutely no 
immediate, direct role in the demise of privateering…The major 
changes in naval technology occurred later.” (Anderson & Gifford, 
1981: 118). 
 
For Anderson and Gifford privateering was undermined partly as a result of 
international diplomatic problems arising from privateers and the rights of 
neutrals and partly because of opposition from naval officials strategically 
positioned within the state apparatus:  
 
 “[Privateering was] less wasteful than other forms of naval “combat” 
 because it did not destroy, but merely reassigned ownership rights to, 
 property….The extinction of privateering was a least partly the result of 
 rent seeking by established political bureaucracies….” (Anderson &  
Gifford, 1981: 118). 
 
Arguing that this cadre understood the competitive threat posed by the private 
sector they conclude: 
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 “Public navy officers and other officials fought a running battle against 
 the commissioning of privateers for centuries…When the national 
 standing navies could not prevent the commissioning of privateers, the 
 navies went to great lengths to harass their private competitors and to 
 generally restrict their ability to compete.” (Anderson & Gifford, 1981:  
118). 
 
A centuries old battle between the privateers and the public navies was only 
ended when privateers were formally banned by international treaty. In 1856, 
most of the major maritime powers of the world signed up to the Declaration 
of Paris. A treaty that formally prohibited the taking of prizes at sea by 
privately owned ships, the United States nevertheless refused its ratification. 
Arguing that it undermined private property rights and that America might 
once again have reason call on the services of privateers it was only in 1899, 
during the Spanish-American War, that the government finally decided to 
formally abolish privateering and thereby adhere to the 1856 declaration.  
More than a century on Kert has pointed out that most maritime historians and 
legal experts know little if anything about the historic world of privateering 
(Kert, 1997: 4-5). Similarly, most economists seem to have almost entirely 
forgotten a body of knowledge that if rediscovered could have profound 
implications for their discipline. Following on from Ronald Coase’s (1974) 
work that demonstrated early lighthouses had in fact been provided by the 
private sector, Anderson and Gifford argue that: “Privateering was not a 
market that can be shown to have “failed”; rather it was one that was 
eliminated through political means.” (Anderson & Gifford, 1981: 31). 
 
2.9 Conclusion: From the Past to the Present 
 
Today, it is popularly believed that there are many goods essential to the 
functioning of society that can only be produced by the state. However, as Dr. 
Stephen Davies has argued: 
 
“The historical evidence does not support arguments for the necessity 
of the state as a provider and regulator. Instead, it lends support to  the 
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thesis that the market is capable of producing private solutions to the 
problem of ‘public goods’.” (Davies, 1987: 2) 
 
That said, the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century saw trends in political economy moving in a very different 
direction. As support grew for the idea of ever-greater government provision 
across a wide range of areas, so warfare began to be practiced on a 
Weberian military-industrial scale (Ferguson, 2006: xxxiv). While the nation-
state came to be progressively viewed as the legitimate possessor of the 
monopoly use of force, today, the private military sector is again breaking out 
of the guns-for-hire model of traditional mercenaries. As is made clear in the 
next chapter, corporations now sell skills and services that until recently only 
state military, security and law enforcement agencies possessed.  
 
Having linked Royal Navy modernisation to the Weberian concept of the 
monopoly use of force, and highlighted the relevance of New Public 
Management, privatisation, PPPs, outsourcing, and argumentation 
surrounding the hollowing out of the state, the transition from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’, formal and informal policy networks, and the realities of an 
increasingly differentiated polity, this chapter has not only gone on to 
introduce a range of important temporal perspectives but it has used the 
history of privateering to better inform an understanding of political economy 
in the area of naval sea power and the legitimation of force and violence.  
 
Chapter III builds on this work by examining the broader history of private 
warfare and charting the rise of the modern global private military sector. In 
doing so, it not only details UK naval policy between 1979 and 2013 but it 
focuses on modern Royal Navy outsourcing, public private partnerships and 
privatisation: theoretically framing their evolution, development and relevance 
in the wider context of governance and the shifting sands of statecraft. 
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Chapter III 
History of Private Warfare to Rise of the Global Private Military Sector: 
Royal Navy Modernisation and New Public Management 
 
 
“The MoD has been one of privatisation’s standard bearers following 
the sale of Royal Ordnance in the early 1980s. It is now set to go into 
the uncharted territory with everything bar its core competence up for 
grabs. A ministry spokesman said it had a duty to ensure value for 
money. It was not predisposed to privatisation but reform was 
necessary. “We certainly don’t accept our policies are daft, damaging 
and demoralising,” a spokesman said” (Mathiason, 2003). 
 
 
From privateering and the broader history of private warfare, to the rise of 
privatisation and the global private military sector, there is a gap in the 
literature that this thesis fills. In analysing key themes in political economy that 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century represent ‘punctuated shifts’ in elite 
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attitudes towards the role of the nation-state’s use of force, it not only 
challenges the traditional paradigms of public management and 
administration, but it does so through the opinions of those who hold elite 
positions of influence in and around one of the world’s oldest military 
institutions and therefore an ‘ideal type’ construct of Weberian legitimacy in 
the area of force and violence.  
 
While Chapter II introduced the relevance of Royal Navy reforms to Weber’s 
concept of the monopoly use of force, and located Royal Navy modernisation 
within the theoretical framework of New Public Management, privatisation, 
PPPs, outsourcing, and argumentation surrounding the hollowing out of the 
state, the rise of governance, policy networks, differentiated polities, the 
importance of temporal perspectives, and used the history of privateering to 
better inform an understanding of political economy in the area of naval sea 
power and the legitimated production of force, this chapter examines the 
broader history of private warfare and charts the rise of the contemporary 
global private military sector. In detailing UK naval policy between 1979 and 
2013 with special reference to Royal Navy outsourcing, public private 
partnerships and privatisation, the chapter not only provides a framework for 
the analysis of policy, but it lays the foundations for research concerning elite 
opinions towards governance and the political economy of legitimacy in the 
area of force and violence. 
 
Echoing seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth century forms of 
privately produced naval sea power, the broad evolutionary ‘paths’, 
‘punctuations’ and ‘cycles’ of Royal Navy history not only serve to highlight the 
shifting sands of public administration and management but, crucially, the 
public and/or private production of violence. Ultimately, the chapter argues 
that Royal Navy private sector reforms are important to NPM and PA because 
they facilitate a surfacing of temporal and attitudinal boundaries that are often 
overlooked by a those more interested in what might at first appear to be the 
‘given’, the ‘now’ and the seemingly timeless ‘future’ of naval sea power. At a 
time of shifting sands for the Westminster model (see Chapter II), NPM, 
privatisation, and ideas surrounding notions of governance, the hollowing out 
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of the state, policy networks and the realities of an increasingly differentiated 
polity, both the history of private warfare and the rise of the modern global 
private military sector not only hold powerful insights into that which is 
conceptually possible but they also help to powerfully frame the methodology 
and research. 
 
 
3.1 History of Private Warfare and Rise of the Modern Global Private 
Military Sector 
 
From a Weberian perspective any re-emergence of private military 
organisations represents a fundamental failure of the nation-state as they 
inherently undermine its ‘quintessential function and signifier of being’. Yet 
today’s private military sector is breaking out of the guns-for-hire model of 
traditional mercenaries. While corporations now sell skills and services that 
until recently only state military, security and law enforcement agencies 
possessed, the products and services on offer range from trained special 
services to strategic advice from generals. 
 
When America launched its invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the country’s 
naval vessels in the gulf were not simply manned by US navy personnel. 
Alongside them were civilians from four private companies operating some of 
the world’s most sophisticated weapons systems. When US Global Hawks 
and B-2 stealth bombers were deployed, many of their weapon systems were 
operated by non-military personnel from the private sector (Traynor, 2003: 1). 
The United States army estimated that of the $87 billion earmarked in 2004 
for the broader Iraqi campaign, including central Asia and Afghanistan, one 
third of that amount, nearly $30 billion, was to be spent on contracts with 
private companies (Traynor, 2003: 1). Deeply involved in the aftermath of the 
war, one US company was given the lucrative contract to train the new Iraqi 
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army while another was contracted to recruit and train the country’s police 
force.1 
 
In recent years, the largest US military base since Vietnam, Camp Bondsteel 
in Kosovo was constructed and serviced by private contractors. At Tuzla in 
northern Bosnia, headquarters for US peacekeepers, most of the items that 
could be farmed out to private contractors had been and by the beginning of 
2004 the bill stood at more than $5 billion.2 Whilst, in Israel, an American 
company provides the security for American diplomats. In Columbia, an 
American company flies the planes that destroy the coca plantations and the 
helicopter gun-ships that protect them. In Kabul, a US company provides 
bodyguards to save President Hamid Karzai from assassination (Traynor, 
2003: 1). Observing the strategic advice and generalship on offer the 
Guardian reported: 
 
 
 “In the small town of Hadzici west of Sarajevo, a military compound 
 houses the latest computer technology, the war games simulations 
 challenging the Bosnian army’s brightest young officers. Crucial to 
 transforming what was an improvised militia desperately fighting for 
 survival into a modern army fit eventually to join NATO, the army 
 computer centre was established by US officers who structured, trained 
 and armed the Bosnian military. The Americans accomplished a similar 
 mission in Croatia and are carrying out the same job in Macedonia. 
 The input from the US military has been so important that the US 
 experts can credibly claim to have tipped the military balance in a 
 region ravaged by four wars in a decade. But the American officers, 
 including four generals, are retired, not serving. They work, at least 
 directly, not for the US government, but for a private company, Military 
 Professional Resources Inc.” (Traynor, 2003: 1) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The major British player in Iraq at this time was Global Risk International based in Hampton, West 
London. 
2 Here the contracts included those to the US company ITT which provided a wide range of armed 
guards. 
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In the Balkans Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) has 
played a pivotal role in governance. In many ways, their deployment altered 
the entire balance of power in the region (Traynor, 2003: 1). Over the past 
decade the Pentagon has awarded more than 3,000 contracts to private 
military companies and the former US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, 
pledged that it will continue to: “Pursue additional opportunities to outsource 
and privatise.” (Traynor, 2003: 1) 
 
Since the end of the cold war many state militaries around the world have 
been downsized, hugely benefiting a growing private military sector. The US 
military is 60 per cent the size it was twenty years ago and the Soviet collapse 
largely gravely impacted the Russian military. Britain’s armed forces, including 
the Royal Navy, are at their smallest since the Napoleonic wars. Yet, 
privatisation and contracting-out continues a pace. Back in 2003, one senior 
Royal Navy officer, Rear Admiral Hugh Edleston, went on the public record to 
question where this process might lead. Warning of the economic challenges 
posed to the navy by a burgeoning private sector, he complained: 
 
 “There’s an explosion of these companies attracting our servicemen 
 financially…you should never mix serving military with security 
 organisations. You need to be absolutely clear on the division between 
 the military and the paramilitary.” (Traynor, 2003: 1) 
 
In the same year, Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution published a book 
that surprised many in the United States of America and far beyond. 
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Singer, 2003) 
provides a detailed and wide ranging account of a privatised military industry 
that is not only growing rapidly in global capability but often challenges our 
common understanding of government, the state and notions around the 
monopoly use of force and violence. 
 
Singer’s work is important because it makes clear that a new and rapidly 
growing privatised military industry has emerged at the dawn of the twenty 
first century that encompasses hundreds of companies, thousands of 
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employees and billions of dollars in revenue. Whether as proxies or suppliers, 
its firms have participated in a host of recent wars in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, 
and Latin America. They even made up the second largest contingent of allied 
forces during the Iraq war of 2003. The significance of this latter point was 
underlined in Britain by a Guardian newspaper report in December 2003. 
Under the front-page headline, ‘The privatisation of war’, the article warned 
that: 
 
 “Private corporations have penetrated western warfare so deeply that 
 they are now the second biggest contributor to coalition forces in Iraq 
 after the Pentagon…While the official coalition figures list the British as 
 the second largest contingent with around 9,900 troops, they are 
 narrowly outnumbered by the 10,000 private military contractors now 
 on the ground.” (Traynor, 2003: 1) 
 
The article continued by asserting that the: 
 
 “…proportion of contracted security personnel in the firing line is 10 
 times greater than it was during the first gulf war. In 1991, for every 
 private contractor, there were about 100 servicemen and women; now 
 there are 10.” (Traynor, 2003: 1) 
 
In recent years in Britain, the United States of America and elsewhere in the 
developed world, politicians have been under increasing pressure to 
modernise and reform the state’s security apparatus in the widest sense.  
 
Away from the military, as consumers have expected ever more from limited 
taxation and policing budgets so the private security industry has expanded to 
meet popular demand. For every one state policeman in Britain today there 
are now estimated to be at least two private security guards (see Chapter VI). 
In supermarkets, shopping malls, residential housing estates and many office 
buildings private security services and personnel abound. City centres are 
increasingly being watched by privately monitored closed circuit television 
cameras and the police themselves are being supported by a plethora of 
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private support personnel. Away from Weberian notions of government 
holding a monopoly on the use of force, today’s law enforcement arena is an 
increasing testimony to the reality of public private partnerships, outsourcing, 
privatisation and new practices of governance within an increasingly 
differentiated and decentred polity. Similarly, the military over the last twenty-
five years have seen continuing pressure on their budgets and capabilities. 
Defence ministers in Britain, the United States of America and elsewhere 
have pursued a wide range of modernisations aimed at the more effective use 
of finite resource and capability. Many support services such as catering, 
maintenance and even training have already been outsourced or privatised 
(see section 3.2 below).	  Indeed, one insight into the British government’s long 
range thinking on military capability came with the publication of the 2002 
Green Paper ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ (Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 2002).  Recognising the increasing importance of 
the private military sector and its likely future role, the paper asserted:	  
 
 “…the private sector is becoming increasingly involved in military and 
 security activity. States and international organisations are turning to 
 the private sector as a cost effective way of procuring services which 
 would once have been the exclusive preserve of the military. It is 
 British Government policy for example to outsource certain tasks that in 
 earlier days would have been undertaken by the armed services.”   
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002: 4) 
 
The paper concluded: 
 
 “The demand for private military services is likely to increase.” (Foreign  
and Commonwealth Office, 2002: 4) 
 
Significantly, if we look back through history people specialising in the art of 
warfare can be traced back to the very earliest divisions of labour amongst 
humankind (Lane, 1979). Since the dawn of man human conflict has, in 
reality, enabled specialists to privately market and sell their ‘efficiencies’ in the 
use of force and ‘governance’.  
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While the organisation of military groups in the ancient world might have 
differed in time and place such operations were typically tymocratic (money 
based) enterprises. In the earliest urban civilizations weaponry was 
essentially placed in the hands of key social groups based on their economic 
standing. Most early governments were seemingly unable to develop coherent 
administrative structures such as regular armed forces (Greveld, 1999: 29, 
138). As such, leaders relied invariably on foreign trained soldiers and units to 
do their bidding. Structured along similar lines to those of other business 
ventures of the day they were formed on essentially tribal or cultural lines. 
Today, the earliest records of warfare highlight numerous examples of outside 
forces being employed to fight for ancient rulers. The earliest official reference 
is of mercenaries who served in the army of King Shugi of Ur (2094-2047 B.C) 
(Singer, 2003: 20). For example, the battle of Kadesh in 1294 BC is the first 
great battle in history from which a detailed account remains. In this battle, 
between the Egyptians and the Hittites, the army of Pharaoh Ramses II 
included units of hired Numidians (Taulbee, 1998: 145). 
 
Across the ancient world similar stories abound. Even in the Bible the 
Pharaoh chased the Israelites out of Egypt with an army that included hired 
foreigners, while David and his men, on the run from Saul, were employed in 
the Philistine army of Achish. In ancient Greece it was common practice for 
armies to further build up their capabilities by privately hiring additional 
capacity. Amongst the most notable were units of Cretan slingers, Syracusan 
hoplites and Thessalian cavalry (Griffith, 1968: 4). A number of naval units, 
including those that fought on behalf of Athens in the Persian wars were also 
privately raised. The Macedonians honed their fighting skills when working on 
behalf of various Greek city-states during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 
BC). They soon defeated their old clients in the following wars of King Philip. 
By the end of its conquest of the Persian Empire in 336 BC the army of his 
son, Alexander the Great, had evolved from a largely Macedonian force into 
one mainly made up of hired soldiers. Significantly, it contracted a private 
navy of 224 ships from the Phoenecians (Singer, 2003: 21).  
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In the following period, the Carthaginian Empire was almost totally dependent 
on mercenary troops. And although early Rome was itself distinguished by an 
essentially citizen army, it too was heavily dependent on mercenaries. Even 
during the Republic era it relied on private units of archers and cavalry. 
Overall, Rome recruited Numidians, Balearics, Gauls, Iberians, and Gretans 
during the Punic Wars. At the end of the third century the imperial army was 
more Germanic than Roman (Delbruck, 1975). Similarly, the rulers of the 
Byzantine Empire also relied heavily on foreigners to fight their battles. The 
elite Varangian Guard was made up of hired Norsemen (Haldon, 1999). Its 
Muslim opponents included hired units too including the Manalukes who 
eventually took over the rule of Egypt: amongst other places (Glubb, 1973). 
With the fall of the Roman Empire, Western Europe sank back into the Dark 
Ages. As the money-based economy faltered, society became more reliant on 
the principles of deference, feudalism and a layered-based system of 
obligations for military service.  
 
While during the medieval period hired soldiers remained an integral part of 
most force structures they often provided the more technical services that 
short-term feudal forces could not supply. For example, they often specialised 
in weapons, such as the crossbow, which demanded skill and patience and 
yet was considered inappropriate for gentlemen. By the thirteenth century, the 
revival of an urban-based commercial economy in Europe witnessed the 
rebirth of widespread economic growth and prosperity. With the emergence of 
a viable banking system a wide range of trading companies soon emerged 
(Ferguson, 2009).  
 
In Italy it was not long before several towns had turned themselves over to 
private investors to run. It was in this climate that the contract (condotta) 
system flourished by which military services were contracted out to private 
units (Scammell, 1982: 5). Initially promoted by business guilds, the idea of 
hired units became popular amongst the nobility, who feared a potential 
uprising from an armed populace, and hence saw mercenaries as an 
attractive and practicable option (Contamine, 1984: 158). Venice started to 
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hire out salaried rower-soldiers from its navy during the Crusades 1095-1270. 
And the development of hired ground forces was not far behind.  
 
Across Europe, rulers began to charge shield money (scutagium), the cost to 
equip a fighting man, and by the end of the fourteenth century, privately 
organised units had largely taken over the field of battle from their feudal 
predecessors. The way to form an army now consisted of “commissioning” 
(the term still used to specify the rise to a rank of officer) a private individual to 
raise troops, and to clothe, equip, train and lead them. In exchange, the 
organiser received payment and a potential share of any goods seized in 
conflict (Creveld, 1999, p. 158). During this time, many of the military 
campaigns in Aquitaine, Brittany, and Normandy were in reality some of the 
first ‘joint stock enterprises’ (Ormorod, 1990: 103). Private investments were 
ventured in expectation of future dividends. While many soldiers hired 
themselves out as ‘free lancers’ (the origin of the modern business 
expression), having no homes or careers to return to, many came together to 
form ‘Companies’ (the term itself derived from ‘con pane’ - the bread that 
members received) which were organisations designed to provide mutual 
support, protection and sustenance. At this time, private companies of 
freelance soldiers often used carefully thought out marketing strategies that 
disseminated stories of fierceness and cruelty to effectively brand their 
product(s). In 1291 the Swiss forest cantons came together to resist foreign 
domination. Forming the Swiss confederation, each town supplied a citizen-
militia – organised into pike men. Winning impressive victories against the 
Austrians at the battles of Sempach in 1386 and Nafels in 1388, Swiss 
mercenary units were to earn an unrivalled reputation for their fighting abilities 
over the next century. Even today, the Swiss mercenary tradition continues 
with the Pope being protected by the Swiss Guard.  
 
By the seventeenth century, warfare in Europe was an essentially mercantilist 
enterprise (Howard, 1976: 15). Armies of the period were often combinations 
of hired mercenary companies, each with their own specialisation and 
branding. Albanians often supplied light cavalry; Scots and Gascons formed 
infantry companies; the Swiss continued the tradition of pike men and 
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Germans supplied cavalry pistoleers. In this world, patriotism was an 
essentially meaningless concept to the average soldier. The business of war 
and ‘governance’ was firmly in the hands of a new class of military 
entrepreneur. These were people who hired and equipped military units at 
their own cost and then hired them out as private units of property. Among the 
most famous of the players in this market was Louis de Geer, a businessman 
from Amsterdam who provided the Swedish government with a complete 
navy, including sailors and commanders (Singer, 2003: 28). 
 
While such arrangements might seem strange in today’s more statist world, in 
reality the idea of the nation state dominating warfare is a fairly new 
occurrence in the overall pattern of history. It was not until the thirty years war 
of 1618-1648 that official armies loyal to the nation state, and not to specific 
rulers or ‘houses’, came to the fore. While the military forces of all countries 
continued to consist of hired mercenaries, this war ushered in a fundamentally 
new era. Ultimately, with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia the war 
resulted in the concept of sovereignty winning over that of empire. From 1648 
onwards the rising state was legitimised by the idea of sovereignty overseeing 
all affairs within specified national borders. By the time of the Napoleonic wars 
at the end of the eighteenth century hired armies of foreigners began to give 
way to standing state armies made up of citizens. Overall, the period saw the 
wars of kings give way to the wars of the masses. And in many ways the 
mass armies that began to take shape were now both a cause and an effect 
of the organisational form that is the modern Weberian state and 
‘government’. 
 
As the Enlightenment took hold, ideas concerning social contract and formal 
rationality encouraged new ways of thinking about the function, structure and 
organisation of government and the state. With the erosion of deference and 
feudalism, people became more willing to fight as citizens than as subjects. 
Profit gave way to patriotism and by the 1700s the entire structure of war 
began to give way to the centralised direction of the impersonal, bureaucratic 
and top down state. The end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 signaled the end 
of hired soldiers playing a serious role in warfare for much of the next two 
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centuries. Although some relatively minor examples of private practice 
continued, professional and conscript state militaries became the norm.  
 
In naval affairs however it is notable that by this time private businesses had 
long taken on military roles through the charter company system. Here, 
government to have monopoly power over trade with a specific area licensed 
joint-stock companies. The most notorious of such ventures were the Dutch 
East India Company and the English East India Company. The English East 
India Company was formed in 1599 and the Dutch East India Company in 
1602. Both were granted monopoly authority by their home states to trade in 
the Indian Ocean and both these companies effectively emerged to become 
states in their own right (Thomson, 1994: 32). They not only controlled 
business networks - effectively dominating trade in spices, tea, silk, Chinese 
porcelain, gold and opium - but they also amassed sufficient private resource 
as to ensure their own military prowess: 
 
“Thus, it was not uncommon for private charter companies to take on 
the trappings of a state. They became quite curious institutions where 
all the analytical distinctions between economics and politics, non-state 
and state domains, property rights and sovereign powers, and the 
public and private broke down.” (Singer, 2003: 34) 
 
In reality, such firms controlled armed forces and territory that dwarfed their 
own and most other European states. At its time, the English East India 
Company hired a mix of British, German and Swiss mercenaries, as well as 
local Sepoy units. By the late eighteenth century the company’s army was 
more than 100,000 men. The Dutch company grew from modest beginnings 
and soon had more than 140 ships and 25,000 men under arms (Singer, 
2003: 35). 
 
Significantly, the English Company’s first engagement with the Indian market 
was in the form of a naval battle to aid the Mogul Emperor against Portugal. 
The company’s ships sank most of the Portuguese fleet in the area. However, 
over time the world again moved on and the trading companies began to 
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weaken as political environments stabilised. With excessive military 
overheads, the Dutch East India Company began to lose money in the late 
eighteenth-century. While the English East India Company continued for 
several decades longer, in the 1830s the British government broke its 
monopoly trade with India and the company quickly became insolvent. 
Nevertheless, as Peter Singer, noted: 
 
“The length of the charter companies’ histories is striking, particularly 
when one compares them to the longevity of most states. The Dutch 
East India Company lasted 194 years; …and the English East India 
Company, 258 years.” (Singer, 2003: 37) 
 
By the twentieth century the charter companies were largely no more. The 
nation state and the concept of sovereignty had come to predominate. With 
this trend it was not long before norms against private soldering were in the 
ascendant.  
 
Having once been a part of large, integrated and influential enterprises the 
primary player in what remained of the private military market was 
increasingly the individual ex-soldier: or mercenary. Usually operating in weak 
state areas of the world, such as China, Latin America, and later Africa, their 
heyday was during the decolonisation period of the 1950s and 1960s. The 
groups that fought in these campaigns often had nicknames such as ‘Les-
Affreux’ (The Terrible Ones) and included such notorious commanders as 
‘Mad Mike Hoare’ and the Frenchman Bob Denard. Denard later led a series 
of violent coups in the Comoros Islands and the Seychelles from the 1970s 
onwards. His latest coup attempt was as recent as 1995 (Quettevile, 2000). 
 
However, as we have started to see, the story does not end here. Instead, the 
present unevenness of the public monopoly is not only continuing but the 
companies involved in today’s market have reached such a critical mass as to 
earn the formal classification of Privatised Military Firms (PMFs). As Peter 
Singer notes:  	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“They are business organizations that trade in professional services 
intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate bodies that specialize 
in the provision of military skills, including combat operations, strategic 
planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training, 
and technical skills. By the very fact of their function, they break down 
what have long been seen as the traditional responsibilities of 
government. That is, PMFs are private business entities that deliver to 
consumers a wide spectrum of military and security services, once 
generally assumed to be exclusively inside the public context”. (Singer, 
2003: 8) 
 
Today, in the post-Cold War era, the conjuncture of the corporate form with 
military functionality has not only become a reality: 
 
“A new global industry has emerged. It is outsourcing and privatization 
of a twenty-first century variety, and it changes many of the old rules of 
international politics and warfare. Beginning in the 1990s, PMFs have 
been active in zones of conflict and transition throughout the 
world…PMFs have been active on every continent but Antarctica, 
including in relative backwaters and key strategic zones where the 
superpowers once vied for influence. Moreover, their operations have 
become integral to the peacetime security systems of rich and poor 
states alike. Their customers also are ranged across the moral 
spectrum from ruthless dictators, morally depraved rebels and drug 
cartels to legitimate sovereign states, respected multinational 
corporations, and humanitarian NGOs.” (Singer, 2003: 9) 
 
Given the modern rise of PMFs, there is only a limited amount of academic 
literature available which analyses them. When it comes to private companies 
carrying out activities that were once the sole domain of the Weberian state 
and therefore relate to the central issues of governance and legitimacy, 
several works deserve mentioning.  
 
Sarah Percy’s book Mercenaries (Percy, 2007) discusses the complex legal 
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standing of PMFs in both international and national law. Percy argues that the 
conflicting norms which have developed around mercenaries has led to weak 
international laws governing the modern day use of PMFs (Percy, 2007: 169). 
For her, a resulting conflict of norms has been caused by a desire of states to 
simultaneously control, use and restrict PMFs whilst also maintaining liberal 
Western commitments to freedom, limited government and international 
migration (Percy, 2007).  
 
The idea that PMFs represent a dramatic extension of mercenary power is 
further examined in Jeremy Scahill’s book, Blackwater: The Rise of the 
World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (Scahill, 2007). Highlighting the 
complexities of PMF use, he points to a lengthy battle at Najaf in which 
Blackwater forces were resupplied by their own helicopters, yet when they ran 
into trouble on the ground, the US military refused to assist. Deborah Avant’s 
book, The Market for Force (2005), examines the way the U.S. government 
uses private contractors to get around their own concerns of legitimacy. Avant 
argues that in regularly using private contractors, the US government relies on 
corporate entities to undertake those tasks it deems too politically sensitive to 
carry out itself (Avant, 2007: 4).  
 
Throughout the literature, the point is made that the private sector is not yet 
bound by the rules of war that western state militaries have traditionally been 
subjected to, and that in some instances, PMF’s retain the freedom to quit 
where they deem situations to be too dangerous (Isenberg, 2004: 17). While 
government soldiers committing atrocities can be tried in military courts, 
private military contractors are rarely subject to such practices. As PMF 
operatives often find themselves working in countries with diminished rule of 
law, bringing abusers to justice can prove very difficult.  
 
Concerned with another aspect of legitimacy, James Kwok focuses on the 
lack of contractor oversight by bringing attention to the fact that one PMF in 
Iraq hired a former British soldier who had been thrown out of the army and 
served time in prison for assisting Irish terrorists (Kwok, 2006: 37). Moreover, 
Kevin A. O’Brien focuses on the monitoring and accountability of PMFs by 
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highlighting the debate between the competing ideas of industry self-
regulation versus government standard setting (O’Brien, 2007: 57). O’Brien 
makes the point that whilst a government may want to impose a uniformity of 
regulation on the PMF sector, it may refrain from doing so in fear of 
undermining many of the efficiencies and innovations that it seeks to exploit 
for its own ‘governance’.  
 
Laura A. Dickinson (Dickinson, 2005) examines US government contracts 
signed with PMFs in Iraq and finds that none of them stipulated provisions for 
human rights, anti-corruption measures or basic levels of transparency and 
accountability. Indeed, Mark Hemingway identifies a lack of training and 
competence amongst US government contracting staff (Hemingway, 2006: 
26) and argues that failures are compounded, when in response to 
dramatically increasing workloads the government reduced the numbers of its 
relevant contracting and enforcement staff. 
 
Another issue that affects legitimacy is corruption and its opportunity costs. 
Money squandered through contractors billing for overcharged services, or 
products that never arrive, represents systemic failure. On this matter, Matt 
Kelley quotes the ‘Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’ who 
suggested that the problem of corruption had been so endemic in the country 
that it represented a “second insurgency” (Kelley, 2007: 1). Paul Verkuil’s 
work, Outsourcing Sovereignty (Verkuil, 2007), highlights the problems 
caused by the Pentagon’s cost-plus contracts system that “permit and 
encourage fraud and abuse” (Verkuil, 2007: 148). He argues that while many 
military services could be outsourced, oversight functions should be 
strengthened. Noting that effective contract administration can never 
guarantee success, a failure to use competitive bidding, combined with an 
inability to enforce contracts, merely encourages “deficient results” (Verkuil, 
2007: 150). 
 
Ever since the end of the Cold War, western militaries have had their in-house 
capabilities reduced. Now facing additional heavy cuts due to the recent 
financial crisis, very little of the academic literature available considers the 
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long-term implications of an increasing reliance on the political economy of 
PMFs in the context of Weberian legitimacy. For example, while David 
Isenberg (Isenberg, 2007) discusses the fact that the U.S. went to war in Iraq 
with inadequate troop numbers, he fails to examine the ramifications of its 
subsequent reliance on PMFs.  
 
Whilst Robert Young Pelton’s book, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on 
Terror, describes a DynCorp personal security detail assigned to Afghan 
President, Hamid Karzai, which in disputing the terms of its contract resigned 
on the spot, leaving the company to find a replacement at very short notice 
(Pelton, 2007: 75), none of the literature examines such failings in the context 
of both the state and private military sectors or the wider implications for the 
political economy of legitimacy. Whereas Christopher Kinsey’s book, 
Corporate Soldiers and International Security, questions the reliability and 
commitment of some contractors to operations (Kinsey, 2006: 108), the 
capacity both for state and private military actors to manifest inefficiency, 
corruption, disloyalty and unwarranted brutishness is never analysed. 
Moreover, while negative externalities can be cited both for state and private 
military actors, there is simply no literature that examines the boundaries of 
discourse concerning the pros, cons and legitimating rubrics of state versus 
private militaries; or their implications for the wider political economy of force, 
violence and governance. To date, no one has comparatively explored these 
themes in any military and/or modern naval service context.  
 
 
3.2  Analysis of Modern Royal Navy Reforms 
 
By 1979, the Royal Navy had already suffered years of cuts. In 1966 the 
Labour government of Harold Wilson had cancelled a planned new generation 
of large aircraft carriers and ordered that all the existing carriers be scrapped 
by 1971 (Healey, 1966). While one carrier, HMS Ark Royal, was eventually 
given a reprieve which lasted until 1978, such a move made little difference to 
the overall direction of policy. In the 1970s, not only did the number of Royal 
Navy platforms decrease but as the last of is conventional aircraft carriers was 
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de-commissioned, it entered into a fundamentally new era (Grove, 2005). 
Now developing a specialist anti-submarine force at its core, by the 1980s 
expenditure was mainly centred on a small number of helicopter carriers, 
escorts (destroyers and frigates) and nuclear-powered hunter-killer 
submarines: all with the primary aim of conducting anti-submarine warfare 
operations, mainly in the Atlantic (Beaver, 1996). Then, in 1981, the Secretary 
of State for Defence John Nott launched a Defence White Paper that 
proposed further reductions to the fleet (Nott, 1981). The plan not only 
included the proposed sale of the new carrier HMS Invincible to Australia, but 
it also considered selling two of the navy’s large assault ships, HMS Fearless 
and HMS Intrepid to Argentina (Grove, 2005). In 1982, however, a brief but 
costly war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands (Brown, 1987) saw Lord 
Carrington step down from the Cabinet after he took responsibility for the 
failure of the Foreign Office to warn the government of Argentina’s aggressive 
intentions (Nott, 2004). It also delivered a temporary reversal to some of the 
proposed cuts (Brown, 1987). Crucially, the war with Argentina won the navy 
widespread recognition that it should retain at least a minimal carrier and 
amphibious capability (Grove, 2005; Beaver, 1996). However, as becomes 
clear with the material presented below, none of this stopped outsourcing, 
public private partnerships and privatisation progressing in key areas allied to 
the production of British naval sea power. It is to an analytical framework and 
these milestones that this chapter now examines. 
 
Entwined in a complex web of thought, action and practice, change in British 
political economy, governance and accountability during the last thirty years 
has conjoined a range of practical and ideological considerations (Denham, 
1997). As was made clear in Chapter II (above), NPM theorists originally 
argued that the more market-based approaches could be introduced into the 
public sector, the more efficiency may result for government, taxpayers and 
consumers alike (Hughes, 2003; Adams, 2000; Barzelay, 1992; and Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992). Symptomatic of wider changes in political and economic 
discourse, NPM’s agenda was to make what remains of the public sector 
amendable to approaches and methods derived from business, commerce 
and the free market. While privatisation in the form of asset sales and share 
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issues have played their part in this process, PPPs and outsourcing (including 
agencification) have also conjoined a range of disparate forces arguably 
hollowing out the state (Rhodes, 1994) from above, below and within (see 
Chapter II above). With power and governance shifting to the global 
environment and some state capacities transferring to a range of pan-
regional, plurinational and international bodies, still others have been 
transferred or restructured to local and/or regional levels as well as institutions 
in the private and voluntary sectors.  
 
Putting to the side for the moment issues of an increasingly differentiated 
polity, loss of control at the centre and the complexities surrounding 
accountability, performance and outcomes, in terms of political economy, 
privatisation, PPPs, outsourcing and full blown nationalisation can all be 
analysed within the classic model of the compass of political economy 
(Political Compass, 2011). Covering the socio-economic axis of collectivism 
versus individualism, and the socio-political axis of authoritarianism versus 
libertarianism, the framework places centrally planned, tax-funded, 
nationalisations in the socio-economically collectivist and socio-politically 
authoritarian quartile (Fig.4). As an ‘ideal type’ construct, it places consumer 
led, market funded, privatisations in the socio-economically individualist and 
socio-politically libertarian quartile.  
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Fig 4. Compass of Political Economy Framework for Royal Navy Reform 
 
While from this perspective friendly societies may denote forms of libertarian 
collectivism, and churches may denote forms of authoritarian-individualism, 
outsourcing and PPPs variously cross various quartiles. It is through this 
prism that the last thirty years of British naval sea power can not only be 
charted but the direction of its political economy analysed. The compass of 
political economy is useful to this study because it provides an analytical 
framework from which its recent history can be charted and framed 
theoretically. 
 
3.2.1 British Aerospace  
 
More than a year before the Falklands War, on 1 January 1981, British 
Aerospace (BAe) was changed from being a statutory corporation 
(established in 1977) to a public limited company. On 4th February 1981 
(Hansard, 16 February 1981), the government sold 51.57 per cent of its 
shares and in 1985 it sold the remainder. At the time, BAe was the UK’s 
largest exporter, with defence representing more than 75 per cent of its total 
sales (Competition Commission, 1995: 28). Now in private hands and able to 
raise money on the market, BAe set about becoming one of the world’s 
largest privatised defence equipment contractors. 
 
3.2.2 British Shipbuilders 
 
In 1983, British Shipbuilders was privatised under the British Shipbuilders Act 
(Legislation, 1983). As a result, numerous divisions of the company were 
subsequently divested into the private sector and the nationalised parent was 
wound up. 
 
3.2.3 Royal Ordnance 
 
In 1984, a number of Royal Ordnance Factories (ROFs) were privatised as 
Royal Ordnance plc. While a small number of ROFs involved in the production 
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of nuclear weapons (ROF Burghfield and ROF Cardiff) remained in public 
ownership (and eventually became part of the government’s Atomic Weapons 
Establishment), Royal Ordnance took control of several former government-
owned research and development organisations (see below) crucial to UK 
national defence (National Audit Office, 1987). While some elements of the 
UK’s defence research and design network either remained under Ministry of 
Defence control, or where subsequently closed down, a number later became 
part of the newly privatised defence research company, QuinetiQ (see below). 
 
3.2.4 Rolls Royce 
 
In 1987, the government privatised the aircraft engine division of Rolls Royce, 
which had previously been separated from the automotive division (Rolls 
Royce Motors) in 1973. In 1994, Rolls Royce proceeded to acquire the Allison 
Engine Company, a US manufacturer of advanced gas turbines and a wide 
range of engineered items for the maritime and aviation sectors. As a result of 
Allison’s involvement in a number of US classified and export restricted 
projects, the takeover was subject to a US Department of Defense (DoD) 
investigation concerning the ‘mediated dilemmas’ (see Chapter V below and 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2006 and 2010) of national security. In March 1995, the 
DoD finally ruled that the deal between Rolls Royce and Allison “…[did] not 
endanger national security” (Department of Defence, 1995). Nevertheless, 
Rolls Royce was directed to set up a proxy board (staffed by US citizens) to 
manage Allison, and also to set up a separate enterprise, Allison Advanced 
Development Company Inc., which directly managed its classified 
programmes involving sensitive technologies.  
 
In 2000, this restriction was replaced by the more liberal Special Security 
Arrangement (SSA), under which the board of a company can be composed 
both of American citizens and nationals from the country of a parent company. 
Under the new arrangement, issues of national security are only discussed 
when American managers are present (Wayne, 2006). Today, Allison is a part 
of Rolls Royce North America. In 1999, Rolls Royce spent more than £1 
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billion on acquisitions including Cooper Energy Services, the National 
Airmotive Corporation and, finally, Vickers plc, for its marine divisions. 
 
In 2004, Rolls Royce was awarded a £110 million contract with the UK’s 
Ministry of Defence to supply engines for the C-130 Hercules transport 
aeroplane. The company was also a major contractor for the PB199 engine, 
which powered several variants of the Panavia Tornado military aircraft, and 
the EJ200 engine for the RAF’s Typhoon II (Euro-fighter). Another subsidiary 
of the company, Rolls Royce Marine Power Operations Ltd, manufactures and 
tests the nuclear reactors used in Royal Navy submarines (Pugh, 2002). 
 
3.2.5 Royal Navy Dockyards 
 
Overall, while for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the provision 
of national defence came to be viewed as an integral part of the state, and 
national security was regarded as being “incompatible with the profit motives 
of private firms” because it was “uniquely a public good that a nation’s 
government is charged with” (International Federation of Professional & 
Technical Engineers, 2003: 6), in many ways: “…the Thatcher government 
challenged that idea…when the management functions of two major centres 
for the UK Royal Navy warship refitting and maintenance were handed over to 
[private] contactors.” (International Federation of Professional & Technical 
Engineers, 2003: 6) 
 
In 1987, the government announced that the management of the Royal Naval 
dockyard at Rosyth was to be handed over to the engineering company 
Babcock. Similarly, the naval base at Devonport was handed over to 
Devonport Management Limited (DML): a consortium headed by the US 
company Halliburton, through its UK subsidiary Brown and Root. Resonant of 
the NPM paradigm and the rise of an increasingly differentiated polity: “The 
MoD’s rationale behind the management privatization was to reduce costs 
through efficiency that only the private sector could deliver.” (International 
Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, 2003: 6) 
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Now run as Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities, the 
MoD allocated most of the navy’s refit and repair work to these yards without 
significant competition. In practice, this meant: “…66 percent by volume and 
76 percent by value over the three fiscal years from FY94-95 to FY96-97.” 
(Pint, E. M., Bondanella, J. R., Cave, J., Hart, R., & Keyser, D., 2000: 133) At 
this early stage, the remainder of the work was allocated on a competitive 
basis between the dockyards and a limited number of other, by now, 
privatised shipyards.  
 
In the early 1990s the government decided that it wanted to go a stage further 
by actually selling the dockyards to the private sector. As such, the Rosyth 
sale was completed in January 1997 and Devonport was concluded in March 
the same year: “The gross sale price for Rosyth was £27.0 million, but MoD 
deducted £6.5 million in exchange for Babcock Rosyth’s agreement to accept 
all severance liabilities from 2006 onward, and it allowed the company to 
defer payment of £6 million until it had received 70 percent of its allocated 
work, expected to occur in 2001-2002” (Pint, E. M., Bondanella, J. R., Cave, 
J., Hart, R., & Keyser, D., 2000: 135). Moreover: “The sale price for Devonport 
was set at £40.3 million, after deducting £3 million in exchange for Devonport 
Management’s agreement to accept liability for layoffs on commercial work 
and MoD’s completed workload” (Pint, E. M., Bondanella, J. R., Cave, J., 
Hart, R., & Keyser, D., 2000: 135). 
 
On 11 February 1997 Halliburton released a press statement from its 
headquarters in Dallas, Texas. Commenting on the deal in a way that serves 
to highlight the increasingly internationalisation of naval governance and the 
hollowing out of a range of Weberian state capacities, it asserted: 
 
“Halliburton’s subsidiary Halliburton Holding Limited, the United 
Kingdom parent of Brown & Root Ltd., will own 51 per cent of DML. 
The other owners of DML will be The Weir Group plc (24.5 percent) 
and BICC PLC (24.5 percent). 
“Devonport Royal Dockyard, located in Plymouth, England, 
principally provides repair and refitting services for the British Royal 
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Navy’s fleet of submarines and surface ships. DML has operated the 
dockyard under a “government-owned-contractor-operated” term 
contract since April 1987. Following the dockyard acquisition, DML will 
continue to provide the large majority of its services to the British Royal 
Navy.” (Marcus, 1997: 1) 
 
Significantly, Dick Cheney, Halliburton’s chairman at the time, concluded the 
press release by stating: 
 
“We are pleased that Halliburton is able to participate in the United 
Kingdom’s privatization of this important naval facility. Because of 
Brown & Root’s active involvement in the management and operation 
of the dockyard during the past nine years we are confident that private 
ownership will bring real benefits to the United Kingdom defense 
program and provide DML’s owners with a significant business 
enterprise.” (Marcus, 1997: 1) 
 
In 1998, Fleet Support Limited (FSL) was established as an engineering and 
support services company to manage Portsmouth naval dockyard. Providing 
an integrated ship design, build and ‘through life support community’ the 
company was a 50/50 joint venture between BAe Systems and the Vosper 
Thornycroft Group. In 2002: 
 
“Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB) and Fleet Support Limited (FSL) 
entered into an 11 year Strategic Partnering Agreement…with the aim 
of delivering substantial improvements in the efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of the Naval Base. Partnering involved the company 
taking responsibility for delivering many of the naval base outputs such 
as Fleet Time Engineering, Waterfront Services and Logistics along 
with many supporting functions such as estates management. The 
agreement also involved a substantial change to FSL’s Ship Repair 
Business (the former Fleet Maintenance and Repair Organisation) to 
support open competition in the Warship Repair Market.” (Swain, 2005: 
9) 
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Having now transferred into private ownership the UK’s shipbuilding and naval 
dockyards, the Ministry of Defence had effectively established an internal 
market in which different providers competed for Royal Navy contracts and 
work. Shipbuilding, maintenance and repair were no longer the preserve of 
government owned monopolies. They were now subject to greater degrees of 
market competition and forms of governance increasingly reliant on interlinked 
partnership working.  
 
3.2.6 Royal Aircraft Establishment 
 
In 1988, the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) was renamed the Royal 
Aerospace Establishment. Originally created in 1908 as HM Balloon Factory 
and in 1911 renamed the Royal Aircraft Factory, ‘RAE’ was a Ministry of 
Defence research establishment. However, on 1 April 1991 it became part of 
the MoD’s new research organisation, the Defence Research Agency (DRA). 
 
3.2.7 Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 
 
Four years later, on 1 April 1995, the DRA merged with a number of other 
MOD research organisations to form the new Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency (DERA). In 2001, DERA was then itself divided into two 
new organisations. While one part, the Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory (DSTL) remained in the public sector the other division - some two 
thirds of DERA - was privatised as the company, QuinetiQ (Massey and 
Shidlo, 2010).  
 
3.2.8 New Roles for the Royal Navy 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the very early 1990s the major 
priority of the Royal Navy remained its long planned provision of the UK’s 
independent nuclear deterrent through four Vanguard Class submarines each 
armed with Trident II missiles and nuclear warheads (Grove, 2005). Moreover, 
following the rapid decline in the capabilities of the Soviet military and in 
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particular the Russian Navy, from 1991 onwards, the Royal Navy’s role and 
structure came under increased scrutiny. As a consequence of continuing 
budgetary pressures and a desire on the part of the Treasury to reap the 
rewards of a post-cold war ‘peace dividend’, the Royal Navy experienced a 
plethora of cuts. While in 1990 the government had produced its defence 
paper ‘Options for Change’ (Ministry of Defence, 1990), it soon became 
apparent that with such conflicts as in Iraq and Yugoslavia the world was not 
only becoming more unsettled but: 
 
“There seemed…to be a greater likelihood than for many years of the 
UK armed forces being involved with crises around the world, probably 
in conjunction with the UN, NATO or other allies.” (Beedall, 2006) 
 
As a consequence of this new and increasingly globalised and differentiated 
reality (Rhodes, 1994) the Royal Navy started to adapt to a fundamentally 
new role (Grove, 2005). Now much less concerned with the maintenance of 
anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic it started to consider an 
increased range of capabilities of what where then termed ‘out of area’ 
operations. In addition to its primary deterrent role, by 1992, the Royal Navy 
had identified three core capabilities that it subsequently prioritised (Grove 
2005): 
 
1. The development of an enhanced amphibious force capability; 
2. A new generation of Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSNs); 
3. A new generation of large aircraft carriers (CVF). 
 
To free up resources and successfully invest in these areas senior navy 
commanders had to operate in an increasingly tight fiscal environment. As 
such:  
 
“The six years 1992-1997 saw the RN close many bases and other 
shore facilities and lose 33% of its uniformed strength (from 62,400 at 1 
January 1992 to 41,368 at 1 June 1997)” (Beedall, 2006).  
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It was during this period that the Navy’s destroyer and frigate force declined 
from forty-five ships to thirty-five. While the nuclear submarine (SSN) force 
was reduced from fifteen boats to twelve (including in 1992 the 
decommissioning of HMS Swiftsure after only nineteen years service), the 
conventional submarine (SSK) force was eliminated with the 
decommissioning of the navy’s Oberon class units and the lease of four 
completely new Upholder Class submarines to Canada. Similarly, the Royal 
Navy’s mine-sweeper and mine-hunter force was halved. Not only did the 
navy lose its remaining Ton Class vessels, but, its replacements for the aging 
Type 42 Batch 1 destroyers were postponed (Grove, 2005). 
 
3.2.9 Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service and Serco  
 
In 1996, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service (RMAS), which had been the 
government agency that traditionally ran a variety of civilian manned support 
vessels for the Royal Navy (Carrington, 2001) had much of its work 
contracted out to commercial tender by the Warship Support Agency. As 
such, many navy tugs, lifting craft and a host of other support vessels were 
now provided by the private sector. With Serco Denholm becoming the 
preferred bidder, the RMAS was formally disbanded in March 2008 (see 
Chapter II). 
 
3.2.10 New Labour’s Strategic Defence Review 
 
In July 1998, the government announced that as part of its Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) (Robertson, 1998), the Royal Navy was to have a new 
operational concept for maritime forces and one that emphasised joint 
operations alongside the British Army and the Royal Air Force (RAF). Known 
as the maritime contribution to joint operations the Royal Navy was now 
destined to: 
 
“Play a key role in the new Joint Rapid Reaction Forces; 
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“Make maximum use of the navy’s inherent mobility and 
flexibility, together with our ability to deploy early and operate 
independent off shore support; 
“Provide an amphibious force, reinforced when required by Army 
tanks, armoured vehicles and attack helicopters; 
“Deploy joint combat air power from all three services using 
fixed wing aircraft and attack and support helicopters; 
“Provide, support and defend the sealift vessels required to 
sustain operations of all kinds; 
“Help to deter conflict and forestall crises where possible, and; 
“When required, support the movement of land and air forces 
ashore throughout the subsequent campaign.” (Beedall, 2006) 
 
Following the SDR these aims and objectives were to be achieved through: 
 
“A renewed commitment to an amphibious brigade as a highly trained 
and ready force, with better equipment including armoured all terrain 
vehicles, heavier artillery and weapon locating radar; 
“A major commitment to improved amphibious shipping, 
including the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, roll-on/roll-off ships, 
landing ships logistic and the two landing platforms dock, HMS Albion 
and HMS Bulwark; 
“Plans for the procurement of two larger aircraft carriers, able to 
operate fixed-wing and the full spectrum of defence helicopters; 
“Fitting all attack submarines to be able to operate the 
Tomahawk land attack missile; 
“Continued reliance on modern frigates and destroyers, whose 
flexibility allows a wide range of employment in operations of all kinds; 
“Continuing investment in mine countermeasures to enable us to 
undertake force projection in littoral waters; 
“A shift of emphasis towards joint training with land and air force 
units, particularly as part of the new Joint Rapid Reaction Forces.” 
(Beedall, 2006) 
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Following the SDR other major points that affected the Royal Navy included: 
 
“The number of nuclear warheads on each Trident submarine is 
reduced from 96 to 48; 
“The number of Trident missile purchases will be reduced from 
65 to 58; 
“No further Merlin helicopters will be ordered beyond the current 
44. This will require more Lynx to be upgraded to Mark 8 and some 
Sea King Mk6 will not be replaced; 
“RN Harrier FA2 and RAF Harrier GR7 forces are to be 
integrated in a “Joint Force 2000” programme; 
“Anti-ship role RAF Tornado’s are to be withdrawn from service.” 
(Beedall, 2006) 
 
However, the review also concluded that: “No further cuts in RN manpower 
are planned” (Beedall, 2006).  
 
Overall, the review prescribed a profound re-alignment of the UK’s military 
forces and posture. No longer primarily tasked to fight major broad-front wars 
the main objective now was to provide a more flexible joint rapid reaction 
capability and one that enabled a powerful intervention in a wide range of 
crises around the world. Containing mixed news for the Royal Navy the 
Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, stated: “For the RN, the 
emphasis will move from large scale open-ocean warfare to force projection 
and littoral operations in conjunction with the other two Services, with a 
premium on versatility and deployability. We will match the front line more 
closely to today’s requirements so that manpower can be used to maximum 
effect where it is really needed.” (Robertson, 1998)  
 
Significantly, it was at this time that Robertson announced that the Royal 
Navy would now have two new large aircraft carriers, four additional roll on roll 
off container ships, and two replacement landing ships (logistic) (Grove, 
2005). He also announced that all the navy’s Trafalgar class submarines 
would be made capable of firing its 1,000-mile range Tomahawk Land Attack 
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Missiles. Moreover, over the longer term the navy was to have five new Astute 
Class submarines and the Royal Navy Reserve was to be increased by 350 
personnel to a total of 3,850. However, to deliver these changes the 
government also announced that the navy’s attack submarine force would be 
reduced from twelve boats to ten and its combined total of destroyers and 
frigates would be reduced from thirty-five to thirty-two ships (Robertson, 
1998). 
 
3.2.11 Point Class Vessels  
 
While the 1998 SDR announced that “it has been decided that to meet our 
sealift requirement an additional four roll-on-roll-off container vessels will be 
acquired” (Beedall, 2006) by the following year the Ministry of Defence had 
concluded that two existing roll-on-roll-off vessels would be replaced and that 
therefore the total requirement was for six new ships. Significantly, it was 
decided that this programme would be funded by a long range Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) arrangement and that providing the ships were 
equipped and classed as merchant vessels they could become available for 
private commercial activities when not required by the Ministry of Defence.  
 
In October 2000, the government announced that the UK company AWSR 
Shipping Ltd had been chosen as the preferred bidder for a twenty five year 
contract to provide the service. And in June 2002 the government: “…finally 
announced that negotiations with AWSR Shipping Ltd had been concluded 
and a…contract that will run until 2024 had been finally signed.” (Beedall, 
2006) At the time, the authoritative web site Navy Matters commented:  
 
“Based on a projected usage, the service is worth some £950 million, 
of which some £800 million is likely to be spent in the United Kingdom. 
The service will be available from 2003. The full six-ship service will 
only be required for major operations and exercises and under the 
terms of the contract the service providers can make ships available for 
the generation of commercial revenue at times when they are not 
needed by the MOD” (Beedall, 2006). 
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While the contract specified that AWSR Shipping Ltd is responsible for the 
provision of crews and the operation and maintenance of the ships over the 
twenty-five years, it was also agreed that while in MoD use the company 
would provide a completely British officer and merchant seamen crew.3 
Moreover, after a phase-in period: “…these seafarers will be eligible for call 
out as Sponsored Reserves for operational requirements.” (Beedall, 2006) 
 
Eventually delivered into service at the end of 2003, each of these 23,000 
tonne (full load) vessels have contract crews of eighteen people, a maximum 
speed of twenty-two knots and more than 2,500 lane meters available for 
military vehicles. With each ship able to carry a cargo that can include twenty-
five Challenger-2 main battle tanks, twenty-four Warrior Armoured Personnel 
Carriers, and a sizeable number of 155mm self propelled artillery guns, 
vehicles and trailers, they significantly enhance the UK’s military sea borne 
strategic lift capacity (Beedall, 2006). They also signal another important 
advance from government to ‘governance’ in that they involve the buying-in of 
commercial ships, personnel and capabilities previously undertaken in-house 
by the Weberian state. 
 
3.2.12 Astute Class Nuclear Submarine Training 
 
In September 2001, the MoD awarded a key thirty year training contract 
believed to be worth around £300 million to the UK based FAST consortium. 
A private joint venture company owned by BAE Systems and Finmeccanica 
Spa of Italy, CAE Inc., of Canada and Flagship (a joint venture company 
owned by BAE Systems, VT and Johnson Controls of America) the contract 
was for the training of crew members on the Royal Navy’s latest generation of 
nuclear powered attack submarines: the Astute Class. 
 
In September 2004, BAE Systems reported that Flagship Training Ltd had 
been awarded a £20 million extension to their Astute Class training contract. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This rule does not apply when the ships are in commercial use. 
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Asserting that the “packages will be delivered by Flagship using a purpose-
built training facility at HMS Faslane base on the Clyde” (BAe Systems, 2004) 
the company concluded: “The training programmes will be designed over the 
next few years and Flagship will begin delivering the programmes in Spring 
2007.” (BAe Systems, 2004) 
 
3.2.13 900 Reviews 
 
In line with the ideas surrounding policy networks, an increasingly 
differentiated polity and the hollowing out of the state, in March 2003 The 
Observer newspaper published a major article by Nick Mathiason entitled ‘The 
first privatised war’. Initially dwelling on the looming conflict with Iraq, 
Mathiason noted that after years of significant economic reform, the Ministry 
of Defence was now: “…poised to enter into a welter of partnerships with 
business, ushering in the most fundamental shake-up of the military for more 
than 100 years” (Mathiason, 2003). Providing an overview of the 
government’s thinking on the future he wrote: 
 
“Entire training, logistics and supply operations are set to be hived off 
to big business in the most far-reaching intrusion of the private sector 
into what was considered the state’s preserve. More than 900 
procedural reviews by MoD officials and consultants are coming to a 
head.” (Mathiason, 2003)   
 
He continued: 
 
“There are strong indications from within the ministry and unions that a 
shift is under way from the armed forces’ procurement body being a 
‘decider and provider’ of logistic support to an ‘intelligent decider’ that 
may contract out most requirements.” (Mathiason, 2003) 
 
3.2.14 Defence Logistics Organisation 
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In 2002, the leading management consultancy McKinsey published a strategic 
plan for the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO). Turning over more than £6 
billion a year and representing some twenty five percent of the MoD’s total 
budget the report recommended a vision for the DLO in which it would be 
required to: “…leverage industrial capacity and shape our relationship with 
industry” (Mathiason, 2003). Commenting on its conclusions, Mathiason 
asserted: “The shift will be welcomed by companies such as Compass and 
Sodexho, which provide food services, and a host of defence contracts” 
(Mathiason, 2003). Moving to the issue of the training of military personnel, 
the article continued: 
 
“Training of troops is the other main area of focus. BAE Systems and 
VT Group, the shipbuilder and defence PFI specialist, along with 
Thales and a number of building firms, are set to benefit hugely from 
lucrative new contracts. Training schools for the Army, Royal Navy and 
Royal Air Force are now separate, but they are set to amalgamate in 
what could be a property bonanza.” (Mathiason, 2003) 
 
 
3.2.15 Intelligence and Security 
 
Finally, turning to such Weberian matters of ‘core state’ military intelligence 
and security, Mathiason concluded: 
 
“Most controversially, perhaps, management of the armed forces’ 
secret files – which cover Northern Ireland, the Gulf war and a host of 
sensitive and historic areas – is set to be handed over to a private 
contractor. Two private firms are vying to take on the contract, move 
staff from west London to the North and computerise the records.” 
(Mathiason, 2003) 
 
3.2.16 Training 
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On 6 May 2005, the local Portsmouth newspaper, The News, reported 
looming trade union fears over the possible privatisation of naval personnel 
training. Under the heading, ‘Job axe fears over bid to privatise many bases’, 
the article asserted that hundreds of positions were “hanging in the balance 
as ministers decide whether to privatise the Royal Navy’s training bases” 
(Rosamond, 2005: 25). The article continued: “Worried employees of HMS 
Sultan in Gosport and HMS Collingwood at Fareham fear jobs will be lost 
under the massive shake-up.” (Rosamond, 2005: 25)  
 
Reporting trade union concerns that the government’s Defence Training 
Review (DTR) would lead to a fall in the standards of instruction for sailors, 
soldiers and airmen the article continued: “Three consortiums are vying to 
take over the specialist training of all three armed services in a deal worth 
between £17bn and £19bn, involving thousands of instructors and support 
staff. Due to take effect from 2007, the 25-year lease will be the biggest 
private finance deal yet struck by the Ministry of Defence. The winning firms 
are guaranteed the contract for at least 15 years, irrespective of performance” 
(Rosamond, 2005: 25). The article concluded: “An MoD spokesman said: 
“Some posts will be affected by relocation, but…It’s about a significant 
investment in defence training which will create far better facilities, although 
there will be savings through more efficient use of the estate.” (Rosamond, 
2005: 25) 
 
On 18 July 2006, members of the Public and Commercial Services Union 
(PCS) commenced a twenty-four hour candlelit vigil in front of the MoD’s main 
building in London’s Whitehall. Concerned over advancing government plans 
to privatise naval and defence training, Paul Barnsley, the PCS’s national 
officer for the MoD said: 
 
“These plans put at risk the future quality of the training of our armed 
services. The MoD have disgracefully told their staff that they cannot 
bid for their own jobs and are to be denied the opportunity to put 
together an in-house bid. 
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“Today they will make clear that they are not prepared to work 
for the private sector as they believe that the unquenchable thirst for 
profit that will result will lead to a drop in standards and quality to 
ensure shareholder dividends.” (Berry, 2006) 
 
On 17 January 2007 the Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, 
announced that the Metrix consortium was to be awarded both training 
contracts. Arguing that the DTR will provide “the best possible specialist 
training by creating National Centres of Excellence, through a programme of 
investment, rationalisation and modernisation”, the government announced 
that: “St Athan, in the Vale of Glamorgan, South Wales, will be home to a new 
tri-service Defence Training campus. Improvement and investments are also 
planned on a number of other training sites…We expect the anticipated 
solutions to eventually reduce the current defence training estate from about 
30 current sites to about 10 in the future, with a main campus to be located at 
St Athan.” (UK Parliament, 17 January 2007). 
 
Overall, the awarded training contracts covered a number of disciplines which 
included aeronautical engineering, communications and information systems, 
electro-mechanical engineering, logistics and personnel administration, MoD 
police and guarding, and finally, security, languages, intelligence and 
photography services.  
 
3.2.17 Small Warship PPP 
 
By the end of 2003, Vosper Thornycroft Shipbuilding had completed the 
delivery of three new River Class offshore patrol vessels for the Royal Navy. 
The first ship of the class, HMS Tyne, entered service with the navy in 
January 2003; HMS Severn entered service in June 2003 and HMS Mersey 
followed in December 2003.  
 
During 2000 and 2001, VT had successfully submitted a proposal and tender 
to the MoD from which it was finally awarded the contract for the ships in April 
2001. However, under a contractual ‘lease arrangement’, the company 
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financed the capital development and construction costs of the vessels 
(estimated at £60 million) and subsequently chartered the ships to the Ministry 
of Defence for five years. As such, the Royal Navy did not actually own them: 
“Instead, VT retains ownership of the ships and charters them for a period of 
five yeas; added to this is a daily charge for full Contractor Logistics Support” 
(Labone, 2006). 
 
In January 2007, the lease charter was extended for another five years, from 
2008 to 2013. Under the terms of the agreement, VT’s Integrated Logistics 
division is contracted to provide key logistical and maintenance support for the 
vessels. 
 
3.2.18 HMS Clyde 
 
In February 2005, the MoD placed another contract with VT, this time for a 
River Class (Batch 2 variant) designed to be deployed as the new Falkland 
Islands patrol ship (replacing HMS Leeds Castle and HMS Dumbarton 
Castle). In early September 2006 the new ship, HMS Clyde, was formally 
named at an evening ceremony at VT’s shipbuilding facilities within the 
confines of Portsmouth naval dockyard. The first ship to be constructed in the 
naval base since 1967 (when the Leander Class frigate HMS Andromeda was 
built), the vessel was finally ready to commence operations in the South 
Atlantic in 2007. Like the three ships of Batch 1, HMS Clyde came under a 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) programme that now sees the private sector 
supplying key service elements traditionally delivered by state owned 
organisations.  
 
In recent years VT has established what it calls a Contractor Logistics Support 
service (CLS) which according to the company’s Project Manager, Richard 
Labone, breaks: “…new ground in the provision of support and naval vessels” 
(Labone, 2006). Today, VT’s Naval Support division has developed a CLS 
capability that can even support HMS Clyde “…some 6,000 miles away” 
(Labone, 2006). According to Labone: 
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“The fundamental element of the charter and CLS service is that VT 
Naval Support gets paid by results. Only when the ships are available 
for MoD tasking is the MoD liable for costs, working to a minimum 
requirement that VT must make each ship available for 320 days a 
year, this demands a comprehensive, capable and effective CLS 
organisation which has a demonstrable track record.” (Labone, 2006) 
 
Assessing the success of the charter and CLS service, VT asserted that: 
 
“In the first year, the River Class ships achieved 97.5 per cent 
availability of the required number of operational days, compared to an 
average of 82 per cent availability for the ships that they replaced. 
Besides availability, the quality of accommodation on board and 
operational effectiveness have both underlined the value and design 
and the package that VT has put together to provide such an 
innovative solution.” (Labone, 2006) 
 
Initially, the CLS process had been developed from VT’s experience with the 
navy’s Echo Class of survey ships (HMS Echo, launched in March 2002, and; 
HMS Enterprise, launched in April 2002). Although VT Naval Support 
provided these ships with an “extensive 25-year CLS programme…including 
the presence of a VT-sponsored reserve on board to carry out first-line 
maintenance of the ships’ complex electronic systems” the MoD had still 
covered the capital expenditure involved in actually building these ships. 
Indeed, it is in this context that HMS Clyde represents “a step further in the 
provision of effective customer focused support” (Labone, 2006): 
 
“With a fully Integrated Project Team (IPT) of VT Shipbuilding, VT 
Naval Support and DLO representatives, the exacting demands and 
specifications required for this vessel will be met. Lessons learned 
have been incorporated in the design, whilst the partnering 
arrangements established across the stakeholder community have 
further enhanced the effectiveness of the project team in delivering a 
quality product. VT Naval Support will be required to make the ship 
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available for sea at least 282 days a year through a round-the-clock, 
global maintenance commitment including repairs and spares.” 
(Labone, 2006) 
 
According to Larry Purkiss who in 2006 was the CLS Manager for the DLO:  
 
“VT and the UK MOD have, in partnering, worked together to develop 
the policies and procedures to deliver whole ship Contractor Logistic 
Support for the River Class [ships] and the Echo Class Survey vessels. 
“This has enabled the ships to exceed the very challenging 
availability targets and delivered significant cost savings for the MOD. 
The working relationship continues to mature and the lessons learned 
are proving invaluable in the development of the support solution for 
HMS Clyde. 
“The success that has been achieved with this innovative 
approach to whole ship support is attracting genuine worldwide interest 
and VT can be justified in claiming that they are world leaders in this 
field.” (Labone, 2006) 
 
Purkiss concluded: 
 
“[A] VT-sponsored reserve will also be deployed to work alongside the 
ship’s crew managing certain maintenance aspects, effectively 
managing the CLS element in situ. Besides manpower, another 
pressing challenge will be the fast transit of spares beyond those 
available on board or ashore….Although most maintenance will be 
carried out at sea or on short stays at Mare Harbour or Port Stanley, 
there will be a requirement at times for longer periods of maintenance. 
With the likelihood that the ship will never return to UK waters 
throughout her operating life, VT Naval Support is looking at various 
regional options to offer suitable docking facilities...Nevertheless, the 
support services and shipbuilding arms of VT are confident that they 
can fulfill the requirement and provide the MoD with a cheaper and 
more robust South Atlantic patrol presence…” (Labone, 2006). 
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As a result of mergers and acquisitions that variously saw VT taken over by 
British Aerospace (BAe) and Babcock, in 2011, BAe won the contract to 
maintain the ship in the Falkland Islands until 2018. With private maintenance 
personnel stationed onboard since 2007, the private sector has consistently 
had the ship “ready for use by the Navy more than 99 per cent of the time” 
(Merco Press, 2011). In recent years the River Class has attracted interest 
from a range of overseas customers interested in them fulfilling Economic 
Exclusion Zone (EEZ) patrol duties including disaster relief, fire-fighting, 
rescue work and interception. 	  
3.2.19 Continuing Cuts 
 
In July 2004, the MoD listed an important series of changes for the Royal 
Navy as part of its Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future 
Capabilities review (Ministry of Defence, 2004). While it announced 
‘significant’ yet classified increases to the strength of British special forces 
and new investments in their equipment, and it confirmed the government’s 
desire for the Royal Navy to have its two new ‘super carriers’ it also 
announced that the navy’s overall manpower was to be reduced by a further 
1,500 personnel (Grove, 2005).  
 
The review also specified a reduced purchase of the navy’s new Type 45 
destroyers from 12 to 8 vessels; a reduced force of Type 23 frigates from 16 
to 13 vessels by March 2006; a reduced force of nuclear attack submarines 
from 12 to 8 boats by December 2008; a reduced force of mine 
countermeasure vessels from 19 to 16 by April 2005; the paying off of the 
Northern Ireland patrol fleet of three Hunt Class mine hunters by April 2007, 
and; the early retirement of three of the oldest Type 42 destroyers. As such, a 
summary of warships paid off without replacement included: HMS Cardiff, 
HMS Newcastle, HMS Glasgow, HMS Norfolk, HMS Marlborough, HMS 
Grafton, HMS Superb, HMS Trafalgar, HMS Brecon, HMS Cottesmore, HMS 
Dulverton, HMS Bridport and HMS Inverness. As these cuts started to impact, 
Admiral Sir Alan West, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, 
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publicly warned in early 2006 that any further reduction to the number of the 
navy’s warships would seriously jeopardise its operational capability. On this 
point he said:  
 
“I don’t think anything should ever be sacred but we do have to be 
careful that we do not reduce the navy to a level that makes recovery 
difficult….It takes a long time to build up a maritime force that can cope 
with both the expected and the unexpected. The UK’s security depends 
on having the right range of maritime capabilities.” (Rayment, 2006) 
 
In a direct reference to the planned government cuts that had been proposed 
prior to the 1982 Falkland’s crisis and strongly echoing the hollowing out of 
the state thesis, Admiral West warned:  
 
“Whenever the UK has got to the stage where it is spending too little on 
defence the nation has suffered, due to some unforeseen event not 
long afterwards….You can only have what the Government and the 
public are prepared to set aside for defence spending.” (Rayment, 
2006) 
 
3.2.20 The Coalition’s Strategic Defence and Security Review 
 
Following the election of a Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition 
government in early 2010, the government published its Strategic Defence 
and Security Review in October of the same year (HM Government, 2010). 
Overseeing a reduction in MoD budget of 7.7% over four years its central 
financial objective was to address a £38 billion overspend in the military’s 
procurement budget (Taylor, Claire and Lunn, 2010). It is in this context that 
the Royal Navy’s head count was again reduced from 35,000 to 30,000 
personnel (HM Government, 2010). The navy’s flagship aircraft carrier, HMS 
Ark Royal, was decommissioned almost immediately (rather than in 2014 as 
had been expected) and the First Sea Lord was told that either HMS Ocean or 
HMS Illustrious also had to be decommissioned (it was subsequently 
confirmed that the latter is to be withdrawn from service in 2014). The Fleet 
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Air Arm lost its Harrier aircraft and one of the Albion class landing platform 
dock ships was put into reserve on extended readiness (BBC News, 19 
October 2010). Moreover, the review stipulated that one of the Royal Fleet 
Auxiliary’s (RFA) Bay class landing ship dock vessels (RFA Largs Bay) had to 
be decommissioned; whereupon it was sold to the Royal Australian Navy for 
£100m (UK Parliament, 15 December 2010). The review also reduced the 
number of nuclear warheads carried on each of the fleet’s Vanguard class 
submarines from 48 to 40. And it delayed by four years the replacement of the 
UK’s nuclear deterrent. Finally, the navy’s number of frigates and destroyers 
was reduced to just twenty ships (Fig.5).  
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 Fig.5. Decline in the numbers of Major Royal Navy Warships 1990-2012.  
 
 
3.2.21 Royal Fleet Auxiliary PPP 
 
Prior to the Strategic Defence and Security Review, the previous government 
had announced in December 2009 that it was considering a ‘privatisation of 
the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’ (Independent, 2009). Under the heading “Navy 
supply fleet ‘to be privatised’, as MoD seeks £200m cuts” the Independent 
newspaper reported:  
 
“The Ministry of Defence is expected to take the first steps tomorrow 
towards privatising the fleet that supplies Britain’s warships. It will 
announce a review into the future of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) as 
part of a series of cost-cutting measures which should be announced 
early next year” (Independent, 2009). 
 
With trades union leaders reportedly believing the ‘privatisation’ to be a “done 
deal” they nevertheless expressed concern that the RFA Flotilla could be 
“manned with cheap labour from countries such as the Philippines” 
(Independent, 2009). They also expressed concern “that new ships will be 
built in China or India rather than Britain” (Independent, 2009).  
 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, ministerial sources were reported 
as saying that “the MoD is struggling with severe cash-flow problems” and 
one source spoke of “blind panic…such is the scale of the cash crisis” 
(Independent, 2009). Commenting on what he believed to be the strategic 
dangers of ‘RFA privatisation’, the Labour parliamentarian John McDonnel MP 
argued: 
 
“There will be a lot of anger. It is lunatic in the extreme at this point in 
time – who in their right minds would make us vulnerable in this way? 
It’s extraordinary…It comes close to a general election and covers a lot 
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of concerns – from security to the principle of privatisation” 
(Independent, 2009). 
 
The leader of the Rail, Maritime and Transport (RMT) union, Bob Crow, said: 
 
“…this is purely a cost-saving exercise. The only way they could save 
large sums of money is by cutting the cost of the staff. So the people 
who supply the fleet with fuel and munitions would be casual labour, 
and it doesn’t take much imagination to see the inherent security risks 
in that. It could also mean that new ships are built in India or China, 
rather than British shipyards.” (Independent, 2009) 
 
In response, an MoD spokeswoman countered:  
 
“The ministry is looking at ways we can improve efficiency across 
defence. We are considering a number of options, how we can achieve 
this, and trade unions are fully engaged in the process. No decision 
has yet been made.” (Independent, 2009) 
 
Then, in December 2010, government ministers indicated that the “Royal 
Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) will not be privatised…[although]…it will still face cuts…” 
(Defence Management, 2010). During a debate in Parliament, Defence 
Minister Andrew Robathan said that there was “insufficient evidence” to justify 
privatisation after an “informal market exercise” had concluded that “industry 
would not be prepared to shoulder the capital and operating risks in running 
the current fleet” (Defence Management, 2010). The minister continued: 
 
“While there was strong commercial interest in contractorisation of the 
RFA and the industry would be prepared to operate the service at all 
threat levels…[and]…although the study concluded that there might be 
scope for some market efficiency savings, no enthusiasm was 
expressed for either acquiring the existing RFA flotilla in whole or in 
part – or assuming both the capital and operating risks. On that basis, 
therefore, there is insufficient evidence in favour of changing the 
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current RFA business model, which has served us well for a number of 
years” (Defence Management, 2010). 
 
Four months later, in March 2011, the Conservative MP for Wycombe, Steve 
Baker, asked the Secretary of State for Defence what “his policy is on the 
involvement of the private sector in the Royal Navy in addition to the Royal 
Fleet Auxiliary?” (UK Parliament, 15 March 2010) In reply, defence minister 
Nick Harvey MP stated:  
 
“The private sector supports the Naval Service in a range of contracted 
out activities through commercial policy arrangements and includes 
training, maintenance, catering and cleaning. Additionally, under a 
private finance initiative arrangement six roll-on/roll-off sealift ships (the 
Point Class) are used to transport military cargoes when required. 
These are civilian ships with British based crews who are required to 
be sponsored reserves as a condition of service.” (UK Parliament, 15 
March 2010) 
 
 
3.2.22 Private Armed Guards Protect UK Ships 
 
With the subject of the possible privatisation of some of the Royal Navy’s 
larger vessels now the subject of continued Parliamentary debate it was not 
long before the idea of the private production of naval sea power took another 
dramatic step forward. In February 2011, key players in the London insurance 
market announced their plans for a “private navy to fight piracy” (Lloyds 
Loading List, 21 February 2011). As Lloyds Loading List reported at the time: 
 
“Insurance firms in London plan to defeat Somali piracy by creating a 
private fleet designed to escort vessels across the Gulf of Aden. 
Insurers devised the Convoy Escort Programme (CEP), which could 
come into action by the summer, in a bid to reduce the costs of insuring 
vessels and their cargo and crew” (Lloyds Loading List, 21 February 
2011). 
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Outlining the consortium behind the plan, Lloyds Loading List continued: 
 
“Sean Wollerson, a partner in the marine, oil and gas division at 
insurance broker Jardine Lloyd Thompson (JLT) and a key designer of 
the plan, has estimated that approximately US$27.5 million would be 
needed to purchase 18 second-hand vessels. The project is also being 
worked on by insurance underwriters, including Ascot Underwriting. 
The shipping industry has already shown its support for the initiative 
and the Baltic and International Maritime Council (Bimco) has agreed 
to help facilitate the programme.” (Lloyds Loading List, 21 February 
2011) 
 
Commenting on the hollowing out of the state economics of “war-risk 
insurance cover”, the article concluded:  
 
“The aim is for ship-owners to buy the armed escort service, packaged 
with seven days of war-risk cover from Ascot Underwritings’ Lloyd’s 
Syndicate 1414. In doing so, the ship-owner will not need to pay the 
normal higher premium required to transit high-risk pirate areas. It has 
been reported that each insurance-funded vessel will carry eight armed 
security personnel, four crew and inflatable speedboats. Woolerson 
said the programme would allow any vessel looking for protection when 
transiting the Gulf of Aden to do so through its Lloyd’s of London 
broker” (Lloyds Loading List, 21 February 2011). 
 
Then, in October 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that 
ships sailing under a UK flag would in future be able to carry private armed 
guards to protect them from pirates. Pointing out that 49 of the world’s 53 
hijackings in 2010 were off the coast of Somalia (BBC News, 30 October 
2011), Cameron said that under the plans the Home Secretary would be given 
the power to license private armed guards for ships. While the government 
claimed that “No ship carrying armed security has been hijacked” (BBC News, 
30 October 2011), the BBC asserted:  
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“It is thought many British-registered ships already carry armed guards 
because they feel they have no alternative” (BBC News, 30 October 
2011).  
 
Commenting on this significant shift in government policy away from 
Weberian monopoly towards the differentiated protection of British vessels, 
the BBC’s security correspondent Gordon Corera wrote: 
 
“Until now, vessels flying the British flag have not been licensed to 
carry their own weapons on board…Pirates operating out of Somalia 
now range over around three million square miles of sea leaving 
existing navy patrols stretched. The hope will be that armed patrols act 
as a deterrent, but there are risks. Some experts warn of the danger of 
an escalation in the violence with pirates responding with heavier 
weapons” (BBC News, 30 October 2011). 
 
When Mr Cameron was asked on BBC television’s Andrew Marr Show if he 
was comfortable with giving private security personnel the right to “shoot to 
kill”, the Prime Minister responded “We have to make choices” (BBC News, 
30 October 2011). He added: “I want to make sure more of these pirates 
actually face justice” (BBC News, 30 October 2011). However, while Brigadier 
Paul Gibson argued that the Royal Marines should have been given the task 
of arming the ships (BBC News, 30 October 2011), back in July 2011, the 
Foreign Office Minister Henry Bellingham had already confirmed the 
government’s position. In reality, limited tax funded and state military 
resources meant it was:  
 
“…no longer possible to free up Royal Marines for a ship protection 
role” (BBC News, 30 October 2011). 
 
3.2.23 Outsourcing of Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Search and 
Rescue 
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In November 2011, the government announced the outsourcing of the Royal 
Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) search and rescue service. On 29 November 
the press reported that by:  
 
“2016 the country’s coastline and mountains will be patrolled by 
civilians replacing 90 RAF and Royal Navy pilots…The move will mean 
the end to 60 years of military search and rescue by servicemen who 
have saved thousands of lives both at sea and off mountain tops.” 
(Daily Telegraph, 29 November 2011) 
 
Despite ‘policy network lobbying’ to the contrary by the Duke of Cambridge 
who served as an RAF air sea rescue helicopter pilot, the government: 
“…pressed ahead with its original plans and announced yesterday that the 
Navy and RAF will “cease to provide” the service from 2015” (Daily Telegraph, 
29 November 2011). With the military’s distinctive yellow Sea King helicopters 
to be retired by March 2016, the search and rescue function is being 
transferred to the Department for Transport so that they can begin: “a 
procurement process for the private sector to provide civilian crews on a 10-
year contract” (Daily Telegraph, 29 November 2011). In explaining the move, 
Justine Greening, the Secretary of State for Transport said the new contract 
would enable the armed forces to “focus on their front line operations” (Daily 
Telegraph, 29 November 2011). Arguing that she believed the private sector 
would provide “a more reliable service” (Daily Telegraph, 29 November 2011), 
it was also reported that a new mix of privately deployed helicopters would 
range from the small Augusta Westland 139, to the larger Eurocopter NH90, 
Super Puma or the Merlin (Daily Telegraph, 29 November 2011). Significantly, 
the defence analyst for Jane’s Defence Weekly, Tim Ripley, described the 
outsourcing as having “serious implications” for the Weberian state’s 
monopoly. He asserted: 
 
“The most significant impact will be on the ability of the UK military to 
respond to major emergencies at home. The Sea Kings are the only 
military helicopters held at high readiness, in large numbers to respond 
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to a natural disaster, nuclear accident or major terrorist incident” (Daily 
Telegraph, 29 November 2011). 
 
3.2.24 Major Warship PPP 
 
Just as HMS Clyde remains a commissioned Royal Navy warship that is in 
reality owned by VT but leased to the navy under a Contractor Logistics 
Support (CLS) contract (see above), so the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) 
has now taken what is generically termed ‘Availability Contracting’ a step 
further with the recent launch of their ‘Fridtjof Nansen’ class of frigates (Fig.6). 
The first major warship class to be purchased and partly manned under a 
PPP:  
 
“The Fridtjof Nansen class remain the possessions of the builders, the 
Spanish shipbuilding giant IZAR” (Defence Management, 2006).  
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Fig.6. HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (F310) is the Lead Ship of the Norwegian 
Fridtjof Nansen Class of Warships.  
 
Moreover, when compared against the business model of the Royal Navy’s 
River Class patrol ship, HMS Clyde: 
 
“The main difference is in the greater extent of the contractors’ 
involvement in crewing the [Norwegian] ships. Not only are the 
shipbuilders responsible for support and maintenance, but they also 
supply up to half of the mariners. Although the (UK’s) River Class is 
large for a patrol vessel, the willingness of the RNoN to entrust fully-
fledged warships to crews containing large numbers of contractors is a 
further development of the concept of Availability Contracting, which 
has not yet penetrated the British Royal Navy. Although the Royal 
Navy’s commitment to Availability Contracting may now lag behind that 
of Norway, the River Class ships heralded a new level of Availability 
Contracting…and an evolution of the role private companies 
play…in…defence procurement” (Defence Management, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
3.2.25 Private Royal Yacht 
 
Alongside the arrival of major warship PPPs in Europe, in January 2012, the 
British government announced that it would “react favourably” to a new royal 
yacht being built solely with private funding (BBC News, 16 January 2012). 
Symbolic of the overall direction of UK naval sea power, the Future Ship 
Project for the 21st Century (FSP21) reportedly “involves building a ship 600ft 
long, to be used for trade and business events, as well as a training ship for 
200 young people”. Its maintenance would be in part be paid “by fees from 
university students staying on the ship” (Guardian, 16 January 2012).  
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While Rear Admiral David Bawtree, who was reportedly behind the plan (Fig.7 
below) confirmed that Mr Cameron wrote to him in October 2011 saying it was 
an “inspirational initiative that had his full support” (BBC News, 16 January 
2012), the then Education Secretary, Michael Gove, was criticised for 
suggesting that it could be a potential gift to the Queen from the nation to 
mark her Diamond Jubilee: 
 
“Downing Street emphasised that taxpayers’ money would not be used 
on any new royal yacht….There are scarce public resources. Therefore 
we do not think it would be appropriate to use public money at this 
time” (BBC News, 16 January 2012). 
 
Opposed to state funding, the press nevertheless reported: “David Cameron 
has swung behind plans for a new, privately funded royal yacht that will 
double up as a university of the seas, and provide accommodation for royalty 
in the ship’s stern” (Guardian, 16 January 2012). While the £60m yacht has 
already found “£10m in backing from financial leaders in Canada and an 
unnamed £5m private donation” (Guardian, 16 January 2012), Downing Street 
confirmed, “discussions have been held with Portsmouth city council for the 
yacht to be berthed in the south coast port” (Guardian, 16 January 2012). 
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Fig.7. Artists impression of the Future Ship Project for the 21st Century  
 
While the last royal yacht was decommissioned in 1997 on the grounds of 
cost, so the new proposals for a private ship have reportedly been met with 
the “enthusiastic backing of the Liberal Democrat controlled Portsmouth 
council” (Guardian, 16 January 2012). 
 
3.2.26 Privatisation of HMS Victory 
 
At the end of February 2012, it was announced that the Royal Navy was to 
sell its most historic and symbolically Weberian of warships as it requires 
substantial capital investment that the government can no longer afford. HMS 
Victory: 
 
“…the 247-year-old vessel will become the responsibility of the 
National Museum of the Royal Navy – which must then raise funds for 
its upkeep…Victory costs around £2million a year to maintain – and 
needs a £16 million restoration including replacing rigging and timber” 
(Sun, 29 February 2012). 
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While the ship cannot currently be used in association with any advertising as 
it is still on the navy list and therefore technically part of the fleet: “It will 
remain the Second Sea Lord’s flagship after the transfer, and ratings will work 
its decks. But by off-loading it, the new “owners” can apply for funds from 
private donors and even ask for Lottery Fund money” (Sun, 29 February 
2012). While one source was reported in the national press as saying “This 
will spark outrage. The bean-counters at the MoD are not interested in history, 
just the bottom line…” (Sun, 29 February 2012), former First Sea Lord, 
Admiral West concluded:  
 
“It is inevitable she will be used for corporate events – but if we have to 
go this route to prevent her turning into a wreck, so be it” (Sun, 29 
February 2012). 
 
Significantly, an MoD spokesman concluded:  
 
“We are considering options. Under consideration is how her future can 
be secured by responsible custodianship as befits such a national icon” 
(Sun, 29 February 2012).  
 
3.2.27 Britain’s First Private Navy in 200 Years 
 
At the beginning of 2013, it was reported that Britain’s first private navy in 
almost two centuries was to be created by a “group of businessmen to take on 
the Somali pirates who are terrorizing a 2.5m square mile expanse of the 
Indian Ocean” (The Sunday Times, 6 January 2013). According to the Sunday 
Times: 
 
“Its armed vessels – including a 10,000-ton mother ship and high-
speed armoured patrol boats – will be led by a former Royal Navy 
Commodore. He is recruiting 240 former marines and other sailors for 
the force. It will escort its first convoy of oil tankers, bulk carriers – and 
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possibly an occasional yacht – along the east coast of Africa in late 
March or April. (The Sunday Times, 6 January 2013) 
 
Typhon, the company fronting the venture, is chaired by Simon Murray and 
was reportedly set up because “the Royal Navy, Nato and the European 
Union Naval Force don’t have enough vessels to patrol the area” (The Sunday 
Times, 6 January 2013). Providing an economic critique of the Royal Navy 
and the benefits of hollowing out the Weberian state in favour of ever more 
private sector governance, Typhon’s chief executive, Anthony Sharp, asserts: 
“Deploying a billion-pound warship against six guys [pirates] with $500 of kit is 
not a very good use of the asset” (The Sunday Times, 6 January 2013). The 
fundamental problem of maximisation of naval sea power, whether for 
offensive, defensive, suppressive, protective or deterrent capabilities is one 
that Samuel Pepys was familiar with in the Royal Navy of 17th century. While 
according to John Cartner, no sovereign navy has ever come close to solving 
its challenges, he points out that tax funded fleets tend to end up loosing “the 
cost side of the equation” (Cartner, 2013): 
 
“Sovereigns have huge sums of money to spend on admiralty so cost 
becomes not the driving factor. Profit and capital to make profit do not 
view things that way. Cost is the driver in the commercial model” 
(Cartner, 2013). 
 
No doubt mindful of these realities Typhon is a venture led by the large 
commodity business Glencore International plc. Illustrative of the 
differentiated and increasingly hollowed out environment in which the Royal 
Navy now finds itself, Sharp describes how the venture came about: 
 
“I had the idea for Typhon while playing polo one afternoon, thinking 
about what my next business might be. I picked maritime security. Two 
years later we’re completing our funding round, acquiring our first 
vessel in weeks, and hope to be in theatre shortly after.” (Sibun, 6 
January 2012) 
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Hoping to place 10 vessels at sea, he concludes: 
 
“We’ll build this business over three years and sell it to someone like 
G4S or a US equivalent” (Sibun, 6 January 2012). 
 
 
3.3 Conclusion: Relevance of Royal Navy Modernisation to  
New Public Management  
 
An analysis of the Royal Navy’s path to ever-deeper forms of market reform 
reveals a previously unpublicised narrative concerning the evolution of UK 
naval sea power over the last thirty years. With the outsourcing, PPPs and/or 
privatisation of British Shipbuilders, Royal Naval Dockyards, the Royal 
Maritime Auxiliary Service, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Point Class Vessels, 
the Falkland Islands patrol ship, HMS Clyde, Naval and Air Search and 
Rescue Services, a possible Royal Yacht, that most historic icon of the fleet, 
HMS Victory, and the proposal by Typhon to launch a ‘private fleet’ (not to 
mention the private sector’s involvement in key aspects of naval training, 
intelligence and security), so the Royal Navy finds itself once again in a 
differentiated and competitive world where, facing and arguably being a core 
part of an increasingly hollowed out state, capacities such private armed 
guards now protect UK merchant ships, and elsewhere in Europe, major 
warship PPPs (including the provision of major elements of crews) has 
already become a reality.  
 
As is clear from the analytical framework presented earlier and this history, 
between 1981 and 2013, the ‘spear’ of British naval sea power has become 
increasingly reliant on private sector investment, expertise and discourse (see 
Table 1 below). Echoing seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
forms of differentiated political economy and all the attendant complexities of 
governance, accountability and outcomes that such a world brings (see 
Chapter II), it is to the fundamental question concerning the evolutionary path 
of naval sea power and the core state that the empirical research at the heart 
of this thesis attends. 
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Nationalisation Outsourcing PPPs        Privatisation 
 
Tax Funded   State contracts Joint        Privately Funded 
Monopoly Spear Private Building Commissioning   Market Spear 
   and Support of Design, Building 
   the Spear  Financing and 
       Operating the 
                                                                 Spear 
 
                                                                                                      2013 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Typhon Private Fleet 
------------------------------------------------------Major Warship PPP 
------------------------------------------------------Air Sea and Rescue PPP 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Private Armed Guards  
               Protect UK Ships 
-------------------------------------------------------RFA PPP 
-------------------------------------------------------HMS Clyde CLS PPP 
---------------------------Defence Logistics Organisation  
---------------------------Astute Class Nuclear Submarine Training 
---------------------------Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service and Serco 
---------------------------DERA 
---------------------------Royal Navy Dockyards 
---------------------------Rolls Royce 
---------------------------Royal Ordnance 
---------------------------British Shipbuilders 
1981 
 
Table 1. Shifting Political Economy of the ‘Spear’ of Modern British 
Naval Sea Power. 
 
For in asking the question, ‘how do influential agents in and around Weber’s 
nation-state monopoly now conceptualise legitimacy in political economy and 
what are the implications for New Public Management Theory?’, the study 
aims to analyse boundaries of discourse that, according to Weber, inherently 
undermine the state’s ‘quintessential function and signifier of being’. The 
broad evolutionary ‘paths’, ‘punctuations’ and ‘cycles’ of the British naval sea 
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power are important because they not only highlight the shifting sands of 
public management, administration and governance but, crucially, the private 
and/or public production of force and violence.  
 
Ultimately, Royal Navy modernisation is important to NPM and public 
administration because it facilitates a surfacing of temporal and attitudinal 
boundaries that are often overlooked by a body of knowledge primarily 
concerned with the ‘given’, the ‘now’ and a seemingly timeless ‘future’. Whilst 
since 1979, government policy has arguably fragmented service delivery and 
shifted control from front-line, top-down, bureaucracies to diffuse networks 
that span the public, private and voluntary sectors, so the shift from 
government to governance, and from bureaucracy to diffuse networks in and 
around civil and commercial society becomes clear. In a drive to deliver 
greater efficiency, large swathes of the ‘core state’ concerned with the 
production of force and violence has not only embraced numerous and 
significant market based reforms but, in the context of the debate surrounding 
the hollowing out of the state, has arguably even increased the potential risks 
of looming and unintended policy problems (Rhodes, 1994) as a result of ever 
increasing fragmentation and complexity. Increasingly non-accountable to the 
nation-state but instead a disparate array of stakeholders cited internationally 
and in civil and commercial society, the policy networks of governance appear 
to become ever more self-organising, autonomous and replicating. With the 
nation state no longer occupying a preeminently unitary and simplistically 
sovereign role, twenty-first century Britain increasingly resembles a complex 
maze of institutions with varying degrees of functional autonomy even in those 
areas concerned with the core production and management of force and 
violence.  
 
While it is not within the purview of this thesis to pronounce on whether 
market-oriented arrangements will ever develop into anything resembling a 
full-blown market (however defined) in naval sea power, it is nevertheless 
important to analyse the ideas and writings of a collection of authors who 
have long considered such a world. Often overlooked by scholars more 
concerned with the recent past and short-term future, it is to this body of 
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knowledge that the next chapter attends. For in informing an ideal type 
perspective on ‘free markets in naval defence and security’, the literature aids 
the construction of a theoretically oppositional political economy to that of 
Weber’s monopoly nation-state. Building further on the framework of the 
compass of political economy presented earlier, the chapter argues that when 
it comes to the research, it is only when an ‘ideal type’ opposite has been 
constructed concerning concepts of legitimate force in political economy that 
robust strands of ideation can be analysed. The chapter makes the point that 
it is only by comparing and contrasting elite opinions towards ‘ideal type’ 
market and state models that the real boundaries of discourse surrounding 
contemporary perspectives on legitimacy and governance in political economy 
can be researched. 
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Chapter IV 
Literature Review for ‘Ideal Type’ Legitimacy in the  
Supply of Force and Violence: 
Relevance of the Libertarian and State Paradigms in Research on the 
Political Economy of Naval Sea Power, Defence and Security  
  
Whilst it is not within the remit of this study to suggest market-oriented 
arrangements could develop into a full-blown market (however defined) in 
naval sea power, it is nevertheless methodologically important to review the 
ideas and writings of a collection of authors who have long promoted a world 
in which states are proactively hollowed out only to be replaced by societies 
based on idealised free markets. Informing an ideal type construct on markets 
in naval defence and security, their literature aids the development of a 
theoretically oppositional political economy to that of Weber’s nation-state 
monopoly and the world of ‘government’. Building on the framework of the 
compass of political economy presented earlier (Chapter III), this chapter 
asserts that in terms of the research, it is only when an ‘ideal type’ opposite 
has been constructed concerning concepts of legitimated force and violence 
in political economy that robust strands of ideation can be analysed. The 
chapter makes the point that it is only by comparing and contrasting elite 
opinions towards ‘ideal type’ NPM-market and an ideal type PA-state that the 
real boundaries of elite discourse surrounding contemporary perspectives on 
political economy, governance and legitimacy can be researched. 
 
Presenting an ideational framework in which to contextualise modern Royal 
Navy outsourcing, partnerships and privatisation, the chapter explores the 
ideas and work of Gustave de Molinari, Herbert Spencer, Auberon Hebert, P. 
E. De Puydt, Benjamin Tucker, Murray Rothbard, David Friedman, Bruce L. 
Benson, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Brian Micklethwait and Ian Whitehouse. 
Providing an analysis of those authors who have long expounded private 
market provision in defence, security and naval sea power, it brings together 
for the first time, a body of knowledge that not only represents historic forms 
of discourse on the private production of force and violence, but, when it 
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comes to the problematic dimensions of time, economic complexity and socio-
political power, juxtaposes and contributes conceptually to the research and 
data presented in Chapters V and VI. 
 
 
4.1 Relevance of the Compass of Political Economy to the ‘Ideal Type’ 
Literature on Private Defence, Security and Naval Sea Power 
 
It is of some historical curiosity and significance that the Conservative Party 
manifesto at the 1979 general election never mentioned the word 
‘privatisation’ or the idea of ‘outsourcing’ any services to the private sector. 
Instead, it argued: “Our country’s relative decline is not inevitable. We in the 
Conservative Party think we can reverse it, not because we think we have all 
the answers but because we think we have the one answer that matters most. 
We want to work with the grain of human nature, helping people to help 
themselves – and others. This is the way to restore that self-reliance and self-
confidence which are the basis of personal responsibility and national 
success” (Conservative Party, 1979: 3). Under the heading, ‘Improving our 
Defences’, the manifesto continued: 
 
“In recent times our armed forces have had to deal with a wide variety 
of national emergencies. They have responded magnificently despite 
government neglect and a severe shortage of manpower and 
equipment. We will give our servicemen decent living conditions, bring 
their pay up to full comparability with their civilian counterparts 
immediately and keep it there. In addition, we must maintain the 
efficiency of our reserve forces. We will improve their equipment, too, 
and hope to increase their strength.” (Conservative Party, 1979: 18)  
 
Away from political manifestos, since the late 1940s an influential and growing 
circle of economists and academics had been developing ideas and 
institutions that sought to counter what they perceived to be the twentieth 
century trend towards ever-larger government. While in 1947 Friedrich Hayek 
set up his influential international network, the Mont Pelerin Society (Cockett, 
 119 
1994: 100), in 1955, its UK arm, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) was 
established in London (Cockett, 1994: 122-158). An independent think tank, 
dedicated to the promotion of classical liberal economics, by the early 1960s 
the IEA was championing publications on private enterprise, de-regulation and 
alternatives to nationalisation and the welfare state. Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s the ideas and influence of the IEA permeated British political 
consciousness not least through academia, the media and a growing network 
of market-oriented parliamentarians usually associated with the Conservative 
Party (Denham, 1998).  
 
From the mid-1960s onwards a new generation of free marketer started to 
propagate a range of radical alternatives to the traditional paradigm of public 
administration and ‘government’. In 1967, Chris Tame established the UK’s 
free market and civil liberties think tank, Libertarian Alliance (Committee of the 
Libertarian Alliance, 1981). Currently, boasting more than 800 publications, it 
champions a world of privately produced defence, security and law (Bell, 
1991; Tame, 1989; Micklethwait, 1987). Then in 1974, Sir Keith Joseph and 
Margaret Thatcher supported the establishment of the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) (Cockett, 1994: 234-240) which exists to “roll back the state 
and reform public services”. Finally, in 1977, Madsen Pirie and Eamonn Butler 
established the Adam Smith Institute (ASI). Headquartered in London and 
named after the founder of classical liberal economics it boasts more than 300 
of its major policy ideas have been enacted by the UK government. A pioneer 
of privatisation and outsourcing (Pirie, 2012), the ASI’s President asserts: “We 
propose things which people regard as being on the edge of lunacy. The next 
thing you know, they’re on the edge of policy.” (Rushbridger, 1987)  
 
In the ASI’s 1991 paper, An Arresting Idea: The Management of Police 
Services in Modern Britain, the institute stated: “In analysing the 
organisational structure of the police, the report makes a number of 
recommendations which, if implemented, would provide a more sophisticated 
and responsive service for citizens in today’s community” (Evans, 1991: 4). 
Noting, “within the last two centuries there have been many examples of 
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successful non-state policing arrangements” (Evans, 1991: 4) the report 
continued:  
 
“Removed from the constant need to maintain a competitive edge 
which spurs the private sector, the police has found itself undermined 
by the same problems of other state monopolies; high and rising costs, 
top-heavy bureaucracy, a lack of flexibility, and a propensity to favour 
ever-greater increments in manpower. New working practices and 
methods are slow to be implemented because of the inherent 
conservatism of the structure: the service’s monopoly status removes 
the incentive to respond to the new challenges and demands made by 
society.” (Evans, 1991: 12) 
 
Suggesting a much greater role for an expanded private security sector the 
report continued: “New structures must be sought, which allow for greater 
service evaluation, improved efficiency and a more flexible response to the 
increasing market demand for choice” (Evans, 1991: 5). It concluded: 
 
“While the presence of the uniformed bobby on the beat has an 
intangible significance that cannot be over-stated, this fact all too often 
simply serves to engender the belief that law enforcement can only be 
a state-funded public good. However, most formal policing involves 
specific victims, criminals, clients and beneficiaries, and this shows 
how the introduction of specific user charges could promote an 
important and positive shift in law enforcement provision.  
“While the user-pays principle is most visible in the United 
States, its success is based upon the fact that it allows us to determine 
not only where the genuine demand for policing lies, but, also the 
intensity of that demand. Moreover, the value that customers attribute 
to a service at any given time often compels service providers to 
experiment with innovative ways in which to allocate resources.”  
(Evans, 1991: 37) 
 
 121 
In the UK, ever since the mid-1970s disparate networks of think-tanks have 
promoted a wide range of free market policies and in some instances the idea 
of markets and governance without the state (Evans, 1996). It is through this 
institutional nexus and its allies in academia, politics and the media, that 
supply side reforms have been most vigorously promoted. As Richard Cockett 
asserted in his book, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the 
Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983: 
 
“The importance of the ‘think tanks’ to the revival of economic 
liberalism has demonstrated the inflexibility of Party research 
organisations, and their congenital inability to develop new ideas or 
even to ‘think’ at all: bodies like the Conservative Research 
Department contributed almost nothing to the break-through of 
economic liberalism in the Conservative Party. The record of the 
universities has been almost as disappointing, for outside individual 
departments such as the economics department of the LSE and 
Liverpool University, or the Manchester University Inflation Workshop, 
there was little coherent or sustained contribution to the growth of 
economic liberal ideas in the post-war decades. The IEA, the CPS and 
the ASI thus filed the policy and ideological vacuums left by the 
traditional sources of political and economic thinking.” (Cockett, 1994: 
324-325)  
 
For more than thirty years a collection of economic reforms have been 
introduced by all UK governments which have seen the privatisation, 
outsourcing, agencification and/or marketisation of a wide range of 
organisations (Seymour, 2012) outside of defence, security and naval sea 
power (see Table 2 below for a selection of non-defence privatisations). 
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British Telecom  
British Steel  
British Gas 
British Airways 
British Airports Authority 
British Petroleum 
British Rail 
Cable and Wireless  
British Leyland (sold in a range of separate divisions that included Rover 
Group, Jaguar, Leyland Trucks, Leyland Bus, Unipart, and Alvis) 
The Water industry of England and Wales 
The Electricity industry 
British Coal  
The Air Traffic Control system,  
More than two million council homes (sold to their tenants) 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
British Technology Group 
National Bus Company 
Scottish Bus Group    
Post Office 
Table 2. Selection of UK Privatisations. 
 
 
While philosophical, political, economic and institutional drivers of change are 
always entwined in a complex web of thought and action, change over the last 
thirty years has clearly emerged from a broad conjuncture of ideological and 
practical considerations (Denham, 1998). However, in terms of the compass 
of political economy and discourse surrounding Royal Navy nationalisation, 
outsourcing, PPPs and privatisation, the overall direction of travel is clear. 
Presented in Table 3 (below), the ‘spear of force and violence’ is increasingly 
moving away from the legitimacy of Weber’s monopoly state and the era of 
‘government’, to engage ever more deeply the libertarian and individualist 
quartile of the compass. For good or for ill, driven by ideology and/or the 
necessities of governance, differentiation and semi-autonomous networks, 
this is an important reality associated with varying degrees of hollowing out of 
the state. With private ship owners now able to employ their own private 
armed guards and serious businesses publically declaring an interest in the 
establishment of private naval fleets, the boundaries of discourse has already 
strayed into political and economic terrain that is technically minarchist and/or 
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anarcho-capitalist in outlook (Long, 2008). It is a world that conjures up 
increasing images of governance without the Weberian state and 
‘government’. 
 
                                                  
                                          Libertarian 
 
                                                                                                 2013 
                                                                        Typhon Private Fleet 
                                                Major Warship PPP 
                                                Air Sea and Rescue PPP 
                                                                        Private Armed Guards  
                  Protect UK Ships 
                                                RFA PPP 
  Collectivist                       HMS Clyde CLS PPP            Individualist 
                            Defence Logistics Organisation  
                            Astute Class Nuclear Submarine Training 
                            Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service and Serco 
                            DERA 
                            Royal Navy Dockyards 
                            Rolls Royce 
                            Royal Ordnance 
                            British Shipbuilders 
                1981 
 
 
                                                 Authoritarian 
 
Table 3. Shifting Political Economy of the ‘Spear’ of Modern British  
Naval Sea Power. 
 
While contemporary literature portraying a positive image of PMFs and the 
world of private militaries is limited, most of the work that does exist is merely 
written by people already from or close to the PMF sector. For example, 
Colonel Gerald Schumacher’s (Ret) ‘A Bloody Business’, describes an 
incident involving a U.S. sergeant who attributed her PMF provided training, 
as the reason she not only survived an ambush but was also able to cause 
such significant harm to the enemy that she became the first female awarded 
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the US ‘Silver Star’ (Schumacher, 2006: 166). While such works offer 
powerful insights into the work and practice of PMFs, there is no theoretical 
analysis of the positive impact a privatised sector might contribute in the areas 
of governance and legitimacy. For this we have to look way beyond the NPM 
and PMF paradigms and instead turn to a body of knowledge rooted in the 
classical liberal literature of free market libertarianism.  
 
In searching for literature to aid the methodological development of an ideal 
type construct (Weber, 1904/1949: 90) on the private market production of 
naval sea power, defence and security, only free market libertarianism, rooted 
in the Austrian School of Economics (Barry, 1986), provides a body of 
knowledge that effectively stands in opposition to Weber’s state monopoly.  
 
As a conceptual tool, an ideal type approach is important to escape from the 
individualising and particularising approaches of German Geisteswissenschaft 
and historicism. While no scientific system can ever reproduce the full 
spectrum of concrete reality, or conceptually capture the infinite diversity of 
particular phenomena, scientific research demands selection as well as 
abstraction. For the purposes of this research, an ideal type is a useful 
analytical construct that serves as a measuring rod to ascertain similarities as 
well as deviations. Fundamentally, it provides the basic method for 
comparative study:  
 
"An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more 
points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, 
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct" (Coser, 
1977: 223-224). 
 
For this study, an ideal type is not meant to refer to moral ideals or involve an 
accentuation of typical courses of conduct. Instead, it enables the construction 
of hypotheses which link to the conditions that brought a phenomena or event 
into prominence and with the consequences that follow from its emergence. 
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Never corresponding to concrete reality but always one step removed, an 
ideal type is constructed from key elements of reality that form a logically 
precise and coherent whole but which can never be found in that reality. As 
Julien Freund puts it: "Being unreal, the ideal type has the merit of offering us 
a conceptual device with which we can measure real development and clarify 
the most important elements of empirical reality." (Coser, 1977: 223-224) 
 
Building on the compass of political economy and the ‘spear’, it is only by 
comparing and contrasting elite opinions towards ‘ideal type’ market and state 
models, that genuine boundaries of discourse surrounding contemporary 
perspectives on governance and legitimacy in political economy can be 
researched. The libertarian paradigm is important because in providing a 
methodological basis for comparison, it also serves to highlight NPM’s 
limitations when it comes to the dimensions of time, property rights and 
power: examined later in Chapters V and VI. 
 
 
4.2 Literature Review for an ‘Ideal Type’ Construct on the Private Market 
Production of Naval Sea Power, Defence and Security 
 
To the Austrian school economist there is no such thing as a public (non-
excludable, non-rivalrous) good that cannot be provided by a market, 
providing there is genuine demand. However, for a market to be meaningful it 
has to rest on private property rights and, ultimately, even the private 
production and enforcement of law. Long before modern discourse 
concerning NPM, governance, Royal Navy modernisation and the hollowing 
out of the state, scholars and writers associated with the Austrian school 
considered a private market in defence and security. It is to this material that 
this study now briefly turns.  
 
Gustave de Molinari was born in Belgium in the early nineteenth century 
(Rothbard, 1995: 453-455). A leading economist who defended the principles 
of peace, free trade, freedom of speech and voluntary association, he 
provides an important literary entry point into the world of ‘ideal type’ markets, 
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because he was the first person in the history of economic thought to promote 
the idea of free markets in defence and security (Tame, 2004: 1): 
 
 “Molinari was one of the most important figures of his time. Born in 
 Belgium, and residing in both France as well as in his homeland, 
 Molinari’s prolific works expounded some of the most acute and 
 perceptive analysis of his time – in economics, in class analysis, and in 
 the theory of war and the state. Most notable was his exposition, the 
 first academic one, of the position that all services – including law and 
 protection – could be provided by the market.” (Tame, 2004: 1).  
 
Laissez-faire thinking was at its most dominant amongst the French 
economists of the nineteenth century. Starting with Jean-Baptiste Say (Say, 
1803, 1885) and ending with Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer (Hart, 
1994) at the beginning of the twentieth century, for more than one hundred 
years radical free market economists had dominated the country’s 
professional economic society, Societe d’Economie Politique, and its Paris 
based journal the Journal des Economistes. By far the most radical thinker in 
the group, Molinari did not base his argumentation on a moral opposition to 
the state. Instead, he tried to use the logic of lassiez-faire economics to 
answer the fundamental question: “If the free market can and should supply 
all other goods and services, why not also the services of protection?” 
(Rothbard, 1977) In his initial article, ‘De la production de la securite’, 
published in 1849 (first translated into English in 1977) the young Molinari 
wrote: 
 
 “The monopoly of government is no better than any other. One does 
 not govern well and, especially not cheaply, when one has no 
 competition to fear, when the ruled are deprived of the right of freely 
 choosing their rulers. Grant a grocer the exclusive right to supply a 
 neighbourhood, prevent the inhabitants of this neighbourhood from 
 buying any goods from other grocers in the vicinity, or even from 
 supplying their own groceries, and you will see what detestable rubbish 
 the privileged grocer will end up selling and at what prices! You will see 
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 how he will grow rich at the expense of the unfortunate consumers, 
 what royal pomp he will display for the greater glory of the 
 neighbourhood. Well! What is true for the lowliest services is no less 
 true for the loftiest. The monopoly of government is worth no more than 
 that of a grocer’s shop. The production of security inevitably becomes 
 costly and bad when it is organized as a monopoly. It is in the 
 monopoly of security that lies the principle cause of wars which have 
 laid waste humanity.” (McCulloch, 1977). 
 
Molinari refused to accept any deviations from the law of open competition, 
regulation without the state and free markets. All monopolies are “necessarily 
by force” and therefore abhorrent to those who wish to see force reduced to a 
minimum in human affairs: “War is the necessary, inevitable consequence of 
a monopoly of security…[and] this monopoly must give birth to all others” 
(Molinari, 1849a: 282). For Molinari, the monopoly of the use of force by the 
state is the means by which other monopolies are perpetuated. Away from 
Weber, legitimate authority is based on the idea of consent and authority 
arises naturally from society: 
 
“A natural instinct teaches men that their person, that land which they 
occupy and cultivate, and the fruits of their labour are their property 
and that no one other than themselves has the right to dispose of it  or 
even touch it.” (Molinari, 1849a: 288).  
 
It is from this natural impulse that an “industry which prevents and represses 
these abusive aggressions of force and fraud” (Molinari, 1849a: 288) arises. 
Molinari believed that in a market society, individuals and groups would have 
the necessary incentives and encouragement to form businesses that would 
actively seek customers willing to pay for the protection of life, liberty and 
property. Because property ownership is a natural product of man’s instinct he 
believed people would pay for protection. Moreover, he believed that before 
customers entered into an agreement with a private defence company a 
critical mass would adhere to the following process. Providing an overview of 
Molinari’s position David Hart explains that a customer:  
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 “…would determine whether the producer of security had the ability to 
 provide the services wanted by consumers; he would seek guarantees 
 that the business was reputable and that it would not aggress against 
 him instead of defending him against aggression; he would examine 
 the offers of other defence agencies to see whether they offered the 
 same service at a better price or whether they offered a better service 
 at the same price.” (Hart, 2004: 32). 
 
Molinari’s economics introduced the idea of customers paying for protection 
services by individually contracting with what are essentially insurance 
companies. Their terms would invariably include such conditions: 
 
 “…to guarantee to consumers complete security for their persons and
 property and, in case of damage, to pay them an amount proportional 
 to the loss suffered. That the producer would establish certain penalties 
 for offences against persons and property and that consumers would 
 agree to submit to these same penalties if they were to commit some 
 crime against persons or property. That they would impose certain 
 constraints upon their consumers to facilitate the discovery of 
 wrongdoers. That, to cover the costs of their production and the natural 
 profit of their industry, they regularly charge a premium which arises 
 according to the condition of the consumer, his occupation, and the 
 extent, value and nature of his property.” (Molinari, 1849a: 288).  
 
Molinari believed that the laws of political economy could be applied to the 
management of the fullest range of functions traditionally provided by the 
state. As such, he opposed the state’s monopoly in policing, roads, street 
lighting, refuse collection, sewerage and education. Arguing that companies 
competing in an open market would better supply defence, he believed that 
‘proprietary communities’ would gradually replace the ‘leviathan state’. 
 
In the same year, 1849, Molinari published a further explication of his radical 
new perspective in the book, Les Soirees de la Rue Saint-Lazare (Molinari, 
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1849b). Written as a series of fictional dialogues between a Conservative 
(defending state monopoly privileges and tariffs barriers), a Socialist (seeking 
justice) and an Economist (himself), he presented what he argued was the a 
priori logic of private military companies in a free market. Significantly, he 
stated: 
 
 “What would the companies' interest be? It would be to drive back the 
 invaders because they would be the first victims of invasion. They 
 would therefore cooperate in repelling them and would ask their clients 
 for a supplementary premium to protect them from this new danger. If 
 those insured preferred to run the risks of invasion, they would refuse 
 to pay this supplementary premium; otherwise they would pay it, and 
 thus they would enable the companies to ward off the danger of the 
 invasion.” (Molinari, 1849b).  
 
Molinari continued: 
 
 “But just as war is inevitable under a regime of monopoly, peace is 
 inevitable under a regime of free government. Under this regime, 
 governments can win nothing by war, they can, on the contrary, lose 
 everything. What interest would they have in undertaking a war? Would 
 it be to increase the number of their clientele? But since the consumers 
 of security are free to govern themselves as they wish, they would get 
 away from the conquerors. If the latter wanted to impose their rule on 
 them, after having destroyed the existing government, the oppressed 
 would immediately call for the help of all people. ...The wars of 
 company against company, moreover, would occur only as long as the 
 shareholders wished to advance the costs. As war is now no longer 
 able to bring anyone an increase in clientele since the consumers 
 would no longer allow themselves to be conquered, the costs of war 
 would obviously no longer be covered. Then who would want to 
 advance them?” (Molinari, 1849b). 
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Unlike the monopoly of the state which forces people to pay for protection 
through taxation, Molinari asserts that contracts freely entered into with a 
private defence company would be voluntary and without the use or threat of 
force. As with any other businesses in a differentiated market, consumers 
would have the right to use a defence company or choose another: 
 
“If the conditions necessary for the exercise of this industry are 
agreeable to consumers, the transaction will occur; if not, consumers 
will do with out security or go to another producer.” (Molinari, 1849a: 
288). 
 
Similarly, if the defence company raises its prices too far or fails to deliver an 
efficient and high quality service, the disappointed consumers: 
 
 “Will always have the ability to give their business to a new or 
 competing entrepreneur.” (Molinari, 1849a: 289). 
 
Molinari believed that with an end to statism and through a totally hollowed 
out and privatised state society would be without a centralising force that 
could direct and control. With no ‘broker of privilege and monopoly’ there 
would be no need for war. Summing up the logic of Molinari’s position David 
Hart concludes: 
 
 “War is an activity that takes place between states, with their organised 
 armies, conscripted troops, and tax-supported military 
 expenditures…War in fact would become unprofitable because no 
 agency would want to risk the heavy insurance payments that the 
 destruction of property in a war would cause. If a renegade defence 
 agency tried to seek a monopoly, and thus become a state, the 
 consumers would have to conquer each separate company that was in 
 the protection industry. Whereas in warfare between states, the take-
 over of a nation can be accomplished by seizing a single institution, 
 any attempt to monopolize competing protection companies would be 
 prohibitively expensive. The consumers would benefit from the fact that 
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 the security industry was decentralized because it would be more 
 responsible to local and individual needs and because this 
 decentralization would be a considerable barrier to any attempt to re-
 establish the state. Complete liberty to compete in the protection 
 industry would be the precondition for peace and when this has been 
 achieved the condition of the different members of society would be the 
 best possible.” (Hart, 2004: 34). 
 
Nearly four decades on from his initial writings, Molinari wrote in 1887 Les 
Lois Naturelles de l’Economie Politique (Molinari, 1887). Still a firm believer in 
a highly competitive market for all goods and services he continued to 
promote the basic idea of private defence companies and governance without 
the state. A couple of years after Molinari had first proposed his theory in his 
1849 ‘Production of Security’, the English political philosopher Herbert 
Spencer also took free market thought to another possible conclusion. In his 
book Social Statics (Spencer, 1851), Spencer argued that the state was not 
an inevitable or essential institution. Believing that as society progressed the 
state would become smaller and finally lapse into ‘decay’ he thought that 
voluntary market organisations would replace its institutions. Pre-dating 
Rhode’s (1994) idea of the hollowed out state by nearly 150 years, Spencer 
wrote that this evolution was: 
 
 “Towards a complete development and a more unmixed good, 
 subordinating in its universality all petty irregularities and fallings 
 back, as the curative of the earth subordinates mountains and 
 valleys.” (Spencer, 1970: 236). 
 
Spencer advocated the legitimate right of individuals to refuse to pay taxes to 
government for the protection of life and property. He wrote: “…if consistently 
maintained, [this] implies a right to ignore the state entirely.” (Spencer, 1970, 
p. 197). If the state refused to recognise the individual’s right to peacefully 
withdraw their payment of taxes then Spencer argued, “…its action must be 
essentially criminal.” (Spencer, 1970: 189) For Spencer, the alternative to the 
monopoly state society was the creation of a “mutual-safety confederation” 
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(Spencer, 1970: 185) that would provide protection to all who voluntarily paid 
it “taxes”. However, those who chose to opt out would remain free to make 
their own private arrangements. While there is no evidence to suggest that 
Spencer was aware of Molinari’s work, he nevertheless suggested that a 
voluntary defence organisation would be organised along essentially business 
lines: 
 
 “If, as it was shown, every man has a right to secede from the state, 
 and if, as a consequence, the state must be regarded as a body of men 
 voluntarily associated, there remains nothing to distinguish it in the 
 abstract from any other incorporated body.” (Spencer, 1970: 224).  
 
Spencer went on to argue that this voluntary defence organisation was a form 
of “mutual assurance”, “insurance” and even a “joint-stock protection 
society…guaranteeing the rights of its members” (Spencer, 1970: 241-247).  
Another writer who followed a similar path was one of Spencer’s students. In 
1885, Auberon Herbert wrote: 
 
 “The necessary deductions from the great principle that a man has 
 inalienable rights over himself, over his own faculties and possessions 
 – and those, who having once accepted this principle, who having once 
 offered their allegiance to liberty, are prepared to follow her frankly and 
 faithfully wherever she leads, will find, unless I am mistaken, that they 
 are irresistibly drawn step by step to the same or to very similar 
 conclusions.” (Herbert, 1978: 176-177). 
 
Like Molinari, Herbert argued that if the market was set free from the state: 
“Every want that we have will be satisfied by means of a voluntary 
combination.” (Herbert, 1978: 185). Extending Spencer’s ideas on a joint-
stock protection society, Herbert argued that a system of insurance would 
develop by which “voluntary protective associations of every kind and form” 
would replace the monopoly of the uniform and coercive state. Again pre-
dating and echoing early twenty-first century notions of policy networks and a 
highly differentiated polity, in this society: 
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 “The state should compel no services and exact no payments by force, 
 but should depend entirely upon voluntary services and voluntary 
 payments…It should be free to conduct many useful undertakings....but 
 that it should do so in competition with all voluntary agencies, without 
 employment by force, independence on voluntary payments, and 
 acting with the consent of those concerned, simply as their friend and 
 their adviser.” (Herbert, 1978: 390). 
 
Whilst Herbert’s ideas are similar to Molinari’s there is no evidence that 
Herbert was ever aware of his Molinari’s work. One figure possibly influenced 
by Molinari was P. E. De Puydt although the evidence on this point remains 
inconclusive. Writing in 1860 De Puydt extolled the benefits of a system he 
called ‘Panarchy’. Advocating a world of “governmental competition” he 
suggested that competing authorities should essentially become political 
churches, only to have jurisdiction over those individuals and ‘congregations’ 
who elected to become supporters. Disputes between these “governments” 
would be settled by international courts, and transcending geographical 
boundaries, individuals could defect from one church to another by registering 
their decision for a minor fee, with a “Bureau of Political Membership”. He said 
of his “panacea”: 
 
 “Everyone has the right to look after his own welfare as he sees fit, and 
 to obtain security under his own conditions. On the other hand, this 
 means progress through contest between governments forced to 
 compete for followers. True, worldwide liberty is that which is not forced 
 on anyone, being to each just what he wants….it neither 
 suppresses nor deceives, and is always subject to a right of appeal. To 
 bring about such a liberty, there would be no need to give up either 
 national traditions or family ties, no need to learn to think in a new 
 language, no need at all to cross rivers or seas, carrying the bones of 
 one’s ancestors. It is simply a matter of declaring before one’s local 
 political commission, for one to move from republic to monarchy, from 
 representative government to autocracy, from oligarchy to democracy, 
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 or even to Mr. Proudhon’s anarchy, without so much as removing 
 one’s dressing gown and slippers.” (De Puydt, 1975: 227). 
 
While De Puydt’s work is presciently descriptive of a globalised and digitalised 
future in which international travel, migration and real-time communication 
become commonplace, his work is predictably utopian in its quest for 
customers to transcend differentiated geographical, political and economic 
bounds in the areas of security, law and governance. It is in this world that the 
American individualist writer, Benjamin Tucker, was happy to call his own 
brand of laissez-faire liberalism a form of ‘anarchism’. In the late nineteenth 
century he wrote: “The only true believers in laissez faire are the Anarchists” 
(Tucker, 1969: 371). Tucker was certainly familiar with Molinari’s work and 
had reviewed some of it (Scatz, 1907: 514). He generally agreed with Molinari 
that the production and provision of defence was a tangible economic 
commodity that would be best supplied in a genuine market: 
 
 “Defence is a service like any other service; that it is labour both useful 
 and desired, and therefore an economic commodity subject to the law 
 of supply and demand; that in a free market this commodity would be 
 furnished at the cost of production; that, competition prevailing, 
 patronage would go to those who furnished the best article at the 
 lowest price; that the production and sale of this commodity are now 
 monopolized by the State; and that the State, like almost all 
 monopolists, charges exorbitant prices;…and, finally, that the State 
 exceeds all its fellow monopolists in the extent of its villainy because it 
 enjoys the unique privilege of compelling all people to buy its product 
 whether they want it or not.” (Tucker, 1969: 32-33).  
 
For most of the twentieth century free market libertarianism died out in 
France. However, in the United States of America it maintained a strong 
intellectual following particularly through the writings of Milton Friedman, 
Fredrich Hayek and with the rise to power in 1981 of President Ronald 
Reagan (Doherty, 2008). In 1974, Fredrich Hayek won the Nobel Prize for 
economics. Echoing Molinari, Spencer, Herbert, De Puydt and the later 
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debate concerning policy networks and differentiated polities, he asserted in 
1979: 
 
 “Regional and local governments, limited by the same uniform laws 
 with regard to the manner in which they could make their individual 
 inhabitants contribute to their revenue, would develop into business-
 like corporations. They would compete with each other for citizens, who 
 could “vote with their feet” for that corporation which offered the highest 
 benefits compared with the price charged.” (Hayek, 1979). 
 
For several observers, Murray Rothbard was the "central figure” in the 
American libertarian movement of the twentieth century (Miller, 1991; 
McElroy, 2000; Hamowy, 2008: 441). A prolific writer and a disciple of 
Hayek’s tutor, Ludwig von Mises, he argued from a neo-Aristotelian natural-
law perspective rejecting all forms of Weberian statism and tax funded 
governance. Criticising democracy, he states: 
 
 “…the identification of the State with society has been redoubled, until 
 it is common to hear sentiments expressed which violate virtually every 
 tenet of reason and common sense: such as ‘we are the government’. 
 The useful collective term ‘we’ has enabled an ideological camouflage 
 to be thrown over the reality of political life…If ‘we are the government,‘ 
 then anything a government does to an individual is not only just and 
 un-tyrannical; it is also ‘voluntary’ on the part of the individual 
 concerned…Under this reasoning, any Jews murdered by the Nazi 
 government were not murdered; instead, they must have ‘committed 
 suicide’, since they were the government (which was democratically 
 chosen), and therefore anything the government did to them was 
 voluntary on their part.” (Rothbard, 1965). 
 
In Rothbard’s book, For a New Liberty (Rothbard, 1973), a ‘libertarian 
manifesto’ is presented. It starts from the perspective that market economics 
do not emanate from the political left or the right. With libertarians believing 
conscription to be a form of mass slavery they stand foursquare with the ‘civil 
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liberties’ left in supporting freedom of speech, assembly and the right to 
engage in such ‘victimless crimes’ as pornography, sexual deviation, and 
prostitution. On the other hand, because libertarians oppose the violation of 
property rights and government interference in the economic sphere, they are 
inextricably tied to a system of laissez-faire capitalism that is popularly 
associted with the ‘political right’. In terms of political economy, Rothbard is a 
radical yet eclectic thinker. For he argues for nothing less than one global 
market, devoid of states and formal political institutions. A self-styled 
‘anarcho-capitalist’, he rejects the institutions of mainstream democratic 
politics. For him, state services such as health and education are nothing 
more than a “middle class hoax” (Rothbard, 1973: 132-133). In the first 
chapter of his book Power and Market: Government and the Economy, (titled 
‘Defense Services on the Free Market’), Rothbard complains that: 
“…economists have almost invariably and paradoxically assumed that the 
market must be kept free by the use of invasive and unfree actions – in short 
by governmental institutions outside the market nexus” (Rothbard, 1970). 
Rothbard argues that one cannot fully analyse the property rights and 
exchange structures in a free market without first putting forward a theory of 
property rights, and of justice in property. Following the earlier ideas of 
Molinari, he states: 
 
“A supply of defense services on the free market would mean 
maintaining the axiom of the free society, namely, that there would be 
no use of physical force except in defense against those using force to 
invade person or property. This would imply the complete absence of a 
State apparatus or government; for the State, unlike all other persons 
and institutions in society, acquires its revenue not by exchanges freely 
contracted, but by a system of unilateral coercion called “taxation”.  
(Rothbard, 1970).   
 
Complaining that many other laissez-faire economists mistakenly conclude 
that defense services cannot be supplied by the market, he continues: 
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 “Defense in the free society (including such defense services to person 
 and property as police protection and judicial findings) would therefore 
 have to be supplied by people or firms who (a) gained their revenue 
 voluntarily rather than by coercion and (b) did not – as the State does – 
 arrogate to themselves a compulsory monopoly of police or judicial 
 protection. Only such libertarian provision of defense services would be 
 consonant with a free market and a free society. Thus, defense firms 
 would have to be as freely competitive and as non-coercive against 
 non-invaders as are all other suppliers of goods and services on the 
 free market. Defense services, like all other services, would be 
 marketable and marketable only.” (Rothbard, 1970).  
 
For Rothbard, most regular economists hold contradictory views because 
“they sanction and advocate massive invasion of property by the very agency 
(government) that is supposed to defend people against invasion!” (Rothbard, 
1970). By supporting even a minimal state they propose a degree of seizure 
that undermines people’s property rights. Taxation facilitates a compulsory 
monopoly in defence services over “arbitrarily designated territorial areas” 
(Rothbard, 1970). To Rothbard, in attempting to redeem their position such 
commentators either argue that a free market in defence services could not 
exist or that those who value a forcible defence against violence would have 
to fall back on the state. This according to Rothbard: “despite its black 
historical record as the great engine of invasive violence” (Rothbard, 1970). 
For Rothbard, while a free market presupposes a system of property rights 
both in and of the person the state is not required to define and allocate the 
structure of such rights. Believing that a genuine free market society would 
require a specific and underpinning theory of property rights he believed that it 
would be rooted in “self ownership and the ownership of natural resources 
found and transformed by one’s labour”: 
 
 “Therefore, no State or similar agency contrary to the market is needed 
 to define or allocate property rights. This can and will be done by the 
 use of reason and through market processes themselves.” (Rothbard,  
1970). 
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For Rothbard, another position holds that defence has to be supplied by the 
state because of its unique institutional status. Defence is viewed as being a 
necessary precondition of market activity: “a function without which a market 
economy could not exist” (Rothbard, 1970). Viewing such argumentation to be 
a non sequitur, he argues that this was the logic behind many economists 
who previously considered goods and services in terms of large classes. 
While modern economics stress that services must instead be considered in 
terms of marginal units, he argues: 
 
 “…all actions on the market are marginal. If we begin to treat whole 
 classes instead of marginal units, we can discover a great myriad of 
 necessary, indispensable goods and services all of which might be 
 considered as “preconditions” of market activity. Is not land vital, or 
 good for each participant, or clothing, or shelter? Can a market long 
 exist without them? And what of paper, which has become a basic 
 requisite of market activity in the complex modern economy? Must all 
 these goods and services therefore be supplied by the State and the 
 State only?” (Rothbard, 1970). 
 
Noting that the institutional arrangements of a free market in defence could 
not be known in advance, “just as it would have been impossible fifty years 
ago to predict the exact structure of the television industry today” (Rothbard, 
1970), Rothbard believed nevertheless it would be possible to explain some of 
the likely workings and principles of such a market. He thus stated: 
 
 “Most likely, such services would be sold on an advance subscription 
 basis, with premiums paid regularly and services to be supplied on call. 
 Many competitors would undoubtedly arise, each attempting, by 
 earning a reputation for efficiency and probity, to win a consumer 
 market for its services. Of, course, it is possible that in some areas a 
 single agency would out compete all others, but this does not seem 
 likely when we realize that there is no territorial monopoly and that 
 efficient firms would be able to open branches in other geographical 
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 areas. It seems likely, also, that supplies of police and judicial services 
 would be provided by insurance companies, because it would be to 
 their direct advantage to reduce the amount of crime as much as 
 possible.” (Rothbard, 1970). 
 
In a utopian and global market devoid of nation-states, one objection to 
competing defence agencies arises from the question of what happens if 
different people subscribe to different agencies? Assuming for the moment 
that defence companies include their own private law enforcement 
arrangements (police forces and courts), what would happen if Smith alleges 
that he has been assaulted by Jones yet Jones refutes the charge? In 
Rothbard’s libertarian world how would justice be dispensed? On this point he 
argues: 
 
“Clearly, Smith will file charges against Jones and institute suit or trial 
proceedings in Y court system. Jones is invited to defend himself 
against the charges, although there can be no subpoena power, since 
any sort of force used against a man not yet convicted of a crime is 
itself an invasive and criminal act that could not be consonant with the 
free society we have been postulating. If Jones is declared innocent, or 
if he is declared guilty and consents to the finding, then there is no 
problem on this level, and the Y courts then institute a suitable 
measure of punishment” (Rothbard, 1970). 
 
But what would happen if Jones actually challenges the initial finding?  
 
 “In that case, he can either take the case to his X court system, or take 
 it directly to a privately competitive Appeals Court of a type that will 
 undoubtedly  spring up in abundance on the market to fill the great 
 need for such tribunals. Probably there will be just a few Appeals Court 
 systems, far fewer than the number of primary courts, and each of the 
 lower courts will boast to its customers about being members of those 
 Appeals Court systems noted for their efficiency and probity. The 
 Appeals Court decision can then be taken by the society as binding. 
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 Indeed, in the basic legal code of the free society, there probably would 
 be enshrined some such clause as that the decision of any two courts 
 will be considered binding, i.e., will be the point at which the court will 
 be able to take action against the party adjudged guilty.” (Rothbard,  
1970). 
 
While every legal system demands a socially agreed cut-off point, that is, a 
point at which judicial procedure stops and punishment commences, 
Rothbard concludes: 
 
 “…a single monopoly court of ultimate decision-making need not be 
 imposed and of course be in a free society; and a libertarian legal code 
 might well have a two-court cut-off point, since there are always two 
 contesting parties, the plaintiff and the defendant.” (Rothbard, 1970). 
 
Perhaps the most common objection to the viability of a free market defence 
market stems from the question of what would happen if one or more of the 
companies turned their power to aggress against others? Given the 
complexities of human nature, it is unlikely that everyone would be born 
‘good’. Offering a surprising yet direct response, Rothbard writes: 
 
 “Of course some of the private defense agencies will become criminal, 
 just as some people become criminal now. But the point is that in a 
 stateless society there would be no regular, legalized channel for 
 crime and aggression, no government apparatus the control of which 
 provides a secure monopoly for invasion of person and property. When 
 a State exists, there does exist such a built-in-channel, namely, the 
 coercive taxation power, and the compulsory monopoly of forcible 
 protection. In the purely free-market society, a would-be criminal police 
 or judiciary would find it very difficult to take power, since there would 
 be no organized State apparatus to seize and use as the 
 instrumentality of command.” (Rothbard, 1970).  
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Arguing that whilst there can be no guarantee that an anarcho-capitalist 
society would not fall prey to organised crime, Rothbard asserts that this 
would not only be highly unlikely but such pressures could seldom lead to the 
recreation of a state.  
 
 “To create such an instrumentality de novo is very difficult, and, indeed, 
 almost impossible; historically, it took State rulers centuries to establish 
 a functioning State apparatus. Furthermore, the purely free-market, 
 stateless society would contain within itself a system of built-in “checks 
 and balances” that would make it almost impossible for such organized 
 crime to succeed. There has been much talk about “checks and 
 balances” in the American system, but these can scarcely be 
 considered checks at all, since every one of these institutions is an 
 agency of the central government and eventually of the ruling party of 
 that government.” (Rothbard, 1970). 
 
For Rothbard, the concept of a strictly limited government is “truly Utopian” as 
it is “an idea that has never worked historically": 
 
 “And understandably so, for the State’s built-in monopoly of aggression 
 and inherent absence of free-market checks has enabled it to burst 
 easily any bonds that well-meaning people have tried to place upon 
 it.” (Rothbard, 1970).  
 
Significantly, Rothbard argues that the competitive prices paid in a free 
market defence system would provide a great gain to society and consumers. 
Being vastly more cost effective and efficient than the state, he concludes: 
 
 “Thus, a truly free market is totally incompatible with the existence of a 
 State, an institution that presumes to “defend” person and property by 
 itself subsisting on the unilateral coercion against private property 
 known as taxation. On the free market, defense against violence would 
 be a service like any other, obtainable from freely competitive private 
 organizations. Whatever problems remain in this area could easily be 
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 solved in practice by the market process, that very process which has 
 solved countless organizational problems of far greater intricacy”  
 (Rothbard, 1970).  
 
Over the last forty years another American scholar David Friedman has 
similarly argued for a free market in defence services. Author of the The 
Machinery of Freedom (Friedman, 1978), Friedman not only argues that state 
failure in defence is inevitable but that it will be a key future driver of an ever-
expanding private sector: 
 
 “Protection from coercion is an economic good. It is presently sold in a 
 variety of forms – Brinks guards, locks, burglar alarms. As the 
 effectiveness of government police declines, these market substitutes 
 for the police, like the market substitutes for the courts, become more 
 popular.” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
Friedman’s view that private arbitration, security and defence services will 
grow as tax funded governance and government failure mounts is influenced 
by public choice economics. Public choice theory attempts to analyse the 
political system by using the same approach by which mainstream economics 
analyses the free market (Buchanan, 1978). Crucially, it applies the 
techniques of economic analysis - monopoly, competition and information 
costs – to political and bureaucratic behaviour. It drops the traditional view 
that politicians and officials try to serve only ‘the public interest’ and more 
realistically assumes that, as elsewhere, they also try to serve their own 
interests by re-election and empire-building. From this perspective, the vote 
motive in politics is similar to the profit motive in business (Tullock, 1976). For 
Friedman, it is one thing to show there is something government and tax 
funded governance could do to improve on the outcomes of an unregulated 
market and another to show what taxation and polities would actually achieve: 
 
 “That would require a theory of governmental behaviour comparable in 
 power and precision to the theory of market behaviour from which the 
 original efficiency theorem and the inefficiencies due to failures of its 
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 assumptions were derived. No widely accepted theory of that sort 
 exists, and much of the large and growing literature that attempts to 
 produce such a theory seems to suggest that government intervention 
 is more likely to worsen than to improve market outcomes.” (Friedman,  
1999: 7). 
 
For Friedman, the important question is not whether the political market works 
under conditions of zero transaction costs and perfect information, for under 
those conditions the private market is also efficient. For him, the significant 
question is how badly each system breaks down when the assumptions are 
relaxed? On this point he states: 
 
 “Economic efficiency is a strong requirement for the outcome of any 
 real world system of institutions, since an outcome is efficient only if it 
 could not be improved by a bureaucrat god – a benevolent despot with 
 perfect information and unlimited power over individual actions. While it 
 may be seen as an upper bound on how well an economic system can 
 work, one might think that using that bound to judge real systems is as 
 appropriate as judging race cars by their ability to achieve their upper  
 bound – the speed of light” (Friedman, 1999: 7). 
 
Countering the claim that defence is too important to be left to the market 
Friedman retorts: 
 
 “My response would be that the market is, generally speaking, the best 
 set of institutions we know of for producing and distributing things. The 
 more important the good is, the stronger the argument for having it 
 produced by the market. 
  “Both barbers and physicians are licensed; both professions 
 have for decades used licensing to keep their numbers down and their 
 salaries up. Government regulation of barbers makes haircuts more 
 expensive; one result, presumably, is that we have fewer haircuts and 
 longer hair. Government regulation of physicians makes medical care 
 more expensive; one result, presumably, is that we have less medical 
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 care and shorter lives. Given the choice of deregulating one profession 
 or the other, I would choose the physicians.” (Friedman, 1999: 7). 
 
As with other sectors such as education and healthcare, Friedman wants a 
completely de-monopolised and privately regulated global defence market. As 
a utopian looking for a world devoid of states and national borders he goes on 
to address the issue of how such ‘protection agencies’ might work in practice? 
On this he states: 
 
 “On the one extreme, they might limit themselves to passive defenses, 
 installing elaborate locks and alarms. Or they might take no preventive 
 action at all, but make great efforts to hunt down criminals guilty of 
 crimes against their clients. They might maintain foot patrols or squad 
 cars, like our present government police, or they might rely on 
 electronic substitutes.” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
He continues: 
 
 “In any case, they would be selling a service to their customers and 
 would have a strong incentive to provide as high a quality of service as 
 possible, at the lowest possible cost. It is reasonable to suppose that 
 the quality of service would be higher and the cost lower than with the 
 present governmental system.” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
Exploring the specifics of the private generation of law and law enforcement, 
Friedman explores how conflicts could arise between one protective agency 
and another. Moreover, he also explains the process by which they would be 
resolved: 
 
 “I come home one night and find my television is missing. I immediately 
 call my protection agency, Tannahelp Inc., to report the theft. They 
 send an agent. He checks the automatic camera which Tannahelp, as 
 part of their service, installed in my living room and discovers a picture 
 of one Joe Bock lugging the television set out of the door. The 
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 Tannahelp agent contacts Joe, informs him that Tannahelp has reason 
 to believe he is in possession of my television set, and suggests he 
 return it, along with an extra ten dollars to pay for Tannahelp’s time and 
 trouble in locating Joe. Joe replies that he has never seen my 
 television set in his life and tells the Tannahelp agent to go to hell.”  
(Friedman, 1978). 
 
Continuing the scenario, Friedman writes: 
 
 “The agent points out that until Tannahelp is convinced there 
 has been a mistake, he must proceed on the assumption that the 
 television set is in my property. Six Tannahelp employees, all large and 
 energetic, will be at Joe’s door next morning to collect the set. Joe, in 
 response, informs the agent that he also has a protection agency, 
 Dawn Defense, and that his contract with them undoubtedly requires 
 them to protect him if six goons try to break into his house and steal his 
 television set.” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
While the stage seems set for battle between Tannahelp and Dawn Defence, 
such ‘war’ is prohibitively expensive. Because both organisations are profit-
making corporations they will be more interested in saving money. As such: 
   
 “The Tannahelp agent calls up his opposite number at Dawn Defense. 
 ‘We’ve got a problem…’’ After explaining the situation, he points out 
 that if Tannahelp sends six men and Dawn eight, there will be a fight. 
 Someone might even get hurt. Whoever wins, by the time the conflict is 
 over it will be expensive for both sides. They might even have to start 
 paying their employees higher wages to make up for the risk. Then 
 both firms will be forced to raise their rates. If they do, Murbard Ltd, an 
 aggressive new firm which has been trying to get established in the 
 area, will undercut their prices and steal their customers. There must 
 be a better solution.” (Friedman, 1978). 
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Friedman’s a priori assumptions concerning a genuine market in defence and 
security lead him to the commercial world of private arbitration: 
 
 “The man from Tannahelp suggests that the better solution is 
 arbitration. They will take the dispute over my television set to a 
 reputable local arbitration firm. If the arbitrator decides that Joe is 
 innocent, Tannahelp agrees to pay Joe and Dawn Defense an 
 indemnity to make up for their time and trouble. If he is found guilty, 
 Dawn Defense will accept the verdict; since the television set is not 
 Joe’s they have no obligation to protect him when the men from 
 Tannahelp come to seize it.” (Friedman, 1978).  
 
For Friedman, once market institutions and governance are widely accepted, 
private protection agencies would draw up contracts that factored in industry 
wide dispute resolution mechanisms. Turning to the question of who in a 
market society would make law, on what basis private arbitrators would 
decide which acts were criminal, and on what basis punishments should be 
derived, Friedman is clear. He believes that systems of law and enforcement 
should be for profit and emerge in an open market of competing brands:  
 
 “In such a society there might be many courts and even legal systems. 
 Each pair of protection agencies agree in advance on which court they 
 will use in case of conflict. Thus the laws under which a particular case 
 is decided are determined implicitly by advance agreement between 
 the protection agencies whose customers are involved” (Friedman,  
1978).  
 
In outlining the incentives and workings of a market based, polycentric, legal 
system he continues: 
 
 “In principle, there could be a different court and a different set of laws 
 for every pair of protection agencies. In practice, many agencies 
 would probably find  it convenient to patronize the same courts, and 
 many courts might find it convenient to adopt identical, or nearly 
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 identical, systems of law in order to simplify matters for their 
 customers.” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
Believing that the market would lead to much more efficient, effective and 
higher quality legal outcomes, Friedman reminds his readers that under the 
legal systems in which most people find themselves today the way they are 
judged essentially depends on the country, state and often the city in which 
they find themselves. Resonating strongly with the parallel themes of 
governance, differentiated polities and the debate surrounding the hollowing 
out of the state, Friedman argues that under a market based system courts 
and arbitration services would build stronger reputations and brands. In his 
utopia: 
 
 “A court supports itself by charging for the service of arbitrating 
 disputes. Its success depends on its reputation for honesty, reliability, 
 and promptness and on the desirability to potential customers of the 
 particular set of laws it judges by. The immediate customers are 
 protection agencies. But the protection agency is itself selling a product 
 to its customers. Part of that product is the legal system, or systems, of 
 the courts it patronizes and under which its customers will 
 consequently be judged. Each protection agency will try to patronize 
 those courts under whose legal system its customers would like to 
 live.” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
Further examining the likely structure and incentives of law enforcement 
under ‘anarcho-capitalism’ Friedman considers the complex and thorny issue 
of capital punishment: 
 
“Some people might feel that the risk to themselves of being convicted, 
correctly or incorrectly, and executed for a capital crime outweighed 
any possible advantages of capital punishment. They would prefer, 
where possible, to patronize protection agencies that patronized courts 
that did not give capital punishment. Other citizens might feel that they 
would be safer from potential murderers if it was known that anyone 
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who murdered them would end up in the electric chair. They might 
consider that safety more important than the risk of ending up in the 
electric chair themselves or of being responsible for the death of an 
innocent accused of murder. They would, if possible, patronize 
agencies that patronized courts that did give capital punishment” 
(Friedman, 1978). 
 
If one position or the other is universally dominant in the market then it might 
be that all protection agencies use the courts of one type or the other. If 
however, some people feel so strongly as to affect their choice of protection 
they might form a critical mass that is worth serving. Even relatively 
insignificant minorities might well construe a lucrative market well worth 
serving. However, what would happen in a dispute between an anti-capital-
punishment agency and a pro-capital-punishment agency? In reply to this 
question Friedman asserts: 
  
 “We can each have our preferences reflected in the bargaining 
 demands of our respective agencies. If the opponents of capital 
 punishment feel more strongly than the proponents, the agencies will 
 agree to no capital punishment; in exchange, the agencies that want 
 capital punishment will get something else. Perhaps it will be agreed 
 that they will not pay court costs or that some other disputed policy will 
 go their way.” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
Imagining an idealised bargaining process for this or any other dispute he 
concludes: 
 
“Two agencies are negotiating whether to recognize a pro- or anti-
capital punishment court. The pro agency calculates that getting a pro-
capital-punishment court will be worth $20,000 a year to its customers; 
that is the additional amount it can get for its services if they include a 
guarantee of capital punishment in case of disputes with the other 
agency. The anti-capital-punishment agency calculates a 
corresponding figure of $40,000. It offers the pro agency $30,000 a 
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year in exchange for accepting an anti-capital-punishment court. The 
pro agency accepts. Now the anti-capital-punishment agency can raise 
its rates enough to bring in an extra $35,000. Its customers are happy, 
since the guarantee of no capital punishment is worth more than that. 
The agency is happy; it is getting an extra $5,000 a year profit. The pro 
agency cuts its rates by an amount that costs it $25,000 a year. This 
lets it keep its customers and even get more, since the savings are 
more  than enough to make up to them for not getting the court of their 
choice. It, too, is making a $5,000 a year profit on the transaction. As in 
any good trade, everyone wins” (Friedman, 1978). 
 
While the British libertarian writer Paul Birch asserts, “wherever we find an 
ordered society we also find the state” (Birch, 1998: 2), he also argues that 
sovereignty is not necessarily vested in a single centralised authority. Echoing 
the discourse on governance and the realities of an increasingly differentiated 
polity, Birch concedes that when it comes to the idea of a fully hollowed out 
state, more often than not, authority and power: 
 
“…is divided amongst rival factions. Courts religious, secular and royal; 
commercial guilds; trades unions; local councils; houses of parliament; 
lords spiritual and temporal; the civil service; the King; the Pope; the 
Emperor; all these and more claim the right to exercise coercive power; 
and almost always they attempt to usurp more power than is rightfully 
theirs.” (Birch, 1998: 2).  
 
However, Birch argues that the broader the division of power: 
 
“…the greater the total force available, the more that force is likely to 
be exercised for coercive ends, and the less the rule of law is likely to 
be recognised. The naïve notion that federation and the separation of 
powers reduces the propensity for state oppression is fallacious; 
plurarchy (by which I mean plural rule not rule by many) may 
sometimes reduce the scope for oppression by each branch of 
government, considered severally, yet by multiplying the functions and 
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divisions of the state it radically increases the potential for oppression 
overall. It is worse to be bullied by two gangs than by only one.” (Birch, 
1998: 2).  
 
While Birch acknowledges that under ‘anarcho-capitalism’ the defining 
characteristic of courts are that they are not coercively funded he 
nevertheless concedes that territoriality is a defining characteristic of any state 
court system: 
 
“It is in this way that the world order of diverse nations deviates from 
our model of anarcho-capitalism. The world order is fundamentally 
territorial. Anarcho-capitalism is not.” (Birch, 1998: 2). 
 
Significantly, Birch argues that under anarcho-capitalism a free market in 
courts would eventually lead to the establishment of territorial governance as 
defined by privately owned monopolies. As such, he believes that a genuine 
free market in enforcement, justice and courts would: 
 
“…end up with one of two outcomes. Either a single court monopolises 
the entire territory; or the dominant court divides the territory into 
monopolistic domains. Intermediate and more complex arrangements 
along the same lines are also possible; such as where the most 
powerful court controls most of the territory, smaller but still powerful 
courts corner other large chunks, and the rest comprises the domains 
of the local courts. The point to note is that in each locality there 
obtains a monopoly; competition persists only along the domain 
boundaries.” (Birch, 1998: 3). 
 
Echoing many elite concerns on monopoly highlighted in the research in 
Chapters V and VI (below), Birch asserts: “the key point is that there is a 
strong tendency for the anarcho-capitalist courts to become territorial” (Birch, 
1998:  3). He continues: 
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“It is important to realise that the territorialisation of the courts, even 
though many courts continue to exist across the region, and even 
though there may be no single sovereign state, anarcho-capitalism is 
dead. Each domain defines a mini-state; within each domain, the court 
is king.” (Birch, 1998: 3). 
 
Arguing that when taken to their extreme, privatisation and free markets totally 
hollow out the state to the point where they re-create their own territorial 
monopolies of private law and governance, Birch argues that the resulting 
institutional nexuses are ultimately dependent on local ideational and cultural 
factors: 
 
“How will these mini-states behave? What will their political structure 
be? This depends upon the details of their emergence and the internal 
arrangements of the courts in question. A co-operatively owned court 
might create a commune, a church-court a theocracy, a privately 
owned court a monarchy, a joint stock court a republic. The dominant 
court might be controlled by businessmen, or lawyers, or policemen, or 
soldiers, or gangsters – or solid citizens. The court might be monolithic, 
or composite; its powers might be unitary, or divided. It might be 
pragmatic, or ideological. It might be honest, or corrupt. It might be in it 
for the money, or the power, or for the furtherance of justice.” (Birch, 
1998: 3). 
 
Noting that “this is not unlike a small-scale version of the world order”, (Birch, 
1998: 3) Birch argues that there would nevertheless be two significant 
differences: 
 
“In the first place, the boundaries between domains will not be well-
defined; these are in essence not nation states but city states. 
Competition between courts will persist in the border zones, which will 
mostly consist of farmland, open countryside, small villages and market 
towns – but seldom if ever cities large enough to have their own 
dominant court. In the second place, the existence of a common 
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language means that other domains will not be considered foreign; it 
will be comparatively easy to migrate from one to another.” (Birch, 
1998: 3). 
 
In the United States of America the libertarian writer and Austrian school 
economist, Bruce L. Benson, has spent years examining the history, theory 
and reality of privately produced legal and law enforcement systems. In his 
seminal The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State (Benson, 1990),  
Benson argues that the modern reliance on the state to make and enforce law 
is not the historical norm. 
 
 “Public police forces were not imposed on the populace until the middle 
 of the nineteenth century in the United States and Great Britain, for 
 instance, and then only in the face of considerable citizen 
 resistance.” (Benson, 1990: 2). 
 
Noting the voluntary and commercial heritage of law production and 
enforcement he continues: 
 
 “The foundation of commercial law was developed by the European 
 merchant community and enforced through merchant courts. To this 
 day, international trade is “governed” to a large extent by merchants, 
 as they make, arbitrate, and enforce their own law; and in the United 
 States, at least 75 per cent of commercial disputes are settled through 
 private arbitration or mediation with decisions based on business 
 custom and practice (customary commercial law). Arbitration services, 
 particularly for commercial disputes, have been increasingly used for 
 some time, but the last few years have witnessed the development of a 
 new industry – private for-profit courts competing with public courts for 
 a wide spectrum of civil disputes.” (Benson, 1990: 2). 
 
Noting the accelerating and world-wide trend away from Weberian state 
legitimacy and towards ‘justice without the state’, Benson points out that:  
“…there are now over twice as many private police as public police in the 
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United States, as citizens hire more and more watchmen, guards, and highly 
trained security experts.” (Benson, 1990: 2) As if he is following the prophetic 
warnings of government failure made by Molinari, Tucker, Rothbard and 
Friedman, Benson concludes by noting:  
 
 “Between 1964 and 1981, employment by private firms offering 
 protective and detective services increased by 432.9 per cent, and the 
 number of firms offering such services grew by 285.5 per cent over  the 
 same period.” (Benson, 1990: 2). 
 
Since the early 1980s the private sector has grown even more substantially 
(Benson, 1998). Today, there are more than twenty million Americans living in 
privately policed gated communities and in the UK there are more than a 
thousand such communities (Atkinson & Flint, 2004: 9). 
 
Another prolific Austrian school scholar is Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Hoppe, 
1989, 1993, 1995). In his book, Democracy: The God That Failed (Hoppe, 
2002a), Hoppe argues that democracy is a “de-civilising state” that has swept 
the world since the First World War. Initially comparing it with monarchy, 
which he likens to privately owned government, he argues that both systems 
must be de-legitimised for violating private property rights, individual liberty 
and human prosperity. In the book, The Myth of National Defense (2002b), 
Hoppe et al., argue for the total privatisation and individualisation of all 
defence services. He comments: “Though the implications of the arguments 
made in this volume are radical and sweeping, the principles are quite simple 
at root.” (Hoppe, 2002b) Stressing the authoritarian and empire building 
tendency of governments, he states: “Given the continued rise of the national-
security state in our own time, the future of liberty itself may hinge on our 
willingness to push these principles to their fullest extent.” (Hoppe, 2002b).  
 
Following the work of Murray Rothbard, for Hoppe a monopoly has no 
necessary relation to a market share or the concept of ‘dominance’. Instead, it 
relates to the lack of entry into a particular market place. For him monopolies 
cannot arise in a geniunely free market. Instead, they must always result from 
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state barriers of entry and exit. Hoppe shuns monopolies because they lead to 
higher prices for consumers and undermine quality. While mainstream 
economists might agree with such an analysis for everyday goods and 
services, Hoppe applies these principles to protection and justice. In his essay 
The Private Production of Defence (Hoppe, 1999) Hoppe argues that 
competing private insurance and defence agencies would deliver a higher 
quality of protection and dispute resolution than could ever exist under 
monopoly state control: 
 
 “Among the most popular and consequential beliefs of our age is the 
 belief in collective security. Nothing less significant than the legitimacy 
 of the modern state rests on this belief. And yet, the idea of a collective 
 security is a myth that provides no justification for the modern state. 
 Private-property owners, cooperation based on the division of labour, 
 and market competition can and should provide defense from 
 aggression” (Hoppe, 1999: 1). 
 
For Hoppe, while the boundaries of natural disasters, such as volcanic 
eruptions or earthquakes are natural, political borders are unnatural man 
made entities. From this insight he invokes Austrian methodological 
individualism and argues that while natural disasters are somewhat 
indiscriminate, human aggression is usually calculated and rational. Invaders 
tend not to attack worthless locations. 
 
 “The borders of all valuable places and things are coextensive with the 
 borders of all property. At any given point in time, every valuable place 
 and thing is owned by someone; only worthless places and things are 
 owned by no one.” (Hoppe, 1999: 9).  
 
Hoppe contrasts a world of private defence and protection with the incentives 
and record of democratic states in the twentieth century. Arguing that 
democracy has aided a century of total democratic war, where great collective 
entities (national populations) are pitched as enemies against each other, he 
asserts: 
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 “...the existence of a state does not just increase the frequency of 
 aggression, it changes its entire character. The existence of states, and 
 especially of democratic states, implies that aggression and defense – 
 war – will tend to be transformed into total, undiscriminating war.”  
(Hoppe, 1999: 10). 
 
Hoppe is significant not least because he asks the question “how would a 
system of competitive insurance agencies deal with the existence of states 
and state aggression?” (Hoppe, 1999: 11). Arguing for a market based society 
in which people can insure against state aggression, he asserts a necessity 
for the regaining of the right to self-defence: “…whereas a tax-funded 
monopolist will manifest a tendency to raise the cost and price of protection, 
private profit-loss insurance agencies strive to reduce the cost of protection 
and thus bring about falling prices. At the same time insurance agencies are 
more interested than anyone else in rising property values, because this 
implies not only that their own property holdings appreciate but in particular 
that there will also be more of other people’s property for them to insure.” 
(Hoppe, 1999: 11). He concludes that in a genuine insurance market: 
 
 “…every neighbourhood would be described, and its risk assessed, in 
 terms and in light of a multitude of crime indicators, such as the 
 composition of sexes, age groups, races, nationalities, ethnicities, 
 religions, languages, professions, and incomes.  
“Consequently, and in distinct contrast to the present situation, 
all inter-local, regional, racial, national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
income and wealth redistribution would disappear, and a constant 
source of social conflict would be removed permanently.” (Hoppe, 
1999: 12-13). 
 
Whether any of these writings are practicable is irrelevant for the purpose of 
this thesis. In reviewing the writings of Hans-Hermann Hope, Gustave de 
Molinari, Herbert Spencer, Auberon Hebert, P. E. De Puydt, Benjamin Tucker, 
Murray Rothbard, David Friedman and Bruce L. Benson, this study is not 
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remotely concerned with  how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ such ideas may be in terms of 
their veracity and argumentation. Instead, what matters here is this body of 
knowledge’s methodological input in terms of constructing an ideal type 
‘libertarian NPM perspective’ for the purposes of the research.  
 
 
4.3 Modern British Free Market Libertarians 
 
As Britain’s most radical free market thinker in this area, Brian Micklethwait, 
published in 1987 a think tank paper called Taking Free Market Defence 
Seriously. In it he prophesised:  
 
	   “Most likely is that libertarian ideas will continue to spread among 
 libertarian enthusiasts, including ideas about libertarian defence, and 
 that these enthusiasts will, in about twenty or thirty years time, 
 gradually find themselves with bigger and better opportunities to try 
 them out.” (Micklethwait, 1987: 6). 
 
As if predicting the privatised military world of MPRI and Halliburton 
mentioned in Chapter III (above), Micklethwait continued: 
 
 “Personally, I think that a global defence market leader probably will 
 emerge, sometime during the next fifty years or so, at which point the 
 benefits of global defence “compatibility” may then suddenly become 
 available…” (Micklethwait, 1987: 8). 
 
Significantly, Micklethwait described how he thought a market in defence and 
security arrangements would emerge. Arguing that it would develop 
incrementally he predicted: 
 
 “Surely what will happen is that once business enterprises have made 
 a success of defending (which may or may not include “governing”) 
 one particular patch of territory, they will then be asked to apply – and 
 will wish to apply – the same formula to other territories, as happens 
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 now with successful department stores, restaurants, construction 
 companies, holiday camp managers, and so on. Multinational 
 corporations will arise, selling defence and/or “government” to different 
 local groups. These enterprises will have proved themselves adept at 
 grappling with all the complex pricing and service problems now 
 assumed insoluble by the critics of free market defence, and they will 
 want to cash in.” (Micklethwait, 1987: 8).   
  
Like other authors mentioned above, Micklethwait believes that a free market 
in defence would be more efficient and effective than the highly statist 
alternatives of recent centuries. Likening different forms of defence to the 
development of personal computers he argues: 
 
 “Free market defence would not be the anarchic “Lebanese” shambles 
 that most now predict, any more than free market personal computers 
 have been. But nor would it be the rigid, cumbersome process that is 
 presided over by the Pentagon, or NATO, or worst of all, the Kremlin. 
 Like the personal computer industry, it would be rather complex, and 
 rather imperfect and rather unsatisfactory, but would only be these 
 things by its own much higher standards. 
  “If governments had totally run the personal computer industry, 
 there  would have been no complaints at all about the personal 
 computer industry, but that is because there would have been no 
 personal computer industry to complain about. I believe that the gap in 
 quality between free market defence and the defence we have now 
 would be similarly huge.” (Micklethwait, 1987: 9). 
 
He continues: 
 
 “Free market defence would not only supply alliances; it would supply 
 better alliances, and keep them up to the mark, updating them and 
 improving them as customer pressure for new arrangements made 
 itself felt. Governmental organisations are very difficult to alter, but in 
 the market producer disruption is routine. If there are natural 
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 monopolies, the free market is better at supplying them than 
 governments, just as the free market supplies better carpets.”  
(Micklethwait, 1987: 9). 
 
Significantly, Micklethwait acknowledges that while conflict is bad for 
business, because it erodes capital and other forms of value, there has to be 
doubt as to whether a genuine and unfettered market would find war or peace 
a more attractive and profitable path. On this key point he echoes elite 
opinions in the research (Chapters V and VI below) by concluding with 
remarks that are somewhat reminiscent of the statist world that already exists. 
Just as war and peace depend today on the intentions of individuals he 
concludes: 
 
 “Meanwhile, the trouble with the theory that war is bad for business is 
 that it is only bad for some kinds of business. It is very good for others.
 What will eventually settle the matter is how badly peace is wanted, 
 and how determinedly and cleverly entrepreneurs are willing to work to 
 provide it.” (Micklethwait, 1987: 11). 
 
Commander Ian Whitehouse (Ret) spent twenty-two years in the Royal Navy. 
He specialised in submarines and commanded two boats, HMS Onyx and the 
nuclear powered HMS Sovereign. In July 2002 he published a paper in The 
Naval Review called: ‘A Private Service: The Possible Privatisation of Britain’s 
Armed Forces’. Republished by the Libertarian Alliance (Whitehouse, 2002b), 
Whitehouse not only proposed a more privatised future for the Royal Navy but 
he argued that given underlying trends in political economy reform should be 
extended well beyond dockyards. 
 
Whitehouse begins his paper by invoking the Laffer Curve to argue that British 
government tax revenue has been roughly held at a culturally optimum level, 
which he believes currently to be some 40 per cent of GDP, for a quarter of a 
century. However, so as not to over tax the economy (and thereby cause 
capital flight) the British government (along with many others around the 
world) have pursued a huge array of privatisations and contracted out to the 
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private sector an ever wider range of functions. Mindful of globalisation, the 
rising psychology of consumerism and the built in inefficiencies of 
government, Whitehouse argues that as pressures continue to mount in those 
areas where government remains active (healthcare, social security, 
education, law enforcement and defence) so structural and electoral 
pressures will demand ever-greater market-oriented reform. Mindful of the 
budgetary pressures on the Royal Navy and Britain’s other defence services 
Whitehouse believes that public private partnerships and privatisation will 
have to be extended in ways that would have seemed unimaginable when for 
example Micklethwait (above) wrote his paper in the late 1980s. Whitehouse 
starts with the questions “Is privatisation a step too far? Is it possible, 
desirable, inevitable?” (Whitehouse, 2002b: 3) He replies: “I believe it is 
certainly possible, it may well be desirable and if it’s inevitable then the 
implications should be considered” (Whitehouse, 2002b: 3). Noting the 
economic underpinnings of most defence he asserts: 
 
 “A country, state or alliance will wish to have access to, and control 
 over, the use of force but control does not necessarily mean ownership 
 or management….Why shouldn’t other entities, smaller than nations 
 and governments, interested in the security of their future also fund or 
 even take part in organising or directing the defence of their region?”  
(Whitehouse, 2002b: 3). 
  
Exploring the incentives for private funding and strongly echoing the debate 
surrounding privatisation, governance, differentiated polities and the hollowing 
out of the state, Whitehouse muses: 
 
“No.5 Tornado fighter squadron, based at RAF Coningsby, was 
designated for the air defence of London, but it’s about to be  scrapped 
in response to a funding crisis. Perhaps Lloyds of London should have 
been asked for support, or any one of many billion pound companies 
that see London, and its continued existence, as important and worth 
investing in. The squadron could easily have also provided defence for 
Paris, Birmingham, or Brussels from Coningsby; perhaps these cities 
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would be prepared to contribute to its continuing in service?” 
(Whitehouse, 2002b: 3). 
 
Analysing the potential for differentiated networks of governance and 
personnel that oversee British naval and military forces, Whitehouse argues: 
 
“The Chief of Defence Staff and his team are both the independent 
advisors to Government on defence and also the senior management 
team that manage and deploy the Armed Forces. However, they rely 
solely upon government funding for the continued existence of the units 
they control, if the funding mechanism were to change this independent 
advice would still be available and importantly would be perhaps even 
more independent. If they also had the ability to charge for services of 
the armed forces this might create greater freedoms, improved 
effectiveness and reduce constraints in key areas” (Whitehouse, 
2002b: 3). 
 
Asking whether the United Kingdom government should be the sole purchaser 
or supplier of defence services and how they should be more effectively 
costed, he retorts: 
 
 “Could the Treasury, through the Defence Budget, pay for the 
 infrastructure by purchasing and maintaining ships, aircraft and tanks; 
 paying enough to keep them and the staff in a state of readiness and 
 training? Then, when a deployment was required, MoD staff would 
 quote  for the work - £10 million a day to prepare, rising to £15 million a 
 day on sailing, £2 million for every missile fired, an extra £5 million a 
 day for deployments lasting more than sixty days or south of the 
 Equator, all travel expenses to be paid by the mile.” (Whitehouse,  
 2002b: 3-4).  
 
Moving further down the road of market-oriented governance and 
differentiated polities, he continues: 
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 “More intriguingly we might then perhaps start to question whether the 
 UK government should be the sole purchaser of these new semi-
 independent sector Armed Forces, would the EU or the USA want to 
 hire a naval detachment to protect and support a task force in the 
 Mediterranean?” (Whitehouse, 2002b: 4). 
 
Exploring practical ways in which a more commercialised and market-oriented 
approach to defence might impact, Whitehouse writes: 
 
“Perhaps the Armed Forces would use a more flexible staffing system? 
Perhaps ship’s captains will advertise for crews as our forebears did in 
the 18th century, some experience necessary but not always. A bonus 
system is usual these days in business, maybe there’ll be a re-
introduction of prize money and head money to reward captains, 
officers and crews for their private enterprise and zeal…” (Whitehouse, 
2002b: 4).  
 
Commenting on the private funding of the Royal Navy he says: 
 
“An alternative model might involve certain aspects of the naval task 
group being hived off. I’m sure there are many ex-fisheries protection 
and small ships officers that would happily join a company run by 
retired Sea Training Staff. This company might also guarantee to 
manage mine clearance when needed, keeping their diving expertise 
up to scratch by selling services to the offshore oil industry.” 
(Whitehouse, 2002b: 4). 
 
Asking the question “who else would this private navy sell its services to?” he 
responds: 
 
 “I think fishing companies, Customs & Excise and the Hydrographer 
 perhaps would all be interested. So would other navies wishing to be 
 trained, engineering and defence companies wishing to test equipment 
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 and perhaps even the occasional high living individual wanting to 
 impress friends.” (Whitehouse, 2002b: 4). 
 
Accepting the plausibility of such market-oriented ideas, Whitehouse goes on 
to assert: 
 
 “In fact aspects of naval life have already been privatised, dockyards 
 went private years ago, fleet maintenance is going the same way. 
 DERA is privatised and the Hydrographic Office can’t be far behind, do 
 we still have naval architects – I’m not sure? Maybe VSEL would want 
 to be a partner, or BAE systems, SAAB Bofors, Rolls Royce?”  
 (Whitehouse, 2002b: 4). 
 
Whitehouse concludes: 
 
“There are companies out there that are experienced in delivering new 
services in new ways and creating wealth through partnerships, so why 
not a partnership with the business of national defence?” I’m sure there 
are defence related industries that would be very keen to rent out “for 
hire” a warship or two, particularly when trailing and demonstrating 
their new weapon systems.” (Whitehouse, 2002b: 4). 
 
Overall, from the combined perspective of Whitehouse, Micklethwait and the 
other libertarian literature reviewed, free markets offer a heady range of 
solutions to problems which the authors tend to believe is rooted in the 
political economy of ‘state failure’: irrespective of such legitimating rubrics as 
democracy. Whether right or wrong, this literature represents an extreme 
body of knowledge that is utopian in its idealisation of markets and their 
conceptualised role in the political economy of naval sea power, defence, 
security and the wider debate surrounding governance, accountability and 
outcomes. 
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4.4 Building the ‘Ideal Type’ Construct of an NPM Free Market in 
Defence, Security and Naval Sea Power  
 
From the ideological perspective of this literature, the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries witnessed a significant accommodation between the state 
and a wide range of sectional interests of which consumer driven propertarian 
markets formed only one part. In areas such as defence, naval sea power, 
law enforcement and even sanitation, the idea of an enhanced state was 
ascendant alongside industrialisation and mass production. Yet today, it is still 
popularly believed that there are a number of services essential to the 
functioning of a modern complex society that can only be organised and 
legitimated through government. It in this context that the journalist Peter 
Kellner, for example, comments: 
 
 “The unrestricted operation of market forces in nineteenth century 
 Britain produced grave consequences, especially a lack of major public 
 goods as public order, sanitation and education. This shortcoming was 
 remedied only by a massive expansion of the state, without which 
 capitalist society would have broken down. The market was unable to 
 solve these difficulties.” (Kellner, 1987) 
 
While today it seems inappropriate to question such an entrenched 
perspective, the historian Stephen Davies has asked the question: ”Surely the 
Blue Books, official reports and the works of social investigators reveal a 
horrendous state of affairs in the early nineteenth century, with large towns 
and cities lacking such elementary facilities as water, lighting, and an effective 
police force to protect the public from rising crime? Weren’t the inhabitants 
deprived of education and other elements of culture?” (Davies, 1987: 1). 
Commenting on the reality of nineteenth century Britain, Davies argues: 
“Certainly, the condition of many larger towns and their inhabitants was often 
deplorable. These deficiencies had two main causes: a sharp rise in 
population, coupled with large-scale urbanisation; and an utterly inadequate 
system of local government, riddled with corruption and jobbery” (Davies, 
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1987: 1). Significantly, Davies points out that there were at this time classical 
liberal economists who disagreed with the idea of more state interventionism 
and instead campaigned for the widespread removal of anti-market 
restrictions which undermined private sector solutions. Indeed, some research 
that goes beyond the official reports of the day reveal that a host of private 
sector innovations were already being successfully developed. For Davies, 
the early history of Britain’s law enforcement and sanitation sectors 
demonstrate that the free market can supply public goods.  
 
Between the middle of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries widespread 
market demand led to the establishment of an impressive range of private law 
enforcement agencies. The services they offered ranged from the deployment 
of newspaper advertising and thief-taking to the work of professional 
detectives. Overtime, the most significant players in the market became the 
private associations for the prosecution of felons. Voluntary associations of 
citizens initially established to defray the costs of mounting criminal 
prosecutions they essentially became private police forces. Acquiring, by 
popular consumer demand, a broad range of functions that included 
insurance and crime-prevention, association members only paid for services 
in line with their ability to pay. The income generated covered compensation 
for loss through theft or criminal damage, the recovery of stolen goods, cost of 
criminal prosecutions and for the compiling of information against delinquents. 
Finally, the resource generated was used to finance local foot-patrols and a 
network of watchers. Between 1744 and 1856 there were more than 450 
associations (Schubert, 1981). By the 1830s the largest and most successful, 
such as the Barnet Association, had to all intents and purposes become 
private police forces. According to Davies they offered services that were 
reasonably priced, efficient and very popular with customers across the social 
spectrum. Crucially, membership spanned the social classes, not simply the 
wealthy.  
 
Again, by the early part of the nineteenth century, many water and sanitation 
services were being supplied by a complex network of chartered private water 
companies. Although these organisations did not receive a favourable press 
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following the 1842 Sanitation Report (Flynn, 1965), the picture was not as bad 
as this report portrayed. In many areas such as Ashton-under-Lyne, private 
water companies provided water at a constant supply and pressure (Holland, 
1846). While in London there were problems with the water supply and the 
provision of sanitation services, in reality, these were arguably the result of a 
lack of competition between providers and the manifest failings of local 
government. In the metropolis alone there were more than three hundred 
separate bodies operating under the auspices of two hundred and fifty 
separate Acts of Parliament (Davies, 1987: 2). 
 
For Davies, the early nineteenth century witnessed rapid growth in the private 
supply of a range of infrastructural services. In the area of justice, the period 
saw the development of a plethora of private arbitration services, and large 
insurance companies such as Sun Alliance facilitated a new generation of 
private fire services (Arthurs, 1985). The Royal Lifeboat Institution (now the 
Royal National Lifeboat Institution) is very much a product of this period. 
Dating back to 1824 it is an exemplar of the private supply of a public good 
(Meek, 1999): in this instance, rescue at sea. 
 
Significantly for this study, Davies is critical of those academics who fail to 
scrutinise and assess the received wisdom of the nineteenth century. For him 
the deference shown to the official (the 1834 Poor Law, the 1839 
Constabulary and the 1842 Sanitation) reports of Edwin Chadwick is gravely 
misplaced, not least as in recent years it has become increasingly clear that 
they were often little more than exercises in political propaganda. For 
Chadwick doctored a great deal of the evidence of his enquiries to justify his 
own prejudices. As such, his work represents “…hearsay evidence or urban 
folk-myths presented as fact” (Davies, 1987: 2). Dwelling on the efficacy of 
Chadwick’s research, Davies concludes: “Thus the majority of respondents to 
the 1839 Constabulary Report said that they were satisfied with the existing 
state of affairs and saw no requirement for a state police force, and yet when 
Chadwick drew up the Report most of this evidence was simply omitted” 
(Davies, 1987: 2). For Davies, the historical record does not support the idea 
that the Weberian state and the world of public administration was an 
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inevitable or better provider of so called public services: “Instead, it lends 
support to the thesis that the market is capable of producing private solutions 
to the problem of ‘public goods’” (Davies, 1987: 2). Davies concludes:  
 
“That the necessity of a large state for commercial society is not only 
unproven but even doubtful. It seems apparent that many of the ‘core’ 
functions of the state can be provided in quite a different way through 
the market. History can offer ideas as to how the state today may be 
replaced and even as to what a truly commercial society might be like” 
(Davies, 1987: 2).  
 
Nevertheless, even in accepting such a situation, the fundamental question 
still remains as to why the state prevailed? On this key point Davies 
comments: “The problems were so acute in many cases that drastic action did 
seem necessary. The laissez-faire solution could be blocked by the vested 
interests of the old order and was not supported by a sufficiently powerful 
interest group. By contrast the state reformers had a coherent ideology in 
Benthamism and were able to work with the vested interests, even if some of 
their more radical proposals were thwarted. Yet the main reason for the 
‘triumph of the state’ was the fear of the  mid-Victorian elite that society was 
facing the prospect of moral disintegration. They feared that economic 
development was dissolving the social bonds and producing an atomised 
‘state of nature’ (Davies, 1987: 2). On this key question of morality as a key 
driver of statism, Davies concludes:  
 
“The primary objection to non-state education was its lack of moral 
instruction, while the prosecution associations were seen as 
inadequate because they concerned themselves only with such 
matters as crimes against property and person while ignoring ‘moral’ 
offences, such as prostitution and drunkenness. Even the debate over 
sanitation was thought to be as much about morals as about drains”. 
(Davies, 1987: 2)  
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For the purposes of this study, it is important to look beyond such historical 
debate. In researching the question, ‘how do influential agents in and around 
Weber’s nation-state monopoly now conceptualise legitimacy in political 
economy and what are the implications for New Public Management Theory?’ 
it is instead important to construct an ‘ideal type’ model of the market that 
theoretically stands in opposition to the political economy of Weber’s 
monopoly nation-state. For it is only in comparing and contrasting elite 
opinions towards ‘ideal type’ NPM-market and PA-state models that the real 
boundaries of discourse surrounding contemporary perspectives on 
governance and legitimacy in political economy can be researched.  
 
While all economic theory refers to the ways in which men would behave were 
they actuated by purely economic motives, this study is concerned with ideal 
types rooted in abstract elements of social reality. Transcending historical 
events, the research requires the construction of an ideal type of free market 
legitimacy, as well as its opposite for the state, so as to ascertain the 
boundaries of discourse for both paradigms. 
 
From the perspective of the compass of political economy (see Fig.8 below 
and sections 3.2 and 4.1 above), there are ultimately four ideal type models of 
political economy (Cooperative Mix, Libertarian Free Market, State Command 
and Control, Corporatist Mixture). However, mindful of the direction of travel of 
the Royal Navy and British naval sea power over the last thirty years (see 
Table 1 above), the research in this study is primarily focused on the transition 
from the lower left, State Command and Control quartile, to the discourse of 
the upper right, Libertarian Free Market quartile.  
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Fig 8. Compass for Ideal Type Constructs in Political Economy 
 
 
It is in this context that the research question first requires the selection of 
those topics that from a Weberian perspective represent the ‘ideal type’ 
antithesis of the state’s “quintessential function and signifier of being” (Small, 
2006: 12) in naval sea power. From the historical, literary and theoretical 
material presented above, the logical topics to be chosen are as follows 
(Table 4). 
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                                             Libertarian 
                                                                                                 2013 
                                                                Privatisation of Naval Sea Power 
                                              Outsourcing of RN Warships 
                                                                Private Armed Guards for Ships 
  Collectivist                     Privatisation of the RFA                Individualist 
                            Privatisation of Royal Navy Personnel Training 
                            Privatisation of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service 
                            Privatisation of Royal Navy Dockyards 
                       1981 
 
 
                                                 Authoritarian 
 
 
Table 4. Key Ideal Type Topics from the ‘Spear’ of Modern British Naval 
Sea Power. 
 
 
To cover the relevant topics of discourse, the research must examine the 
idealised ‘privatisation’ of Royal Navy Dockyards, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary 
Service, Royal Navy Personnel Training, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the idea of 
private armed guards aboard British merchant vessels, the outsourcing of RN 
warships (under Design, Build, Finance and Operate, contracts) and, 
ultimately, the priviatisation of naval sea power via businesses such as 
Typhon. While in reality some of these areas have experienced forms of 
outsourcing, from a methodological perspective, the research requires 
idealised forms of research messaging and therefore the stressing of 
‘privatisation’ as a logical extreme.  
 
Second, in analysing the libertarian literature presented (above), the research 
must rigorously examine the relevant areas of political economy. In 
constructing an ideal type ‘libertarian NPM perspective’ versus a ‘state PA 
perspective’, the literature highlights the following six areas as being crucial.  
 
 170 
First comes the issue of naval sea power as a public versus private good. For 
libertarian free marketers, naval sea power is not only non-excludable and/or 
non-rivalrous, it is not even a necessary precondition of market activity to be 
funded from what they term ‘coercive taxation’. 
 
Second is the issue of monopoly. For libertarian free marketers such as 
Rothbard and Hoppe, a monopoly has no necessary relation to the concept of 
market share. Instead, it relates to the lack of entry into a particular market. 
For them, monopolies can never arise from a genuine free market. Instead, 
they must always result from state intervention. For libertarian free marketers 
therefore, a monopoly of naval sea power is no better than any other. As in 
the production of security, law, law enforcement and any other conceivable 
product or service, a monopoly can only ever be “necessarily by force” and 
therefore inherently rooted in its own inefficiency and ineffectiveness.   
 
For Birch the opposite it true. He argues that an ‘anarcho-capitalist society’ 
would logically lead to the establishment of territorially defined but privately 
owned monopolies and systems of governance. By implication he suggests 
that a libertarian free market in naval sea power, defence and law would end 
up with either a single court monopolising a particular territory and/or area, or 
the dominant court would divide that territory and/or area into “monopolistic 
domains” (Birch, 1998: 3). Arguing that when taken to extremis free markets 
degenerate to re-create their own forms of non-tax funded monopoly and 
governance, Birch concedes that the resulting institutional arrangements are 
ultimately legitimated by local and cultural factors: 
 
A co-operatively owned court might create a commune, a church court 
a theocracy, a privately owned court a monarchy, a joint stock court a 
republic. The dominant court might be controlled by businessmen, or 
lawyers, or policemen, or soldiers, or gangsters – or solid citizens. The 
court might be monolithic, or composite; its powers might be unitary, or 
divided. It might be pragmatic, or ideological. It might be honest, or 
corrupt. It might be in it for the money, or the power, or for the 
furtherance of justice.” (Birch, 1998: 3). 
 171 
 
Whilst libertarian free marketeers see ‘government’ and states ultimately 
degenerate overtime only to rediscover bottom up markets (as was the case 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union), Birch argues that overtime ‘market 
anarchies’ would similarly degenerate leading to a rediscovery of monopoly 
forms of governance, statism and in time ‘government’.  
 
Third, is the issue of private versus public funding of naval sea power and the 
interconnected idea that ‘non-coercive’ funding (read: ‘funding without the 
state’) would more likely ensure the ‘business of peace’. Just as Molinari 
argued, that with no broker of privilege and monopoly there would be no need 
for war, and Spencer advocated the legitimate right of individuals to refuse to 
pay taxes to government for the protection of life and property, so Herbert 
argued that if the market was set free from the state: “Every want that we 
have will be satisfied by means of a voluntary combination.” (Herbert, 1978: 
185). Significantly, Hoppe contrasts the ideational worlds of private defence 
and protection with the incentives and record of democratically legitimated 
states and governance in the twentieth century. Arguing that democracy has 
aided a century of ‘total democratic war’, in which national populations have 
been coercively pitched as enemies against each other, the point is made that 
the existence of a state does not just increase the frequency of aggression, it 
changes its entire character. To Hoppe, the democratically legitimated 
Weberian nation-state implies that aggression and defense: “will tend to be 
transformed into total, undiscriminating war.” (Hoppe, 1999: 10).  
 
Countering Hoppe, Micklethwait acknowledges that while conflict is bad for 
business, because it ‘erodes capital and other forms of value,’ it is only bad 
for ‘some kinds of business’. For him, what will eventually settle the matter is 
how badly peace is wanted under all systems of governance, and “how 
determinedly and cleverly private entrepreneurs are willing to work to provide 
it” (Micklethwait, 1987: 11). Whether such ‘entrepreneurs’ are best found in 
free markets or tax funded and/or differentiated polities is not for this study to 
decide. However, what is of interest is the epistemological tension in the line 
of reasoning and the attendant complexity of political economy. 
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Fourth is the libertarian free market perspective on the temporal dimension of 
the past and, importantly, the future. Spencer believes that overtime the state 
will become smaller; lapse into forms of differentiated decay and that 
voluntary market organisation(s) will eventually come to replace its 
institutional arrangements. De Puydt imagines a future world of ‘Panarchy’ in 
which “governmental competition” will grant individuals and ‘congregations’ an 
ability to engage authorities as if they were subscribing to differentiated 
political churches. Envisioning a globalised future of international travel, free 
migration and real-time communication, he also believes international courts 
will become increasingly important in the resolution of disputes.  
 
While Rothbard believes future market arrangements in defence and security 
cannot be known in advance, just as it would have been impossible now some 
eighty years ago to “predict the exact structure of the television industry” 
(Rothbard, 1970), Friedman believes that ongoing state failure in defence is 
so inevitable it will act as a key driver of an ever-expanding private sector. 
Finally, Micklethwait concludes that just as libertarian ideas continue to 
spread, so more of its practitioners will “gradually find themselves with bigger 
and better opportunities to try them out.” (Micklethwait, 1987: 6). For him, 
hollowed out states and libertarian free markets in naval sea power and 
defence will not only supply ‘new forms of alliance’ but if they are natural 
monopolies then “the free market will be better at supplying them than 
governments” (Micklethwait, 1987: 6). 
 
The fifth issue is the methodological and epistemological superiority of notions 
of market and state failure in political economy research. For the purposes of 
this study the important question is not whether a legitimated political market 
works under conditions of zero transaction costs and perfect information, for 
as David Friedman argued under those conditions the private market is also 
efficient. The really significant question is how badly does each system break 
down when the assumptions are relaxed? On this key point the literature is 
clear, and it is worth restating:  
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“Economic efficiency is a strong requirement for the outcome of any 
real world system of institutions, since an outcome is efficient only if it 
could not be improved by a bureaucrat god – a benevolent despot with 
perfect information and unlimited power over individual actions. While it 
may be seen as an upper bound on how well an economic system can 
work, one might think that using that bound to judge real systems is as 
appropriate as judging race cars by their ability to achieve their upper 
bound – the speed of light” (Friedman, 1999: 7). 
 
The point is well made: in political economy it is not how well a system might 
succeed according to a theoretical yet unobtainable perfectionism. Instead, it 
is more powerful and relevant to theorise on the basis of how a system might 
actually fail given the empirical constraints of actually existing reality.   
 
Finally, the sixth issue concerns the underlyiing institutional architecture of all 
ideal type free libertarian market models: property rights. Although not applied 
specifically in the libertarian literature on naval sea power and security, the 
work of Walter Block suggests that no private naval sea power could ever be 
properly concieved in an ideal type sense without first understanding the 
implications and, as he views it, the benefits, of the private ownership of 
oceans (Block, 2000). As is later made clear in Chapter VI, for Block the 
negative externalities of piracy, enviornmental damage and insecurity at sea 
are not the result of any notional market failure, instead they are the 
consequence of a system of governance devoid of fundamenal private 
property rights and therefore systemic state failure. So long as the seas and 
oceans of the world remain unowned, they will display their tendency towards 
a ‘tradgedy of the commons’. However, for the research in this study, such 
argumentation is not relevant in terms of its efficacy. What matters is the way 
such a perspective can aid the methodological construct of a useful ‘ideal 
type’ position. 
 
 
 
 
 174 
 
4.5 Conclusion: Methodology and an ‘Ideal Type’ Free Market 
 
Combined, when listing in terms of privatisation, PPPs and outsourcing the 
key changes to the Royal Navy and British naval sea power over the last thirty 
years, and placing these developments within the idealised framework of 
libertarian ideation and governance, the following topics of political economy 
are the ones that are derived. Including the epistemological superiority of 
notions of market and state failure, the list culminates in the following topics 
for research (see Table 5):  
 
 
Libertarian Free Market                     Command and Control State 
(NPM Ideal Type State Failure          (PA Ideal Type Market Failure 
Perspective)                              Perspective) 
 
                                 1. Subjects of Empirical Change 
Privatisation of:                        Nationalisation of: 
Royal Navy Dockyards                       Royal Navy Dockyards 
Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service                     Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service 
Royal Navy Personnel Training                       Royal Navy Personnel Training 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary                       Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
Armed Guards on Merchant Ships         Armed Guards Allowed on Merchant Ships 
Royal Navy Warships                        Royal Navy Warships 
Naval Sea Power                        Naval Sea Power  
 
                                  2. Subjects of Political Economy 
Private Good                       Public Good 
No/or Private Monopoly                      No/or State Monopoly 
Private Funding                       Public Funding 
Past, Present and Future                     Past, Present and Future 
 
Table 5. Topics for Political Economy Research on Royal Navy 
Discourse. 
 
When putting together the path and trajectory of Royal Navy modernisation 
and the literature of utopian markets, the relevant topics for research include: 
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privatisation of Royal Navy dockyards; privatisation of the Royal Maritime 
Auxiliary Service; private armed guards on British merchant ships; competitive 
contracting of the training of Royal Navy personnel; privatisation of the Royal 
Fleet Auxiliary; privatisation of Royal Navy warships; public versus private 
funding of British naval sea power; naval sea power as a public or private 
good, and; the future of privatisation in British naval sea power.  	  
It is with this methodological approach in mind that the research presented in 
the next chapter focuses on the key research question: how do influential 
agents in and around Weber’s nation-state monopoly now conceptualise 
legitimacy in political economy and what are the implications for New Public 
Management Theory?  
 
Given for Weber, any re-emergence of private naval, military and/or protection 
organisations represents a fundamental failure of the modern nation state, 
because they inherently undermine governments ‘quintessential function and 
signifier of being’, what do elite opinion formers, in and around the Royal Navy 
as a core state institution, now believe constitutes legitimacy in political 
economy? And what are the implications of their attitudes for NPM theory and 
all those concerned with the future of governance, accountability and public 
administration? It is to this research and its findings that Chapter V attends.  	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Chapter V 
Boundaries of Elite Discourse on Royal Navy  
Modernisation and the Privatisation of Naval Sea Power: 
Methodology, Research and Findings 
 
 
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they 
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen 
in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from 
some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power 
of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual 
encroachment of ideas…But, soon, or late, it is ideas, not vested 
interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.” (Keynes, 1973, p. 383)	  
 
 
This chapter builds on the foundational work presented in Chapter IV, 
introduces the methodology for the research and goes on to present its initial 
findings. Focused on the question, ‘how do influential agents in and around 
Weber’s nation-state monopoly now conceptualise legitimacy in political 
economy and what are the implications for New Public Management theory?’, 
the research examines the attitudes of fifty elite opinion formers (as defined in 
section 5.2.6 below), involved with the discourse surrounding Royal Navy 
modernisation and the wider political economy of British naval sea power. In 
clarifying the boundaries of discourse surrounding notions of market and state 
failure in relevant areas of naval sea power and Royal Navy modernisation, it 
not only compares and contrasts elite opinions towards ‘ideal type’ NPM 
market and PA state models, but it provides original insights into the 
boundaries of discourse surrounding contemporary perspectives on 
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accountability, governance and legitimacy in the political economy of force 
and violence. 
 
 
5.1 Background to Research 
 
Together, chapters II, III and IV (above) have explored the ideas, practice and 
theoretical constructs surrounding the private sector’s involvement in the 
production of British naval sea power and made it clear that such involvement 
is no longer fanciful or illusory. Almost as if ‘returning to the future’, the Royal 
Navy and modern British naval sea power are once again increasingly reliant 
on forms of institutional nexus and governance that echo seventeenth, 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century forms of political economy. If this is 
the case however, then important questions arise concerning how elite 
opinion formers concerned with Royal Navy modernisation actually think 
about such concepts as market and state failure in the area of naval sea 
power and the Royal Navy? At a time when the Royal Navy and British naval 
sea power finds itself at the cutting edge of a potential ‘hollowing out’ of the 
‘core state’ through privatisation, outsourcing and partnerships, the research 
at the heart of this study not only attempts to clarify the boundaries of 
discourse surrounding the political economy of force and violence but, it in 
doing so, it aims to present a critique of NPM with reference to the 
problematic dimensions of time, economic complexity and socio-political 
power. 
 
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
The research in this study is primarily deductive and descriptive (Firebaugh, 
2008) in character. Although inductively informed (Ragin, 1994) by the ideal 
type constructs of the Libertarian free market and the command and control 
state, the methodological aim of the research is to comparatively analyse and 
position theoretically these concepts within newly generated data. While 
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deductive (theory-testing) research is most productive when there are a 
number of competing paradigms, in this case the ‘state failure’ perspective 
traditionally associated with NPM and the ‘market failure’ perspective of PA, 
the research is also descriptive in that it generates and powerfully theories the 
data presented. At the heart of this research is the proposition if we can better 
understand how relevant elite opinion formers think about notions of market 
and state failure in the production of naval sea power, then we will be better 
equipped to theoretically critique Weber’s ideas surrounding the legitimate 
use of force and violence and therefore the wider world of the NPM, PA and 
governance debate (see Chapter VI). 
 
5.2.1 Types of Survey Considered 
 
From the outset, numerous types of study were considered including 
longitudinal and sequential surveys (Neuman, 2006). However, constrained 
by practical considerations of time, money and ethics (see below), a cross-
sectional questionnaire (Creswell, 2003) was deemed to be the most effective 
way of generating quantifiably meaningful data. Early on in the process, it was 
decided that in testing the preferences and attitudes of opinion formers 
concerning the political economy of Royal Navy modernisation, the research 
should primarily measure intensity and be of an interval type (Stebbins, 2001). 
   
Given the purpose of the research is to explore opinion formers’ attitudes to 
notions of market and state failure in the context of British naval sea power 
and the Royal Navy, a cross-sectional design was also deemed to be the 
most appropriate because it involves no time dimension and relies on existing 
differences within and between groups rather than a random allocation. 
Designed to provide a snapshot at a specific point in time, the objective is to 
surface existing inferences and attitudes amongst an established group of 
elite respondents (Munn and Drever, 2004). While longitudinal studies involve 
taking multiple measures over an extended period (Foddy, 1994), this study is 
focused on finding relationships between variables at a single point in time. 
Moreover, the sub-groups identified are purposely selected for their existing 
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differences rather than on the basis of any randomised sample or 
geographical consideration.  
 
A cross-sectional design using survey techniques was chosen because it was 
relatively inexpensive and could be conducted within a timeframe (Andres, 
2012) consonant with the author’s employment commitments. Ideal for 
describing characteristics that exist amongst opinion formers, and not 
concerned with delineating strict cause and effect relationships (Neuman, 
2006), the approach also enables the generation of preliminary data from 
which clear inferences about possible relationships can be drawn. 
 
5.2.2  Small-scale Pilot Study 
 
In June-October 2011, a small-scale pilot study (Munn and Drever, 2004) was 
conducted with respondents. Designed to inform and assist with the 
development of a survey-questionnaire it provided valuable feedback and was 
centred on a series of informal, open-ended interviews with twenty opinion 
formers concerned with Royal Navy outsourcing, public private partnerships 
and the privatisation of British naval sea power (see Appendix I).  
 
During the pilot study process, three key factors became clear. First, an 
overwhelming majority of the respondents were concerned with the sensitivity 
of the subject and wanted to be assured anonymity. Second, respondents 
were only primarily interested in the here, now and future of discourse. In the 
main, respondents were not that interested in (and/or could not necessarily 
see the relevance of) the longer-term history of Royal Navy and British naval 
sea power private sector involvement. Surprisingly, very few were interested 
in the history of its political economy. To get opinion formers to participate and 
engage meaningfully with the research, the questionnaire had to primarily 
focus on the here, now and future of Royal Navy modernisation as well as the 
broader concepts impacting the political economy of British naval sea power. 
Finally, the respondent categories were going to have to be better targeted 
and more narrowly focused (see 5.2.6 below). They were going to have to be 
meaningfully influential, responsible and engaged with the discourse and 
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practice surrounding naval outsourcing, public private partnerships and 
privatisation.    
 
5.2.3 Developing the Questionnaire 
 
Overall, the pilot study highlighted two key issues involved in the development 
of the survey questionnaire. First was the realisation that in examining opinion 
former’s attitudes to Royal Navy and British naval sea power ‘modernisations’, 
the questionnaire had to meaningfully engage theoretical notions of market 
and state failure whilst also exploring aspects of a temporal dimension that 
some respondents preferred to avoid. Second was the realisation that as the 
opinion formers at the centre of the research tend to be very busy people, the 
questionnaire should not be overly lengthy or convoluted (Dillman, 1978). To 
reassure and engage respondents it was decided that the survey 
questionnaire should not contain more than 12 questions and that with 
preliminary explanations its execution should not take more than 15-20 
minutes.  
 
5.2.4 Topics Covered 
 
Having analysed the path and trajectory of Royal Navy modernisations in 
Chapter III (above), the topics chosen for the research were informed by the 
literature reviewed in Chapter IV (above). In combining the path and trajectory 
of Royal Navy modernisation over the last thirty years, with the 
methodological application of utopian and idealised markets, the following 
topics of political economy are the ones derived. Being relevant and familiar to 
Royal Navy opinion formers, the final list of topics included: privatisation of 
Royal Navy dockyards; privatisation of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service; 
private armed guards on British merchant ships; competitive contracting of the 
training of Royal Navy personnel; privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary; 
privatisation of Royal Navy warships; public versus private funding of British 
naval sea power; naval sea power as a public or private good, and; the future 
of privatisation in British naval sea power: the last question being put in the 
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context of a broader temporal and historic perspective. Together, these were 
the topics chosen given the aims of the research (5.2.5 below).  
 
5.2.5 Aims of the Research 
 
Focused on the attitudes of fifty leading opinion formers involved with the 
oversight and delivery of Royal Navy modernisation, the first aim of the 
research was to profile elite attitudes concerning the Royal Navy reforms that 
have already occurred (for example, the privatisation of the Royal Navy’s 
dockyards) and those that are currently being considered by policy makers 
(for example, privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary). Second, the research 
goes on to profile elite attitudes when it comes to key concepts of political 
economy concerned with production and operation of British naval power. In 
this context, the research profiles elite opinion formers’ attitudes to the key 
concepts of NPM-market and PA-state failure in the context of naval power. 
Third, the research then goes on to present and profile elite attitudes to the 
history of private sector involvement in the production and operation of British 
naval sea power and its potential relationship to an even more privatised 
future.  
 
Combined, the research aims to present a range of attitudes and opinions that 
not only delineate the boundaries of elite discourse concerning British naval 
sea power and therefore Weberian ideas on legitimacy concerning force and 
violence but do so in a way that informs NPM, public administration and the 
wider world of governance. In enabling an informed discussion critiquing a 
range of concepts and themes relevant to the discourse surrounding NPM 
and PA, the research is important because it illuminates elite discourse 
focused on an uneven core of modern statecraft and the debate surrounding 
its hollowing out.  
 
5.2.6 Respondents  
 
Whilst there is generally a poor mesh between facts and theory in the study of 
elites, power and the nature of change in public policy discourse, C. Wright 
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Mills’ seminal work (Mills, 1963) on elite opinion formers, provides the 
methodological basis for the selection of respondents. For Mills, elite opinion 
formers are comprised of those agents in the dominant societal institutions of 
military, political and economic life. Their decisions (or lack of decisions) have 
enormous and disproportionate consequences when compared against 
ordinary civilians.  
 
Due to the interchangeability of top institutional positions, opinion-formers are 
popularly thought of as developing a collective consciousness built around a 
community of interests. Whilst in contemporary Britain, previously decisive 
institutions located in and around the feudal aristocracy, the extended and 
nuclear family, and even organised religion, have been marginalised and/or 
adapted to contemporary meritocratic, pluralistic and secular life, so the 
realities of elite power have shifted. Today, elite opinion formers are also 
found in the relevant press and electronic media. 
 
For this study, the phrase ‘elite opinion formers’ seeks to avoid the 
inappropriate simplicities of other theoretical paradigms. While Marxism over-
emphasises an ill-defined ‘capitalist’ as the holder of power, political theorists 
lay too much emphasis on politicians as heading systems, be they elected or 
otherwise. For the purposes of this research, the notion ‘elite opinion formers’ 
denotes those key individuals who in adapting to the necessities of their jobs 
represent a range of perceived personal, business and societal interests in 
and around the discourse of Royal Navy modernisation and the political 
economy of British naval sea power.  
 
In researching and analysing the boundaries of elite discourse, the study 
recognises that far fewer people express opinions than usually receive them. 
Often in modern public life, community denotes an abstract collection of 
individuals who receive impressions via a mass media. The communications 
that prevail are so organised and complex, it is often difficult for ordinary 
citizens to reply with veracity. The realisation that opinion-in-action is often 
dominated by authorities that organise the channels of action, means that 
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most citizens have little degree of autonomy from their society’s dominant 
institutions. Instead, agents of authorised institutions tend to influence the 
mass, therein reducing any autonomy in the formation of opinions and wider 
discourse. Whilst formal definitions of power and influence are essentially 
incomparable, because power is a disposition concept requiring exacting 
specificities, there are nevertheless always types of power circles and ‘policy 
networks’ that bear specific relations to formal social structures. Indeed, most 
propositions about power structures can only be located in these terms.  
 
In selecting the respondents that denote the policy community in and around 
the Royal Navy and which form a core part of that opinion forming elite 
concerned with the political economy of British naval sea power, both the 
decisional and reputational dimensions of elite power had to be combined. 
The research had to bring together a circle that represents a powerful network 
of public policy voices with those communicators who dialectically provide 
public amplification and feedback on the key issues of governance.  
 
Originally for this research, the twenty respondents for the pilot study were 
drawn from ten sub-groups which included: two national defence journalists; 
two local journalists from naval towns (one from Portsmouth, one from 
Plymouth); senior civil servants (one from the Ministry of Defence, one from 
HM Treasury); senior naval and military officers; Members of Parliament (one 
Conservative, one Labour); defence, security and international relations 
academics; think tank policy experts (one left-wing, one right-wing); Members 
of Parliament on the House of Commons Defence Select Committee (one 
Labour, one Conservative); party political advisers (one Conservative, one 
Labour); and electronic media journalists (one from television, one from the 
blogger-sphere).  
 
However, the pilot study process suggested that to focus on respondents who 
are both well informed and influential, and therefore worthy of the description 
‘elite opinion former’, several sub-groups would have to be excluded from the 
research. Lacking sufficient responsibility and influence, the targets excluded 
were respondents from the following sub-groups: local journalists (who were 
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found to have insufficient knowledge of Royal Navy modernisation and the 
political economy of naval sea power), party political advisers (who were 
found to be too junior to be classed as ‘opinion formers’) and ‘ordinary’ 
Members of Parliament (who were not as well informed and influential as 
members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee). In light of 
these changes, it was agreed that the research should focus on no more than 
50 targets. To access the relatively small and inaccessible world of ‘elite 
opinion former’ concerned with Royal Navy modernisation and naval sea 
power, the research focused on respondents from the following five influential 
and knowledgeable subgroup categories, each containing ten individual 
targets (see Appendix II). 
 
1. Journalists:   Defence correspondents from the national press  
    and media.   
2. Politicians:   Members of the House of Commons Defence  
    Select Committee. 
3. Policy Experts:  Senior Defence Policy and Think Tank Players. 
4. Academics:   Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics. 
5. Naval Officers:  Senior Naval Service Officers.  
 
Going into the research, there was no great theoretical expectation on the part 
of the author that there would or would not be significant cleavages in attitude 
between the different respondent categories. Whilst others might have 
expected senior naval officers to be more institutionally conservative and 
statist in outlook, shunning and/or fearing unpredictable forms of competitive 
new market entrant, when compared to radical think tank respondents who 
purport to be in the business of ‘thinking the unthinkable’, an open mind was 
kept throughout the data collection process.  
 
5.2.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
In the small-scale Pilot Study (see 5.2.2 above) it became clear that a majority 
of respondents were concerned with the sensitivity of the research. In 
particular, the politicians, senior naval officers and journalists interviewed 
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stressed the importance of them being given anonymity concerning their 
participation throughout the research process. While politicians and senior 
naval officers wanted anonymity so that they could ‘speak their minds’ and be 
free from corporate orthodoxy, journalists did not want to be individually 
identified with responses which might jeopardise or put at risk their 
professional contacts. While academics and respondents from think tanks 
were generally more relaxed about confidentiality, it was decided that for both 
ethical and methodological reasons the research should grant all respondents 
the highest possible degree of anonymity.  
 
While full anonymity was not possible given, for example, the relatively small 
number of national defence correspondents and/or members of the House of 
Commons Defence Select Committee, the research set out to ensure as clear 
commitment to anonymity as possible. This meant that at no stage would any 
response or finding be associated with a named or identifiable individual. 
Individual responses and results would only be articulated in the context of 
membership of a particular subgroup category and/or the wider population 
surveyed. Importantly, the ethics committee at the University of Exeter 
formally approved the methodology and research.  
 
5.2.8 Creating and Developing the Questionnaire 
 
Following the aims of the research outlined above, a survey questionnaire 
was developed which examined elite opinion on existing and proposed Royal 
Navy modernisations, questions concerning the political economy of modern 
British naval sea power, and elite attitudes to the broader history and future of 
private sector involvement. Not only was the survey questionnaire designed to 
provide insights into how relevant and elite opinion formers think about the 
attendant concepts of political economy but, through the use of an open 
question at the end, it also sought to profile key opinions and attitudes 
concerning the temporal dimension of the distant past linked to a possible 
future. 
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Mindful of the need for brevity so as to ensure support from respondents, a 
three page 12-question, survey questionnaire was developed which asked 
respondents to answer in a set format with 11 closed and one open question 
(Appendix III). Having learned lessons from the small-scale pilot-study, the 
survey questionnaire was designed in such a way that respondents would be 
encouraged to give accurate and honest answers. 
 
5.2.9 Question and Subject Ordering 
 
To avoid problems associated with order bias and respondent confusion 
(Gillham, 2008), the survey questionnaire started with questions concerning 
the specifics of the ‘here and now’ before moving on to cover broader issues 
with greater degrees of generality. The more theoretical issues concerning 
notions of NPM market and PA state failure were left until later in the survey 
questionnaire. So as to build early rapport with respondents, the more familiar 
questions concerning modern Royal Navy reforms were placed first. 
Wherever possible, questions concerning modern ideal type privatisations 
were delivered close to the chronological sequence presented in Chapter IV 
(above). 
 
5.2.10 Rating Scales 
 
In the questionnaire, questions 1-11 (concerning privatisation of Royal Navy 
dockyards, privatisation of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service, private armed 
guards on British merchant ships, competitive contracting of the training of 
Royal Navy personnel, privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, privatisation 
of Royal Navy warships, public versus private funding of British naval sea 
power, and naval sea power as a public or private good) were covered in 
closed-ended questions. While the final question, number 12 (covering the 
history and possible future privatisation in British naval sea power), was 
covered by an open-ended and more investigative question, all the others 
sought to measure intensity (Schutt, 2006). 
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After exploring the four types of response scales (Babbie, 2005) for closed-
ended questions (dichotomous, where the respondent has two options; 
nominal-polytomous, where the respondent has more than two unordered 
options, and; ordinal-polytomous, where the respondent has more than two 
ordered options) it was decided that for the purposes of this study 
respondents should be presented with a bounded continuous scale. For this 
research, a Likert-type scale (Likert, 1932) was chosen so as facilitate 
analysis of levels of agreement or disagreement concerning statements on a 
symmetric agree-disagree scale. Importantly, the agreed method adopted 
attempted to eliminate respondents’ opting-out by ranking all factors as 
‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (10) on a 1-10 point scale. By forcing 
a choice, a better understanding of respondents’ decision-making was gained. 
Moreover, a 10-point scale was chosen over the more traditional 5 to 7 point 
options so as encourage respondents to stop and truly consider levels of 
importance (Dawes, 2008). The value of gaining in-depth insights into how 
respondents really rate the importance of a certain characteristic was of 
significance. For in this study, scaling an importance rating not only facilitated 
statistical analysis but also it is linked to a key open-ended question at the 
end. 
 
While with Likert scales respondents might use extreme response (Allen and 
Seaman, 2007) categories (central tendency basis), agree with statements as 
given (acquiescence bias), or try to portray themselves as being overly 
consensual (social desirability bias), in this research a number of questions 
were used with balanced keying in an attempt to obviate these problems 
(Allen and Seaman, 2007). Questions concerning notions of market and state 
failure (8 and 10), and public and private funding of British naval sea power (9 
and 11) were both given positive and negative statements. While the 
challenge of central tendency and social desirability problems remain, 
balanced keying was used to obviate the key risk of acquiescence bias 
(Dawes, 2008) in these key areas.  
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5.2.11 Data Collection 
 
In order to keep costs down, accurately target the selected population, 
encourage participation, and elicit truthful responses, it was decided that a 
telephone survey provided the best mode of data collection for the research. 
Cost and time effective, easy to administer and not geographically dependent 
(Oppenheim, 2000), it was also the case that as the author undertook the 
interviews himself, quality control could be assured and maintained 
throughout. While a mail survey might have been less expensive, a telephone 
survey was deemed superior on the grounds that it could also deliver the most 
complete and accurate results. The fact that the process associated with the 
telephone survey questionnaire for respondents could be limited to a 
maximum of 15 to 20 minutes meant that it was the most suitable option. 
Finally, when it came to the targeting of the busy opinion formers, pre-booking 
agreed time slots proved a great strength in delivering an extremely high 
response rate. 
 
5.2.12 Responses 
 
To reduce non-response rates, several techniques were used with the target 
population. For most respondents, a short letter of introduction was sent 
followed by a phone call to confirm diary arrangements. For a minority, a one-
off telephone conversation and/or email exchange was all that was necessary 
to arrange the interview. Significantly, every respondent approached 
participated fully in the research except for two respondents who had to be 
replaced by other candidates within their subgroups: one involved a new 
academic and the other a change of national television journalist. As such, the 
achieved response rate was one hundred per cent with each respondent 
answering all the questions put before them.  
 
While the survey questionnaire was commenced with a short introduction from 
the author (specifying his name, the subject, the fact that the research was for 
a doctoral thesis at Exeter University and that the interview would take no 
 189 
more than 15-20 minutes), the assurance of individual anonymity was also 
highlighted (Babble, 2005: 90). 
 
5.2.13 Analysis and Presentation of Data 
 
For the study, the central challenge of measuring attitudes and opinions lay in 
the procedures for transferring their qualities into quantitative measures for 
the purposes of data analysis (Schutt, 2006; Oppenheim, 2000; Foddy, 1994). 
As outlined above, Likert-type scales were used to generate interval scale 
data in which the numbers used indicate order and reflect a meaningful 
relative distance between the points on the scales.  
 
The data analysis decisions for the Likert-type scale questions, and the open-
ended question, were taken at the questionnaire development stage of the 
research process. For the stand-alone Likert-type scale questions, mean 
averages and frequencies were the appropriate statistical tools used and from 
which the data is analysed. For the open-ended question that concludes the 
survey, a textural analysis is presented.  
 
Ultimately, the analysis of the data generated by the research at the heart of 
the study is both descriptive and exploratory in character. Never claiming an 
overly positivistic mantle of timeless or predictable ‘truth’, instead, the 
research seeks to explore, interpret and theorise the boundaries of elite 
opinion whilst avoiding and never claiming the methodological excesses of 
scientism (Kuhn, 1996). 
 
 
5.3 The Research 
 
The research centred on a series of telephone interviews and a survey 
questionnaire that was conducted between 1st June 2012 and 20th August 
2012. Overall, 50 elite opinion formers were surveyed from five respondent 
subgroup categories and given the sensitivities surrounding the subject each 
respondent was assured anonymity.  
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The five respondent categories chosen for the research included: Defence 
correspondents for the national press and media; members of the House of 
Commons Defence Select Committee; Senior Defence Policy and Think Tank 
Players; Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics, and; Senior Naval 
Officers equivalent or above the rank of Commander. Together, the 
respondents surveyed account for a significant number of opinion formers 
concerned with Royal Navy modernisation and public private partnerships.  
 
In analysing the opinions of some of the most experienced and influential 
navy-related journalists, politicians, policy analysts, academics and officers, 
the research presented below represents a high degree of internal validity 
given the elite nature of the population. During the course of the research no 
major problems or obstacles were encountered beyond those already outlined 
above. While the author’s financial constraints and the respondents’ busy 
lives made a telephone survey questionnaire the most viable and effective 
option, the author is also mindful of the positive spirit with which the research 
process was engaged by the targeted population and policy network.  
 
Overall, the survey questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first 
section (Section A) dealt with ‘opinions on Royal Navy Modernisation’. With 
questions generated from Chapter IV (above), it covered: dockyard 
privatisation (Question 1), privatisation of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service 
(Question 2), private armed guards on British merchant ships (Question 3), 
competitive contracting of Royal Navy personnel training (Question 4), 
privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (Question 5), the privatisation of 
warships (Question 6) and the private funding of British naval sea power 
(Question 7). Requiring respondents to score their reactions to statements on 
a Likert-type scale this section introduced the research by exploring 
respondents’ attitudes to a number of already topical changes.  
 
The second section (Section B) drew on the material and ideas covered in 
Chapters II, III and IV (above) and, as such, concentrated on elite opinions 
concerning ‘notions of market and state failure in the production of British 
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naval sea power’. Covering a range of theoretical questions designed to 
surface respondents’ attitudes, it covered conceptual issues that include 
public goods, private goods, and public versus private funding in the 
production of British naval sea power. As with section A, section B required 
respondents to score their reactions to statements on a Likert-type scale 
thereby enabling a statistical analysis of the data generated.  
 
Significantly, so as to provide a foundation by which comparative data could 
be generated on each Likert-item, this section used some scales with 
balanced keying. As stated above, questions concerning notions of market 
and state failure (8 and 10), and public and private funding of British naval sea 
power (9 and 11) were each given an equal number of positive and negative 
statements. For example, while respondents were invited to react to the 
statement “If a market in naval defence existed this would not stop some of it 
being run by government because naval sea power is a natural public good”, 
this section later invited them to respond to the converse statement: “If the 
state attempted to monopolise naval defence this would not stop some of it 
being run privately because naval sea power is a natural private good”. 
 
Significantly, the survey questionnaire concluded by inviting respondents to 
react to the open-ended question: “How to you react to the following 
statement? Just as in past centuries British naval sea power was often 
privately provided, for example through the East India Company, so, in the 
future, more defence and security is going to be delivered through greater 
privatisation”. 
 
Throughout the survey process the interviewer’s primary objective was to gain 
access to respondents own interpretations of the questions and statements 
presented. At no stage did the interviewer lead or guide respondents on any 
matter of interpretation or meaning. Questions and statements were read out 
and occasionally repeated for clarification but at all times matters of 
interpretation were left strictly up to the individual(s) surveyed.  
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While both sections A and B measured respondents’ attitudes via a Likert-
type scale, question 12 in section B was designed to focus on the broader 
temporal parameters of discourse surrounding Royal Navy and naval sea 
power privatisation. In total, there were 12 questions in the survey 
questionnaire with 7 in section A (1-7) and 5 in section B (8-12).  
 
 
5.4 Initial Findings  
 
As mentioned above, questions 1 to 7 invited respondents to agree or 
disagree with particular statements along a Likert-type scale. For each 
question in this section, respondents were given the following instruction: “On 
a scale of 1-10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly agree’ 
can you please tell me what you think of the following statement?” 
 
5.4.1 Section A. Elite Opinions on Royal Navy Modernisation 
 
Q.1 Dockyard Privatisation 
Q1. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A1. Today, the British dockyards of the Royal Navy have been largely 
privatised. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the navy and has 
improved the quality of its support facilities? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     0     0     0    1     1    4     1     2     1       0      6.5 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               0     0    0    0     1     2     2    3     1       1      7.4  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               0     0    0    0     1     0     3    2     2       2      8.0  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             0     0    0    1     0     2    2     4     0       1      7.2  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    0     0    0     1    1     2     4       2      8.5  
Frequency Totals                  0     0    0     2    3     9    9   13     8       6 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        7.52 
 
 
In response to the statement “Today, the British dockyards of the Royal Navy 
have been largely privatised. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the 
navy and has improved the quality of its support facilities”, all respondent 
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subgroup categories answered within a narrowly positive 6.5 to very positive 
8.5 range.  
 
While overall the opinion forming fifty averaged a positive mean score of 7.52, 
all subgroup categories answered within a relatively narrow range. Combined, 
the subgroups deviated no more than 2.0 points (20 per cent). Nevertheless, 
below the combined mean average of 7.52 there were important cleavages. 
With defence correspondents in the national press and media scoring a mean 
average of 6.5 and Royal Navy defence and security academics scoring a 
positive 7.2, members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee 
scored 7.4. The greatest degrees of support for the statement came from the 
senior defence policy/think tanks players who scored a very positive 8.0, and 
senior naval service officers who scored 8.5. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  0     0    0     2    3     9    9   13     8       6 =  50    
 
While 28 per cent of respondents gave answers within the 4 to 6 point range, 
72 per cent scored 7 to 10 points. Here, 16 per cent scored 9 and 12 per cent 
scored 10. Significantly, no respondent gave a negative score of 1, 2 or 3 
points in response to the statement. Overall, the boundary of discourse 
occurred across the 4 to 10 point range. 
 
Q.2 Privatisation of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service 
Q2. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A2. Today, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service has been privatised and 
Serco now runs these services. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the 
Royal Navy and has improved the quality of its support services? 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     0     0     2    0     1     4    2     1     0       0      5.4 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               0     0    0    1     0     3    2     3     1       0      6.9  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               0     0    0    0     1     1    2     2     2       2      7.9  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             1     0    0    0    2     1     4     0     1      1       6.4  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    0     0    1     0     1    5     1       2      8.1  
Frequency Totals                  1     0    2     1    5     9   11  11     5       5 =  50    
             Overall Mean Average        6.94 
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In response to the statement, “Today, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service 
has been privatised and Serco now runs these services. This has led to 
greater efficiency gains for the Royal Navy and has improved the quality of its 
support services”, the respondent subgroup categories answered within a 
relatively broad undecided/controversial 5.4 to very positive 8.1 point range.  
 
While overall, the opinion forming fifty averaged a positive mean score of 
6.94, the respondent subgroup categories displayed a relatively broad range 
of opinions. The subgroups categories deviated across a range of 2.7 points 
(27 per cent).  
 
Below the overall mean average of 6.94 there were some important 
cleavages. With defence correspondents in the national press and media 
averaging 5.4, Royal Navy defence and security academics scoring 6.4, and 
members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee averaging 
6.9, the greatest degrees of support came from the senior defence policy/think 
tanks players at 7.9, and the senior naval service officers at a very positive 
8.1.  
 
It is apparent from the responses to questions one and two, that senior naval 
officers are the most supportive respondent category when it comes to the 
privatisation of Royal Navy dockyards and the service’s formerly provided by 
the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  1     0    2     1    5     9   11  11     5       5 =  50    
 
 
While 8 per cent of respondents gave answers within the negative 1 to 4 point 
range and 28 per cent scored 5 to 6 points, 64 per cent of respondents 
answered within the positive to extremely positive range of 7 to 10 points. 
Overall, the boundary of discourse was found to range over the full 1 to 10 
point scale. That said, 98 per cent of the conversation occurred in just the 3 to 
10 point spectrum. 
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Q.3 Private Military Personnel to Defend UK Merchant Ships  
Q3. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A3. It is right that British merchant ships carry private armed guards to defend 
them from pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     0     0     0    0     0     0     3    2     2       3      8.5 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               0     0    0    0     0     1     1    2     3       3      8.6  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               0     0    0    0     1     1     1    3     1       3      8.1  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             0     0    0    0    0      2     2    4     2       0      7.6  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    0     1    0     0     6    0     2       1      7.4  
Frequency Totals                  0     0    0     1    1     4   13  11   10      10 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        8.04 
 
 
In response to the statement “It is right that British merchant ships carry 
licensed armed guards to defend them from pirates in the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean?” all respondent subgroups answered within a relatively narrow, 
yet positive, 7.4 to very positive 8.5 range. While overall, the respondent 
subgroup categories averaged a very positive mean score of 8.04, it is 
important to note that all the subgroup categories displayed similar views. The 
subgroup categories deviated across a range of no more than 11 per cent 
(1.10 points).  
 
With senior naval service officers scoring a positive mean average of 7.4 and 
Royal Navy defence and security academics scoring 7.6, very positive levels 
of support for the statement came from senior defence policy and think tank 
players at 8.1, defence correspondents in the national press and media at 8.5 
and, most supportive of all, members of the House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee at 8.6. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  0     0    0     1    1     4   13  11   10      10 =  50    
 
 
While no respondents gave answers within the negative 1 to 3 point ranges 
and only 12 per cent scored 4 to 6 points, 88 per cent of respondents 
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answered within the positive to extremely positive range of 7 to 10 points. 
Indeed, 40 per cent of respondents scored 9 or 10 in agreement with the 
statement. Overall, the boundary of discourse ranged across just the 4 to 10 
point spectrum.  
 
Q.4 Privatisation of Royal Navy Personnel Training 
Q4. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A4. All Royal Navy personnel training should be privatised? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media      2     0    1    2     0     3    2     0     0       0      4.5 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               1     1    0    3     3     1     1    0     0       0      4.3  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               4     1    1    0     0     3     0    0     0       1      3.7  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             5     1    2    0     2     0     0    0     0       0      2.3  
Senior Naval Service Officers                3     1    2    2     1     0     1    0     0       0      3.1  
Frequency Totals                15     4    6    7     6     7     4    0     0       1 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        3.58 
 
 
In response to the statement “All Royal Navy personnel training should be 
privatised” all respondent subgroup categories responded within a negative 
2.3 to 4.5 range. Importantly, no subgroup provided a positive score in 
response to the idea of privatising all the Royal Navy’s training of its 
personnel. While overall the opinion forming fifty averaged a negative mean 
score of 3.58, all respondent subgroup categories answered within a range of 
no more than 2.2 points (22 per cent).  
 
While Royal Navy defence and security academics averaged a negative mean 
score of 2.3, and senior naval service officers scored 3.1, senior defence 
policy and think tank players scored 3.7. Displaying greater degrees of 
uncertainty/controversy, members of the House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee scored 4.3 while defence correspondents in the national press and 
media scored 4.5.  
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                15     4    6    7     6     7     4    0     0       1 =  50    
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While only 2 per cent of respondents gave answers with an extremely positive 
score of 10, no respondents scored in the very positive range of 8 or 9 points. 
30 per cent of respondents gave extremely negative scores of just 1, with 34 
per cent scoring in the range of 2 to 4 points. Under analysis it is clear that 26 
per cent of respondents scored within the undecided/controversial range of 5 
to 6 points. Overall, the boundary of discourse was found to span the full 1 to 
10 point range. That said, 98 per cent of the conversation occurred just in the 
1 to 7 point range.  
 
Q.5. Privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
Q5. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A5. Some of Britain’s largest naval ships are in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The 
RFA should be privatised? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     0     0     2    0     2     4     0    2     0       0      5.6 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               1     1    0    1     0     5     2    0     0       0      5.1  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               1     1    0    0     2     3     2    0     0       1      5.5  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             2     1    0    1     1     3     2    0     0       0      4.4  
Senior Naval Service Officers                1     1    2    1     1     1     1    2     0       0      4.4  
Frequency Totals                  5     4    4    3     6   16     7    4     0       1 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        5.00 
 
 
In response to the statement “Some of Britain’s largest naval ships are in the 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The RFA should be privatised”, significantly all 
respondent categories answered within the relatively undecided/controversial 
range of 4.4 to 5.6. While the opinion forming fifty averaged an overall mean 
score of 5.0, all respondent subgroup categories answered within a relatively 
narrow range of 1.2 points (12 per cent).  
 
While both senior naval service officers and Royal Navy defence and security 
academics scored a mean average of 4.4, defence correspondents in the 
national press and media scored a more undecided/controversial 5.6. In 
between these categories were members of the House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee at 5.1 and senior defence policy and think tank players who 
also scored an undecided/controversial 5.5. 
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               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  5     4    4    3     6   16     7    4     0       1 =  50    
 
 
While 10 per cent of respondents gave answers with an extremely negative 
score of just 1, only 2 per cent of respondents provided an extremely positive 
score of 10. With 44 per cent of respondents scoring within the 
undecided/controversy range of 5 to 6 points, of the rest, 22 per cent scored 
between 2 to 4 points while the remainder (22 per cent) scored between 7 and 
8 points. Overall, the boundary of discourse was found to range over the full 1 
to 10 point scale.  
 
Q.6 Privatisation of Royal Navy Warships 
Q6. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A6. There is no reason for the Royal Navy to actually own many of its war 
ships. Instead, it would be more efficient if its ships were privatised? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media      1    0     1    0     1     1     6    0     0       0      5.7 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               1     0    1    1     1     1     3    1     1       0      5.7  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               2     1    1    0     2     1     2    0     0       1      4.7  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             2     1    0    1    1      3     2    0     0       0      4.7  
Senior Naval Service Officers                1     1    2    1     1     1     1    2     0       0      4.7  
Frequency Totals                  7     3    5    3     6     7    14   3     1       1 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        5.10 
 
 
In response to the statement “There is no reason for the Royal Navy to 
actually own many of its war ships. Instead, it would be more efficient if its 
ships were privatised”, all respondent categories answered within an 
undecided/controversial range of 4.7 to 5.7 points. Significantly, no 
respondent subgroup category overtly supported or opposed the statement. 
With the opinion forming fifty scoring a mean average of 5.10, all respondent 
subgroup categories answered within a very narrow range of 1.0 point (10 per 
cent).  
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Therefore, around the average mean score of 5.1 there were only minor 
cleavages. While senior naval service officers, Royal Navy defence and 
security academics and senior defence policy and think tank players all 
scored a mean average of 4.7, defence correspondents in the national press 
and media, and members of the House of Commons defence select 
committee, scored an undecided/controversial 5.7 points. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  7     3    5    3     6     7    14   3     1       1 =  50    
 
 
While 14 per cent of respondents gave answers with an extremely negative 
score of just 1, only 2 per cent of respondents provided an extremely positive 
score of 10. With 26 per cent of respondents scoring within the 
undecided/controversy range of 5 to 6 points, of the rest, 22 per cent scored 
between 2 to 4 points while the remainder (34 per cent) scored between 7 and 
8 points. Overall, the boundary of discourse was found to span the full range 
of 1 to 10 points; although 96 per cent scored in just the 1 to 8 point range.  
 
Q.7 Private Funding of British Naval Sea Power 
Q7. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A7. In the future, Britain’s naval sea power should not simply be funded from 
taxation. One can imagine a time when various forms of private money will be 
used to fund the production of naval sea power? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     1     0     1    0     1     1     6    0     0       0      5.7 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               1     0    1    1     1     1     3    1     1       0      5.7  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               1     0    1    0     1     3     3    0     0       1      5.8  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             1     1    0    1    0      1     3    1     2       0      6.0  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    0    1     1      3     0    3     0      2      7.1  
Frequency Totals                  4     1    3    3     4      9    15   5     3      3 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        6.06 
 
 
In response to the statement “In the future, Britain’s naval sea power should 
not simply be funded from taxation. One can imagine a time when various 
forms of private money will be used to fund the production of naval sea 
power”, all respondent category subgroups answered within a positive 5.7 to 
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7.1 point range. With the opinion forming fifty averaging an overall mean of 
6.06, the respondent subgroups deviated in their overall averages by no more 
than 1.3 points (13 per cent).  
 
Around the overall mean of 6.06 there were relatively small differences 
between the subgroup categories. While both defence correspondents in the 
national press and media and members of the House of Commons defence 
select committee averaged 5.7 points, senior defence policy and think tank 
players scored similarly at 5.8. Royal Navy defence and security academics 
averaged 6.0 points with senior naval service officers scoring a positive 7.1. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  4     1    3    3     4     9    15   5     3      3 =  50    
 
 
While 26 per cent of respondents in this subgroup category gave answers 
within the 5 to 6 point range, 52 per cent scored 7 to 10 points. Moreover, 
while 8 per cent of respondents scored an extremely negative 1, the 
remaining 14 per cent of respondents scored within the negative 2 to 4 point 
range. Overall, the boundary of discourse was found to range over the full 1 to 
10 point scale. 
 
5.4.2 Section B. Notions of Market and State Failure in the Production of 
British Naval Sea Power 
 
Most of the questions (see 8-11 below) in section B invited respondents to 
agree or disagree with particular statements along a Likert scale. As with 
section A (above), but this time dealing with ‘opinions towards notions of 
market and state failure in the production of British naval sea power’, each 
respondent was given the following instruction: “On a scale of 1-10, with 1 
being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me 
what you think of the following statement”. Only question 12 (see below) 
provided a statement that invited an open-ended response.  
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Q8 Naval Sea Power as a Public Good 
Q8. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A8.  If a market in naval defence existed this would not stop some of it being 
run by government because naval sea power is a natural public good? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     0     0     0    0     0     1     3    4     0       2      7.9 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               1     0    0    1     0     0     0    0     2       6      8.3  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               0     0    0    0     0     2     1    2     2       3      8.1  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             0     1    0    1     0     0     2    2     3       1     7.3  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    0     0    0     1     2    1     1       5      8.7  
Frequency Totals                  1     1    0     2    0     4     8    9     8      17 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        8.06 
 
 
In response to the statement “If a market in naval defence existed this would 
not stop some of it being run by government because naval sea power is a 
natural public good?” all respondent categories answered in-between a 
positive score of 7.3 and a very positive score of 8.7. While the opinion 
forming fifty averaged a very positive mean of 8.06, all respondent categories 
answered within a narrow range of 1.4 points (14 per cent).  
 
Around the overall mean average of 8.06 there were cleavages between the 
respondents. While Royal Navy defence and security academics averaged 
7.3; defence correspondents in the national press and media scored 7.9. Very 
positive levels of support for the statement came from senior defence policy 
and think tank players at 8.1, members of the House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee at 8.3 and senior naval service officers at 8.7. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  1     1    0     2    0     4     8    9     8      17 =  50    
 
 
While 16 per cent of respondents gave answers within the 4 to 6 point range, 
50 per cent of respondents scored 7 to 10 points. Of these, 16 per cent 
scored 9 and 34 per cent scored 10. Significantly, only 8 per cent of 
respondents gave negative scores in the 1 to 4 point range. Overall, the 
boundary of discourse occurred across the full 1 to 10 point spectrum. 
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Q9 Inadequacy of Private Funding of Naval Sea Power  
Q9. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A9. Because naval sea power requirements are unpredictable some costs will 
always have to be covered by taxation: private arrangements such as 
corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or sponsorship could never do it 
all? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     0     0     0    0     0     1     4    1     0       4      8.2 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               0     0    0    0     0     1     1    2     1       5      8.8  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               0     0    0    0     0     0     1    0     2       7      9.5  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             0     0    0    0     0     0    1     2     0       7      9.3  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    1    0     1     0     0    1     1       6      8.5  
Frequency Totals                  0     0    1    0     1     2     7    6     4      29 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        8.86 
 
 
In response to the statement “Because naval sea power requirements are 
unpredictable some costs will always have to be covered by taxation: private 
arrangements such as corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or 
sponsorship could never do it all”, all respondent categories answered within 
a very positive 8.2 to extremely positive 9.5 range. With the opinion forming 
fifty averaging a very positive mean of 8.86, overall, the respondent subgroup 
categories answered between a relatively narrow range of 1.3 points (13 per 
cent).  
 
Around the overall average of 8.86 there were only small cleavages between 
the various subgroup categories. While defence correspondents in the 
national press and media scored a very positive mean of 8.2 points, senior 
naval service officers scored 8.5 and members of the House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee scored 8.8. Scoring extremely positively were 
Royal Navy defence and security academics at 9.3 and senior defence policy 
and think tank players at 9.5. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  0     0    1    0     1     2     7    6     4      29 =  50    
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While 2 per cent of respondents gave a negative 3 point score, 58 per cent 
gave an extremely positive 10 point score. With 6 per cent of respondents 
scoring in an undecided/controversial 5 to 6 points, the remaining 34 per cent 
scored in the positive 7 and very positive 8 to 9 point range. Overall, the 
boundary of discourse was found to spread over the 3 to 10 point range. That 
said, 96 per cent of the conversation occurred in the narrower 6 to 10 point 
range. 
 
Q10 Naval Sea Power as a Private Good 
Q10. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement? 
 
A10.  If the state attempted to monopolise naval defence this would not stop 
some of it being run privately because naval sea power is a natural private 
good? 
 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     1     0     2    2     1     3     1    0     0       0      4.5 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               1     0    2    1     0     1     4    0     0       1      5.5  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               2     1    2    3     1     0     1    0     0       0      3.4  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             3     1    0    2    1     1     2    0      0       0      3.8  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    1     1    1     2     4    0     1       0      6.1  
Frequency Totals                  7     2    7     9    4     7   12    0     1       1 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        4.66 
 
 
In response to the statement “If the state attempted to monopolise naval 
defence this would not stop some of it being run privately because naval sea 
power is a natural private good”, all respondent subgroup categories 
answered in-between an overall negative mean of 3.4 to positive 6.1 range. 
With the opinion forming fifty averaging a median negative score of 4.66, all 
respondent subgroup categories averaged in-between a relatively wide range 
of 2.7 points (27 per cent).  
 
Around the overall mean average of 4.66 there were therefore relatively wide 
variations between the subgroup categories. While senior defence policy and 
think tank players scored a negative 3.4 and Royal Navy defence and security 
academics averaged 3.8, the only subgroup category to provide a positive 
response were senior naval service officers who scored a mean average of 
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6.1. In between were defence correspondents in the national press and media 
at 4.5, and members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee 
who scored an undecided/controversial 5.5. 
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  7     2    7     9    4     7   12    0     1       1 =  50    
 
 
While 22 per cent of respondents gave answers within the 5 to 6 point range,  
28 per cent scored 7 to 10 points. Moreover, while 14 per cent of respondents 
scored an extremely negative 1, the remaining 36 per cent of respondents 
scored within the negative 2 to 4 point range. Overall, the boundary of 
discourse was found to range over the full 1 to 10 point scale. 
 
Q11 Inadequacy of Public Funding of Naval Sea Power  
Q11. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement? 
 
A11. Because naval sea power requirements are unpredictable some costs 
will always have to be covered by private arrangements such as corporate 
funding, insurance, donation and/or sponsorship? Taxation could never do it 
all. 
                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Defence correspondents national press and media     0     1     0    2     0     2     2    1     1       1      6.3 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee               1     0    1    1     1     1     3    2     0       0      5.6  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players               0     0    0    0     1     2     0    4     0       3      7.9  
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics             1     0    1    0    1     2     2    1      2       0      6.1  
Senior Naval Service Officers                0     0    0     0    0     0     2    3     4       1      8.4  
Frequency Totals                  2     1    2     3    3     7     9   11    7       5 =  50    
                                                                                                Overall Mean Average        6.86 
 
 
In response to the statement “Because naval sea power requirements are 
unpredictable some costs will always have to be covered by private 
arrangements such as corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or 
sponsorship. Taxation could never do it all”, all respondent categories 
answered within a undecided/controversial 5.6 point to very positive 8.4 
range.  While combined the opinion forming fifty averaged a positive mean of 
6.86, the respondent subgroup categories answered across a relatively broad 
range of 2.8 points (28 per cent).  
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With Royal Navy, defence and security academics averaging 6.1 points and 
defence correspondents in the national press and media scoring 6.3, 
members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee delivered a 
more undecided/controversial score of 5.6 points. While senior defence and 
think tank players responded positively at 7.9, senior naval service officers 
scored very positive with a mean average of 8.4 points.  
 
               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  2     1    2     3    3     7     9   11    7       5 =  50    
 
 
While 20 per cent of respondents gave answers within the 
undecided/controversial 5 to 6 point ranges, 64 per cent scored 7 to 10 points. 
Moreover, while 4 per cent of respondents scored an extremely negative 1, 
the remaining 14 per cent of respondents scored within the negative 2 to 4 
point range. Overall, the boundary of discourse was found to range over the 
full 1 to 10 point spectrum. 
 
Q12 Future of Privatisation in British Naval Sea Power 
 
Q12. How do you react to the following statement: “Just as in past centuries 
naval sea power was often privately provided, for example through the East 
India Company, so in the future more British naval sea power is going to be 
provided through greater privatisation?”   
 
 
 
In response to the statement, “Just as in past centuries naval sea power was 
often privately provided, for example through the East India Company, so in 
the future more British naval sea power is going to be provided through 
greater privatisation?”, defence correspondents from the national press and 
media were essentially divided into three groups. 
 
First, there were three journalists out of the ten surveyed who generally 
agreed with the statement in its own terms. While one journalist commented, 
“Totally agree. Tony Blair understood this. This will be the future”, another 
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retorted: “True. It is already happening in many ways”. A third journalist 
asserted: “Nothing surprises me nowadays. So yes, I agree”. 
 
Second, there were four journalists who generally agreed with the statement 
but added caveats concerning regulation, time, private sector capacity and 
degree of privatisation. While one journalist commented: “This is all possible. 
However, it has to have enough regulation to ensure security is protected”, 
another invoked the dimension of time: “A true statement but will take a long 
time before becoming real in the modern age.” Turning to private sector 
capacity, one journalist responded: “I don’t know. Probably. But there is no 
East India Company today. Difficult to identify companies to fill such a gap”. 
Finally, questioning the degree of privatisation, a fourth journalist in this group 
asserted: “I can see a world similar to this but not fully blown private”. 
 
Third, there were also three journalists who disagreed with the statement. 
While one said “I can see ship building and support services being privately 
managed but not a full blown fleet of warships”, another asserted: “Disagree. 
We no longer live in a world where fighting forces are private. It could work 
with humanitarian missions”. Finally, concerned with the issue of legitimacy 
one journalist concluded: “I don’t think the defence of the realm should be 
private. Conflicting interests. Moved into a different world.” 
 
In contrast to the defence correspondents in the national press and media, 
members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee were 
generally more supportive of the statement. Under analysis, the Members of 
Parliament surveyed divided into just two groups. 
 
First, there were six MPs who generally agreed with the statement but added 
various caveats focused around private sector capacity, regulation, the role of 
overseas organisations and the need for integrated protocols and 
communications. While one MP asserted “Its already taking place. I agree in 
principal”, and another commented it “has to be regulated efficiently”, a third 
stated: “Public private partnerships and privatisations are here to stay. No 
government can afford to stop them. It all depends on the capacity the private 
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sector offers in the future.” Moreover, while one MP said such a future was 
“Possible. However, it raises questions over control by overseas 
organisations”, another asserted: “In the current financial crisis it could be an 
alternative in order to cut the Ministry of Defence deficit.” Finally, focusing 
more on the detail of the future, one MP concluded:  
 
 “To achieve the maximum coverage of a great deal of sea both public 
 and private sectors must work together. There are risks in this but the 
 better integrated it is the better; e.g., agreed protocols and 
 communications between marines and private soldiers on commercial 
 ships. Huge and as yet untapped scope in intelligence gathering.” 
 
The second group of MPs on the House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee displayed a much greater skepticism concerning the statement. 
Their concerns centred on the hollowing out of core state power, the power of 
corporations, mercenaries, and financial and voter accountability. While one 
MP stated, “It won’t happen in the same way. The state is too powerful to 
dismantle”, another retorted: “I hope we don’t go back to that sort of world, 
dominated by imperial corporations. It has to be about partnerships for the 
common good.” Moreover, one MP was concerned with a rise in mercenaries 
stating: “Construction, facilities, vessels and training all good. Privatise these 
as much as possible. But you can’t have a mercenary navy in warfare. The 
old model can’t return. All operational aspects should be state run”. Another 
MP concluded:  “Depends on financial responsibility and accountability in 
addition to voters”. 
 
Significantly, senior defence policy and think tank players focused their 
attentions much more on the future of public private partnerships. While a 
senior government policy adviser asserted, “This government will progress 
public private partnerships. The Ministry of Defence will be part of this”, 
another said in reply to the statement: “Yes, one cannot disagree with that. 
The government cannot do it all”.  
 
 208 
Out of ten respondents in this category, seven suggested PPPs and 
‘privatisation’ had further to go. While one respondent retorted, “There will be 
a lot more partnerships with the private sector in the future. But it will have the 
right democratic governance”, another argued: “Forget public private 
partnerships. The future should be more genuine privatisation”. With one 
respondent admitting they had “Never thought about this. Interesting parallels. 
The future will probably have more embedded public private partnerships” 
another policy expert confidently asserted: “As the private sector’s capacity to 
deliver grows so more public private partnerships will become viable without 
threatening democratic governance”. Finally, warning against a pure market 
totally hollowing out the Weberian state and democratic governance one 
senior defence policy and think tank player concluded: “The Royal Navy will 
not go back to what it was last century. But privatisation must not stray into 
anarchy.” 
 
In opposition to the statement that “just as in past centuries naval sea power 
was often privately provided, for example through the East India Company, so 
in the future more British naval sea power is going to be provided through 
greater privatisation”, only one senior defence policy and think tank player 
overtly mentioned state funding: “The government should fund the Royal Navy 
properly. This is an uncertain world and the government has a duty to defend 
the country first”. Similarly, two respondents expressed other concerns with 
the statement. While one asserted, “Nothing is inevitable. Depends what 
politicians want the state to do in the future. Maybe the state will shrink and 
focus more on its core areas of defence. Maybe not. If not, there might be 
more public private partnerships and privatisations”, the other concluded: “It 
would be scary if we went back to the sort of world of the East India 
Company. But maybe that is where we are going. I don’t know.” 
 
The Royal Navy defence and security academics surveyed focused more than 
any other groups on the East India Company and its relevance to the modern 
world. Overall, this group was divided between those who generally agreed 
with the statement and those who did not.  
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One academic who generally agreed with the statement asserted, “Totally 
agree. Privatisations are here to stay. The age of big government was the 
anomaly. Not the East India Company or partnerships with privateers though!” 
Citing government finances as being the main driver of change another 
respondent retorted, “Inevitable. Given debt levels all political parties are 
going to rely ever more vigorously on private partnerships.” While one 
academic argued, “It will happen but most operate on a scale that the public 
approve of”, another concluded: “Don’t know. We are in a very different world 
to the EIC. The state is very different. There will be partnerships in the future. 
But not sure what form they will take”.  
 
Uppermost in the minds of the academics was a concern for the legitimate 
boundaries of cooperation between the public and private sectors and the 
issue of sustainable governance. While one respondent said, “The Royal 
Navy has always had private partnerships for most of its history. It is about 
degree and balance I guess”, another focused on the comparative youth of 
nation states: “It depends. The nation state is not that old. Not sure about the 
governance arrangements in the future. Business and politicians will always 
be in the mix”. 
 
More than with any other subgroup, the theme of the interwoven nature of 
politics and business was at the forefront of Royal Navy defence and security 
academics’ thinking. Emphasising possible discontinuities between the past, 
present and future one respondent asserted: “The EIC was very different and 
there was always a clear separation from the Royal Navy. Partnership and 
privatisation is not the same. It is about the Royal Navy and the government 
taking the lead within legitimate boundaries”. While one academic favoured 
taxation, “By observing that in 1789 Pitt the Younger introduced income tax 
for the express purpose of paying for the Royal Navy, and since then we have 
correctly had the defence of the realm as the first call on taxation”, another 
emphasised the problematic boundaries of governance and differentiation 
between the public and private sectors: “Subcontracting in some cases is a 
fact and always has been. East India Company navy was a Royal 
organisation: HM EIC ship not private. It was a company by Royal Charter”. 
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Finally, one academic not only emphasised the eventual failure of the East 
India Company but he invoked the failure of the private security company 
G4S, at the 2012 London Olympics, to question the practicability of 
meaningful public private partnerships: 
 
 “What applied in the past doesn’t necessarily do so now. The East 
 India Company was unable to protect British interests in India and 
 elsewhere and I take this as evidence of the inherent limits of for-profit 
 organisations in the provision of the more deadly types of services. The 
 G4S fiasco [with the 2012 London Olympics] simply reinforces the 
 point, even at the lower end. This doesn’t mean to say that private 
 partnerships have nothing to offer. They do, but only in the lower 
 reaches of the security requirement and in support systems.”  
 
Whilst the East India Company flourished from 1600 to the 1800s and in so 
doing existed for longer than most nation states, Norway’s recently contracted 
in frigates (discussed in Chapters II and III) serve as an empirical counter to 
the idea that the private sector can only operate in the lower reaches of 
security and naval support. As modern nation states increasingly struggle to 
provide the range of naval capabilities that they want it is clear that some are 
again turning to the private sector for often-unexpected and differentiated 
contributions.  
 
That said, the final subgroup to react to the statement was the senior naval 
service officers. Comparatively more open than any other subgroup to the 
idea that “in the future more British naval sea power is going to be provided 
through greater privatisation”, it was noticeable that eight out of ten 
respondents reacted positively to the statement. Whether overtly supportive or 
otherwise, all seemed to ultimately accept its description of future public policy 
direction in an increasingly post-Weberian world:  
 
 “Naval sea power will have more private input in the future. But the 
 forms it will take and the consequences will be unclear”  
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 “No doubt of that. The Royal Navy has a real challenge in the future to 
 justify using its own ships as well as many other parts of the value 
 chain” 
 
 “Totally agree. The future will be about more privatisation not just 
 contracting out and public private partnerships. Also, there will be more 
 international cooperation and links between allied navies” 
 
 “Agree. Can’t really say more than that. It is the world we live in now. 
 Not sure if the public and politicians realise it however” 
 
 “Probably. Seems so, irrespective of who is running the government of 
 the day” 
 
 “Very clear. Yes, I guess so. Not sure what the Ministry of Defence and 
 ministers really want. Depends on events and money” 
 
 “Naval defence always needs private sector input. The future will 
 depend on what the government can afford, or not. It also depends on 
 which gaps business wants and can fill. There will be a lot of public 
 private partnerships in the future”  
 
 “There are many examples of private fleets in the past and maybe the 
 future will look more like that. But I am mindful that predictions are very 
 difficult. Realities and priorities change; sometimes quickly and 
 unexpectedly”. 
 
While one respondent was mindful of treasury pressures, “Depends on what 
the navy advises the government and how the Treasury reacts. I don’t know 
where privatisation will take us. I suspect it has further to go”, another 
concluded with explicit concerns over governance, legitimacy and a hollowed 
out core state: “Governance and legitimacy are more important than 
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ownership issues. That said, the two are linked. If you weaken the military you 
weaken the state”. 
 
 
5.5 Overview of Initial Research Findings 
 
 
A1. Today, the British dockyards of the Royal Navy have been largely 
privatised. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the navy and has 
improved the quality of its support facilities? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        7.52 
 
 
Overall, the research found that the opinion forming fifty were positive towards 
Royal Navy dockyard privatisation. Scoring a mean average of 7.52, the 
average respondent believes such a policy has: “…led to greater efficiency 
gains for the navy and has improved the quality of its support facilities”. While 
28 per cent of respondents gave answers within the 4 to 6 point range, 72 per 
cent scored 7 to 10 points. No respondent gave a negative score of 1, 2 or 3 
points. The boundary of discourse therefore occurred across the 4 to 10 point 
spectrum. 
 
 
A2. Today, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service has been privatised and 
Serco now runs these services. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the 
Royal Navy and has improved the quality of its support services? 
 
             Overall Mean Average        6.94 
 
 
On the question of the privatisation of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service the 
opinion forming fifty were positive. Scoring a mean average of 6.94, the 
average respondent believes such a policy has: “…led to greater efficiency 
gains for the Royal Navy and has improved the quality of its support services”. 
While 8 per cent of respondents gave answers within the negative 1 to 4 point 
range and 28 per cent scored 5 to 6 points, 64 per cent of respondents 
answered within the positive to extremely positive range of 7 to 10 points. 
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Overall, the boundary of discourse was spread right across the full 1 to 10 
point range.  
 
 
 
A3. It is right that British merchant ships carry private armed guards to defend 
them from pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        8.04 
 
 
The research found that the opinion forming fifty were very positive towards 
British merchant ships carrying private armed guards to defend them from 
pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. Scoring a mean average of 
8.04, no respondent gave answers within the negative 1 to 3 point range and 
only 12 per cent scored 4 to 6 points. 88 per cent of respondents answered 
within the positive to extremely positive range of 7 to 10 points. Therefore, 
overall the boundary of discourse was spread right across the 4 to 10 point 
range.  
 
 
A4. All Royal Navy personnel training should be contracted out to the 
privatised? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        3.58 
 
 
Overall, the research found that the opinion forming fifty reacted slightly 
negatively to the idea that: “all Royal Navy personnel training should be 
privatised”. Scoring a mean of 3.58, no subgroup produced a positive mean 
average. While the boundary of discourse spanned the full 1 to 10 point 
range, 98 per cent of opinion was expressed just in the 1 to 7 point range. 
 
 
A5. Some of Britain’s largest naval ships are in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The 
RFA should be privatised? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        5.00 
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On the question of the privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the opinion 
forming fifty scored a slightly negative, undecided and controversial, mean 
average of 5.00. While 10 per cent of respondents gave answers with an 
extremely negative score of just 1, 2 per cent of respondents provided an 
extremely positive score of 10. Overall, the boundary of discourse ranged 
across the full 1 to 10 point scale.  
 
 
A6. There is no reason for the Royal Navy to actually own many of its war 
ships. Instead, it would be more efficient if its ships were privatised? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        5.10 
 
 
The research found that the opinion forming fifty were either undecided or 
found the idea of the Royal Navy not owning its warships controversial. 
Scoring a mean average of 5.10, opinions were divided as to whether it would 
be more efficient. While 14 per cent of respondents gave answers with an 
extremely negative score of just 1, only 2 per cent of respondents provided an 
extremely positive score of 10. Nevertheless, the overall boundary of 
discourse spanned the full range of 1 to 10 points.  
 
 
A7. In the future, Britain’s naval sea power should not simply be funded from 
taxation. One can imagine a time when various forms of private money will be 
used to fund the production of naval sea power? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        6.06 
 
 
Concerning the future funding of Britain’s naval sea power, the opinion 
forming fifty scored a slightly positive mean average of 6.06 when presented 
with the statement: ‘One can imagine a time when various forms of private 
money will be used to fund the production of naval sea power’. While 26 per 
cent of respondents gave answers within the 5 to 6 point range, 52 per cent 
scored 7 to 10 points. Overall, the boundary of discourse spanned the full 1 to 
10 point range. 
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A8.  If a market in naval defence existed this would not stop some of it being 
run by government because naval sea power is a natural public good? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        8.06 
 
A10.  If the state attempted to monopolise naval defence this would not stop 
some of it being run privately because naval sea power is a natural private 
good? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        4.66 
 
 
The research found that while the opinion forming fifty were very positive 
towards the statement, “If a market in naval defence existed this would not 
stop some of it being run by government because naval sea power is a 
natural public good”, scoring 8.06, they were slightly negative (scoring 4.66) 
towards to the converse statement: “If the state attempted to monopolise 
naval defence this would not stop some of it being run privately because naval 
sea power is a natural private good”.  
 
Q8              1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10    
Frequency Totals                 1     1    0     2    0     4     8    9     8      17 =  50    
Q10               
Frequency Totals                 7     2    7     9    4     7   12    0     1       1 =  50    
 
 
While the mean average results suggest that the opinion forming fifty believe 
that if a market in naval defence existed (however interpreted) this would not 
stop some of it being run by government because naval sea power is a 
natural public good (however defined and interpreted), it is interesting to note 
that in response to both these statements the boundaries of discourse ranged 
over the full 1 to 10 point spectrum.  
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A9. Because naval sea power requirements are unpredictable some costs will 
always have to be covered by taxation: private arrangements such as 
corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or sponsorship could never do it 
all? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        8.86 
 
A11. Because naval sea power requirements are unpredictable some costs 
will always have to be covered by private arrangements such as corporate 
funding, insurance, donation and/or sponsorship? 
 
      Overall Mean Average        6.86 
 
 
Similarly, the research found that while the opinion forming fifty responded 
very positively to the statement, “Because naval sea power requirements are 
unpredictable some costs will always have to be covered by taxation: private 
arrangements such as corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or 
sponsorship could never do it all”, scoring 8.86, respondents were also 
positive towards to the converse statement (scoring 6.86) that: “Because 
naval sea power requirements are unpredictable some costs will always have 
to be covered by private arrangements such as corporate funding, insurance, 
donation and/or sponsorship”. 
 
Q9               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  0     0    1    0     1     2     7    6     4      29 =  50    
Q11               1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   Avg. 
Frequency Totals                  2     1    2     3    3     7     9   11    7       5 =  50    
 
 
While the individual responses to question 9 were spread over 3 to 10 point 
range, with question 10 the boundary of discourse again ranged over the full 1 
to 10 point spectrum denoting a wide range of opinions and debate. 
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Q12. How do you react to the following statement: “Just as in past centuries 
naval sea power was often privately provided, for example through the East 
India Company, so in the future more British naval sea power is going to be 
provided through greater privatisation?”   
 
In response to the statement in question 12, “Just as in past centuries British 
naval sea power was often privately provided, for example through the East 
India Company, so in the future more naval sea power is going to be provided 
through greater privatisation”, it is clear from the research that an 
overwhelming majority of the opinion forming fifty responded positively. The 
defence correspondents from the national press and media were divided into 
three groups. There were those who agreed with the statement, those who 
added caveats and those who disagreed with it. First, there were three 
journalists who agreed with the statement. Second, there were four journalists 
who generally agreed with the statement but added caveats concerning 
regulation, time, private sector capacity and degree of privatisation. Third, 
there were also three journalists who disagreed with the statement.  
 
Members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee were divided 
into two groups. There were those who agreed with the statement but added 
caveats and those who disagreed with it. First, there were six MPs who 
agreed with the statement but added caveats concerning private sector 
capacity, regulation, the role of overseas organisations and the need for 
integrated protocols and communications. Second, there were four MPs who 
disagreed with the statement. Their concerns centered on the necessary role 
of state power; the power of corporations; the threat of mercenaries; and the 
need for financial and voter accountability.  
 
The senior defence policy and think tank players were divided into three 
groups. There were those who agreed with the statement, those who added 
caveats and those who disagreed with it. First, there was five defence policy 
and think tank players who agreed with the statement: “This government will 
progress privatisations”; “Yes, one cannot disagree with that”; “The future 
should be more genuine privatisation”; “As the private sector’s capacity to 
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deliver grows so more public private partnerships will become viable without 
threatening democratic governance”, and; “The future will probably have more 
embedded public private partnerships and privatisations”. Second, there were 
three respondents who generally agreed with the statement but added 
caveats concerning fear, democratic governance and anarchy: “It would be 
scary if we went back to the sort of world of the East India Company. But 
maybe that is where we are going. I don’t know”; “There will be a lot more 
partnerships with the private sector in the future. But it will have the right 
democratic governance”, and; “…privatisation must not stray into anarchy.” 
Third, there were two respondents who disagreed with the statement. While 
one asserted, “Nothing is inevitable. Depends what politicians want the state 
to do in the future”, the other concluded: “The government should fund the 
Royal Navy properly. This is an uncertain world and the government has a 
duty to defend the country first”.  
 
The Royal Navy defence and security academics were divided into three 
groups. There were those who agreed with the statement, those who added 
caveats and those who disagreed with it. First, there were five Royal Navy 
defence and security academics who agreed with the statement: “totally 
agree”; “inevitable”; “it will happen”; “there will be partnerships”; “the navy 
[has] always had private partnerships, it is about degree and balance”. 
Second, there were three respondents who added caveats: “over governance 
arrangements”; “it is about government taking the lead within legitimate 
boundaries”; and “problematic boundaries about the public and private 
sectors”. Third, there were two respondents who disagreed with the 
statement. While one asserted the “defence of the realm [should have] “the 
first call on taxation”, the other concluded: “What applied in the past doesn’t 
necessarily do so now”.  
 
The final subgroup to respond to the statement was the senior naval service 
officers. This group was divided into thee groups. First, there were eight 
respondents who supported the statement: “Naval sea power will have more 
private input in the future”; “No doubt of that”; “Totally agree”; “Agree”; 
“Probably”; “Very clear. Yes, I guess so”; “Naval defence always needs 
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private sector input…There will be a lot of privatisation in the future”, and; “I 
don’t know where private partnerships will take us. I suspect it has further to 
go”. Second, there was one respondent who generally agreed with the 
statement but added caveats concerning legitimacy and state power: 
“Governance and legitimacy are more important than ownership issues. That 
said, the two are linked. If you weaken the military you weaken the state”. 
Third, there was one respondent who disagreed with the statement on the 
grounds of historicism: “There are many examples of private fleets in the past 
and maybe the future will look more like that. But I am mindful that predictions 
are very difficult”.  
 
Q12. How do you react to the following statement: “Just as in past centuries 
naval sea power was often privately provided, for example through the East 
India Company, so in the future more British naval sea power is going to be 
provided through greater privatisation?”   
                 Agree      Agree with Caveats  Disagree 
Defence correspondents national press and media          3         4          3 
Members HoC Defence Select Committee                   0                              6                            4  
Senior Defence Policy/Think Tank Players                   5                              3                            2 
Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics                 5                              3                            2   
Senior Naval Service Officers                    8                              1                            1 
     Totals   21                            17                          12           
 
 
Overall, 21 respondents (41 per cent of those surveyed) agreed with the 
statement while 12 (24 per cent) disagreed. The rest, 17 (34 per cent) 
generally agreed with the statement but only by expressing caveats. Their 
concerns included issues such as: regulation, time, private sector capacity, 
degree of privatisation, role of overseas organisations, integrated protocols 
and communications, fear, democratic governance, anarchy, legitimacy and 
cohesiveness of the state.  
 
By far the most supportive subgroup category of the statement were the 
senior naval officers (Agree: 8; Agree with Caveats 1; Disagree 1) followed by 
Royal Navy defence and security academics and senior defence policy and 
think tank players who followed in equal measures scoring: Agree 5; Agree 
with Caveats 3; Disagree, 2. While defence correspondents in the national 
press and media were more evenly spread across all three options (Agree 3; 
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Agree with Caveats 4; Disagree 3), it is noticeable that no member of the 
House of Commons Defence Select Committee unreservedly agreed with the 
statement. This subgroup category scored: Agree 0; Agree with Caveats 6; 
Disagree 4.  
  
 
5.6 Ideological Cleavages and Issues of Causation 
 
Overall, the initial research found that the opinion forming fifty were positive 
towards their perception(s) of the modernisations and shifts in governance 
that had already taken place, such as the privatisation of the Royal Navy’s 
dockyards and the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service. The research found that 
respondents were also positive towards the government’s policy of allowing 
British merchant ships to carry private armed guards and even the statement 
that “one can imagine a time when various forms of private money will be 
used to fund the production of naval sea power”. While the research 
uncovered negative attitudes towards the contracting out of all Royal Navy 
personnel training, the privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and the “idea 
of the Royal Navy not owning many of its warships”, in all these areas, the 
opinion forming fifty displayed wide and varying degrees of disagreement and 
therefore deemed the issues to be controversial yet part of the discourse.  
 
Nowhere are the shifting boundaries of conversation and its controversies 
more clear than when it comes to the funding of British naval sea power in the 
context of notions of market and state failure. For the research found that 
while the opinion forming fifty reacted positively to the statement, “If a market 
in naval defence existed this would not stop some of it being run by 
government because naval sea power is a natural public good”, and they 
were slightly negative towards the converse statement, “If the state attempted 
to monopolise naval defence this would not stop some of it being run privately 
because naval sea power is a natural private good”, it is important to note that 
in response to both these statements discourse ranged across the full 
frequency spectrum.  
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Similarly, the research found that while the opinion forming fifty responded 
positively to the statement, “Because naval sea power requirements are 
unpredictable some costs will always have to be covered by taxation: private 
arrangements such as corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or 
sponsorship could never do it all”, respondents were also positive towards to 
the converse statement, “Because naval sea power requirements are 
unpredictable some costs will always have to be covered by private 
arrangements such as corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or 
sponsorship”. Again emphasising the breadth of discourse and therefore 
disagreement, individual results were spread widely across the frequency 
spectrum. 
 
Significantly, the research also found that elite attitudes to the history of 
private sector involvement in the production and operation of British naval sea 
power and its potential relationship to an even more privatised future is 
similarly divisive. Concerning the statement “Just as in past centuries naval 
sea power was often privately provided, for example through the East India 
Company, so in the future more British naval sea power is going to be 
provided through greater privatisation”, a clear majority, 76 per cent, either 
agreed with the statement or agreed citing caveats. Further signaling the post-
Weberian realities of a differentiated polity and a new era of governance, only 
24 per cent disagreed. 
 
Together, these research findings not only highlight the extent to which 
market ideas and the realities of a differentiated polity have become an 
integral part of elite ideation but they also serve to expose the controversial 
nature of the discourse concerning legitimation and governance in the political 
economy of ‘core state’ force and violence. 
 
Moreover, whereas in Chapter II (above) Anderson and Gifford argued that in 
the 19th century privateering had been undermined in part by naval officials 
strategically positioned within the state apparatus, “the extinction of 
privateering was a least partly the result of rent seeking by established 
political bureaucracies….” (Anderson & Gifford, 1981: 118), and again, “public 
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navy officers and other officials fought a running battle against the 
commissioning of privateers for centuries….the navies went to great lengths 
to harass their private competitors and to generally restrict their ability to 
compete” (Anderson & Gifford, 1981: 118), the initial research data suggests 
that the “centuries old battle between the privateers and the public navies” 
has now witnessed a degree of attitudinal change. For what is particularly 
striking about the initial research findings are the variations in opinion 
between the different respondent groups and the ideological cleavages that 
they represent.  
 
Away from the rationalistic simplicities of public choice theory (mentioned in 
Chapter II) and speculation that public naval officers might be inherently 
opposed to ideal type constructs of private naval markets (however defined 
and interpreted), today, this can no longer be said to be the case. Viewed 
from the perspective of an ‘ideal type’ free market, it is the naval officers 
surveyed who are more open to, supportive of, and/or feel the inevitability of a 
hollowing out of the core state in naval sea power than any other category 
surveyed (see Table 6 below). 
 
The data demonstrates clearly that when it comes to the pro-free market 
stance (whether positive or negative), the mean averages of the respondent 
categories put naval officers first at 6.42, senior defence policy and think tank 
experts second at 6.11, members of the House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee third at 6.08, defence correspondents from the national press and 
media fourth at 5.85 and, lastly, naval, defence and security academics fifth at 
5.38. 
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           Media   Politicians Think Tanks  Academics Naval Overall       
                                                          Officers    Mean  
                                                                                                                                                                  Average 
Q1 Dockyard 
Privatisation 6.5 7.4  8.0  7.2  8.5 7.52 
 
Q2 RMAS 
Privatisation 5.4 6.9  7.9  6.4  8.1 6.94 
 
Q3 Private  
Armed 
Guards  8.5 8.6  8.1  7.6  7.4 8.04  
 
Q4 RN  
Training 
Privatisation 4.5 4.3  3.7  2.3  3.1 3.58 
 
Q5 RFA 
Privatisation 5.6 5.1  5.5  4.4  4.4 5.00 
 
Q6 RN  
Warship 
Privatisation 5.7 5.7  4.7  4.7  4.7 5.10 
 
Q7 Private  
Funding 
Naval Sea  
Power  5.7 5.7  5.8  6.0  7.1 6.06 
 
Q10 Naval  
Sea Power 
Private Good 4.5 5.5  3.4  3.8  6.1 4.66 
 
Q11  
Inadequacy  
Public Funding 
Naval Sea  
Power   6.3 5.6  7.9  6.1  8.4 6.86 
 
Ideal Type 
Mean Average 5.85 6.08  6.11  5.38  6.42         5.96 
 
Table 6. Libertarian Free Market ‘Ideal Type’ Results by Respondent 
Groups. 
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While it is difficult to infer causal reasoning to the data, it is now clear that it is 
those respondents most familiar and closely associated with the realities and 
policy consequences of the ‘spear of force’, who appear to be the most 
amenable (for whatever reason) to highly differentiated and networked forms 
of non-state legitimation, governance and idealised versions of the NPM-
market paradigm. While the three groups most closely associated with the 
delivery and policy of the core state’s spear, namely, naval officers, policy 
experts and politicians, provide the most market-oriented responses, those 
further away from the spear follow. Perhaps tasked with roles that require 
greater levels of independent reasoning and critical, defence correspondents 
from the national press and media, and naval, defence and security 
academics are less market-oriented. 
 
The point about the comparative market-orientation of the naval officers 
surveyed, is further highlighted by the data generated in reaction to the 
statement in question 12: “Just as in past centuries naval sea power was 
often privately provided, for example through the East India Company, so in 
the future more British naval sea power is going to be provided through 
greater privatisation”. While 9 out of 10 naval officers either agreed with the 
statement, or agreed with caveats, a similar view was held by 8 out of ten of 
the policy experts surveyed (see Table 7 below). While journalists followed 
with a comparatively low score of 7, on this occasion, politicians swapped 
their rank with the academics surveyed. Whereas 8 out of 10 academics 
agreed with the statement, or agreed with caveats, politicians only scored 6 
out of ten on the same basis. On this key question, politicians gave the lowest 
overall score.  
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                                 Agree/w caveats      Disagree 
Media    7    3 
Politicians   6    4 
Think Tanks   8    2 
Academics   8    2 
Naval Officers   9    1 
 
Table 7. Score and Ranking for Open-ended Question on Future Political 
Economy of British Naval Sea Power. 
 
 
Finally, the initial research demonstrates that when it comes to viewing naval 
sea power as a natural public good and/or something for which private 
funding will always be ‘inadequate’ (however defined and interpreted), the 
mean averages of the respondent categories placed think tank policy experts 
in the first rank scoring 8.80, with politicians, scoring 8.55 in second place. For 
these two groups formally tasked with legitimated public policy formulation, 
the ideas of naval sea power being a natural public good and/or something for 
which private funding will always be ‘inadequate’ seems to make the most 
sense. Whilst all five groups scored within a statist and relatively narrow 8.05 
to 8.80 range, naval officers followed in third place, scoring 8.60, followed by 
academics scoring 8.30 and then, finally, national media journalists who 
scored 8.05 (see Table 8 below): 
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           Media   Politicians Think Tanks  Academics Naval Overall       
                                                          Officers    Mean  
                                                                                                                                                                  Average 
Q8 Naval Sea 
Power as Public 
Good  7.9 8.3  8.1  7.3  8.7 8.06 
 
Q9 Inadequacy 
of Private Funding 
of Naval Sea  
Power  8.2 8.8  9.5  9.3  8.5 8.86 
 
Ideal Type 
Mean Average 8.05 8.55  8.80  8.30  8.60         8.31 
 
Table 8. Command and Control State ‘Ideal Type’ Results by 
Respondent Groups.  
 
 
5.7 In-Depth Interviews 
 
It is in following up these initial research findings that additional research was 
conducted between 25 August and 10 September 2012. To further clarify the 
conceptual boundaries of discourse concerning notions of NPM market and 
PA state failure amongst Royal Navy opinion formers, follow-up telephone 
interviews were conducted which centred around two open-ended questions. 
Ten respondents from the original sample were interviewed: two from each 
subgroup category. The author undertook all the interviews and as with the 
previous research anonymity was assured throughout. Question 1 required an 
open-ended response to the following question: “In naval sea power, what 
would be the consequences of a genuine private market system?” 
 
In response to the statement, the two defence correspondents in the national 
press and media stressed problems which included “insecurity of supply”, 
“questionable responses”, “some failures in coverage”, “pandemonium” and 
even, “Chaos, private firms need profits to survive, therefore need war and 
conflict for their goods and services to be used: privatisation would make 
countries the tools of the defence firms”. On the other hand the respondents 
 227 
also stressed a range of perceived efficiency gains: “boost to innovation and 
research resulting in value for money”, “more investment”, “would necessarily 
mean more efficiency on a large scale”, “more research and development of 
cutting edge technology”, “could work in theory in terms of ensuring a more 
efficient and cost effective sector” and even “greater accountability”.  
 
While there was some concern with a range of economic issues such as a 
“private monopoly risk”, “too higher costs”, “may not deliver the investment to 
meet unexpected events” and “always need state funding”, the journalists 
were concerned with the efficacy of a fully privatised world: “mercenary forces 
could rise up”, “confusion and issues around secrecy and loyalty”, “private 
forces would not be answerable to the government, resulting in political coups 
or civil war” and finally, “where would the checks and balances exist to 
safeguard society against the rogue elements in the private security sector?”. 
While one journalist was concerned with issues of probity and equity, “the 
richest would be in charge of defence, danger of some poor areas of the UK 
not being defended”, “security and defence provision could be compromised 
by private/sectional interests”, “would lead to conflicts of interests among 
investors whose businesses maybe concerned with natural resources when 
the resources become the source of political conflict”, “who owns what?”, 
there was also the view that increased competition could result in more 
innovative products and services: “more money and extra incentives in terms 
of competition”, “issues of secrecy and the sharing of ideas and technologies, 
cutting edge technology in defence would once again prove reliable”, “cutting 
edge innovation but an over-reliance on money value and materials rather 
than effectiveness”. 
 
In response to the statement, the two members of the House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee interviewed found it difficult to imagine such a 
world of market-based governance. Envisaging “significant market losses” 
one respondent assumed that in such a world “state intelligence would be 
kept secret.” The other commented: “Confusing, and raises issues of 
ownership, control and responsibility”. While one forecast a “massive public 
outcry forcing government to take it back after private military companies balls 
 228 
it up” the other worried in the following terms: “natural monopolies would arise 
and warlords rise up similar to the middle east”, “…unpredictability of the 
government’s ability to respond to events”, “disastrous”. Finally, while one 
respondent claimed that such a market would lead to “greater efficiency and 
[would be] more outcome focused” both complained it would also deliver “less 
esprit de corps”. 
 
While the two respondents in the senior defence policy and think tank players 
category welcomed the prospect of a full blown private market in naval sea 
power stating it would “increase provision and advances in military 
technology”, “cutting edge technology and healthy competition which would be 
a good thing for all services”, one respondent was concerned that a “strong 
design and innovative infrastructure…could become very money and value 
oriented”. The other asserted: “natural competition, profit driven, little 
guarantee of quality outside of those imposed by market forces”. Moreover, 
while one respondent expressed concerns which centered on issues of 
probity and morality, “corruption”, “loyalty and moral concerns”, the other 
related the statement directly to the Royal Navy and asserted: “the navy 
should be ultimately run by HM government, privatisation opens the door to 
anarchy and raises moral questions of patronage. Privatisation has to be 
bound by this reality”.  
 
For the two Royal Navy defence and security academics interviewed there 
was an overriding concern with the sanctity of the state: “without government 
or state involvement the results could be catastrophic”, “threat to national 
security”, “no guarantee of universal provision or democratic accountability”, 
“questions and issues surrounding the defence of the realm, not a job for 
individuals, the state has a role”, “chaos”, and: “the command structure would 
no longer be a moral and disciplined ritual, money becomes the tool by which 
orders are obeyed in terms of the front line”. Perhaps significantly, the two 
respondents in this category offered a particularly wide range of opinions. 
While one asserted that the “rule of law depends on state control of defence”, 
the other commented: “unable to respond quickly, no single authority”, 
“enterprising and cutting edge, could expose some areas of defence if the 
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state was removed completely”. Finally one respondent offered a detailed 
commentary that encompassed a range of opinions: “Danger of anarchy. 
Inevitably, all governments would wish to create some form of regulatory 
framework to cover weaponry - as nuclear weapons in private hands are not 
desirable. Greater innovation in funding and range of services plus the 
reduction in ‘prestige/ego’  projects by governments or states. Defence 
industry ownership of not just the hardware but also the operators of weapon 
systems/platforms. Possible polarisation between haves/have not’s both 
within a particular state and between states. Sales of security and defence 
services between states and supra national organisations: UN, NATO, 
SEATO, EU etc.” Finally, while both respondents saw attributes in a market 
for naval sea power, “more competition for contracts resulting in a flexible and 
cost effective training and procurement service for the military”, “decrease of 
tax payers money, more focused market driven, sharpening in provision, 
design and development”, they also accepted such a world would demand a 
“radical transformation of the political system”.  
 
Question 2 requested open-ended responses to the statement: “In naval sea 
power what would be the consequences of a genuine state-run system?” In 
response, the two defence correspondents in the national press and media 
argued that a state run system would be too bureaucratic and inefficient: 
“overly bureaucratic and wasteful”, “inefficiency and loss of choice”, “rigid 
system of bureaucracy and under funding that would be hidden from the 
public eye”, “too bureaucratic, money would be wasted, not enough time 
spent on development of key resources, the state would do it all on the 
cheap”, “less accountability and less responsiveness to the demands of the 
public”, “risk of overspend and supply”. While one respondent asserted “full 
control but with limitations”, the other commented: “The state should control 
security and defence so that decisions are in an ideal world taken for the good 
of the people not the shareholders”. Finally, while one respondent argued that 
what was needed was “a balance between the two” sectors, the other 
concluded: “The dangers of a state system could be an inefficient, overblown 
sector which would be closed to the efficiencies the private sector could 
bring”.  
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While members from the House of Commons Defence Select Committee 
expressed less concern with the issue of state bureaucracy, the theme 
nevertheless did arise twice: “heavily bureaucratic”, “bureaucracy and lack of 
cutting edge development; although it seems logical in terms of defence to 
have it under government control for international safety”. Much more 
prevalent amongst these two respondents was a concern for “what we have 
now”. While one respondent said, “theoretically a state run system should be 
able to act impartially and avoid accusations of financial interests”, the other 
saw state funding in a very different light: “not enough funding”, “under 
funding resulting in under performance”, “less investment where it is needed 
and more slip-ups in planning”. While one MP believed state security and 
defence led to “more control of investment”, the other believed it engendered 
“loyalty, trust and [the] organisation of economic and production 
programmes”. 
 
In response to the statement, the two senior defence policy and think tank 
players commented: “confusion with no one seemingly in charge”. Displaying 
skepticism over a state run system in naval sea power, particularly in terms of 
efficiency, they asserted: “poor provision of defence”, “inefficiency”, “lead to 
inefficiency in provision of naval services”, “waste, inefficiency and a 
conservative approach, money will be wasted and inconsistency with policy 
and implementation, problems also with risk calculations and a less rapid 
response”. Sticking to this theme one respondent concluded: “Inefficient, risks 
in moving towards a dictatorship. It is also immoral in terms of the state’s 
ability to supply complete security. Ultimately, it limits people’s abilities and 
rights to defend themselves.” Moreover, one respondent in this subgroup 
category commented that under a full blown state system of naval sea power 
there would be: “Too much number crunching and acquisition of kit that is 
useless but looks good in a magazine”. While only one respondent stated that 
the problems would be “less than those problems faced through privatisation” 
the other concluded: “We’re practically there already!” 
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Respondents in the Royal Navy, defence and security academics category 
generally displayed a wide range of concerns. While one was concerned with 
issues of inefficiency, “great deal of inefficiency”, “concerns over efficiency”, 
“inefficiency and high cost”, “although the state should retain some 
authoritative control, total control would result in a less cutting edge system 
clouded in paperwork and debate”, “an absence of competition would result, 
massive over-runs and over-spending coupled with bad timescales and poor 
investment”, the other respondent asserted, “would be effective if the 
government behaved responsibly”; “the state must control all legal uses of 
violence in the national interest.” With one respondent believing that the “state 
system should be seen as an authoritative governor to the private market, 
state control limits the amount of research into new technology in terms of 
finance”, the other concluded: “Reduction in navy and defence spending 
unless immediate threat visible. Greater reliance upon defence organisations 
and treaties. Cross-national defence projects that would probably be as costly 
and inefficiently run as at present! We have passed this point, it could be 
argued that the period 1945–1995, the period that was the stalemate 
extension of WWII, was the highest point of the full blown state system 
reflecting the old ‘balance of power’ concept. Nowadays, defence and security 
is already fragmented and this change is probably irreversible.” Finally, one 
respondent in this subgroup category reacted with profound hostility to the 
idea of a genuine state run system in naval sea power and defence more 
widely: “Totalitarian mass murder. Around the world most state militaries act 
against the interests of peace and people. Most state military and security 
services violate their ‘own populations’ more than private companies could 
ever get away with. When people foolishly complain of private mercenaries: 
think of what governments, as protection rackets, have wrought throughout 
human history.” 
 
The two senior naval service officers surveyed were more supportive of the 
idea of a genuinely state run system than the other respondent categories: “if 
managed properly it would provide defence cover for everyone, far more 
disciplined approach to warfare or peace keeping”, “total security”, “high 
quality provision of service but at a high financial cost, political factors could 
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affect funding around election time”. While one respondent commented that 
such a world would “need to be clear in respect of roles and regulations, state 
control gives less of a problem of mutiny”, the other was more skeptical: 
“blinkered thoughts”, “corruption and too much target setting without enough 
groundwork to satisfy the demands”, “a very dated and vulnerable defence 
system”, “could be bureaucratic, but more organised if it was run properly”. 
Perhaps interpreting the statement purely in terms of a democratic state one 
respondent commented: “very restrictive and less cost effective: defence and 
security would not be a top priority”. The other complained: “governments try 
to do everything on the cheap; current administration is inept”. Significantly, 
both respondents associated a genuine state run navy with bureaucracy, 
inefficiency and a lack of innovation: “bureaucracy”, “possible loss of value for 
money”, “limited growth for defence technologies and innovation”. While one 
respondent anticipated the “continuation of defence cuts”, another 
commented: “Secure system of morality with regards to the defence of the 
realm but more at risk of mistakes in procurement of appropriate equipment”. 
While one respondent believed it would result in “chaos” and said it would 
lead to “too much waste”, the other questioned the state’s impact in terms of 
efficiency and innovation: “maximum taxpayer risk and cost”, ”dated systems 
which would affect the operational ability of the armed forces”, “over 
complexity would damage future innovation”, “a far too rigid system with little 
room for manoeuvre on certain issues”, “over reliance on structure and 
deliverance which affects the final effectiveness”. 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion: Changing Discourse on the Political Economy of 
Governance 
 
Overall, the research from the in-depth interviews with the Royal Navy’s 
opinion formers found that many respondents now believe both a full-blown 
private market (however defined and interpreted) and a pure state system 
(however defined and interpreted) would ultimately deliver forms of naval sea 
power that are similarly prone to bureaucracy, inefficiency, under provision, 
poor accountability, low quality and varying degrees of adverse monopoly 
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(see Tables 9 and 10 below). Moreover, while many respondents believe that 
greater degrees of marketisation might offer improvements in efficiency, 
technological innovation and even peace, the state and the free market are 
both ultimately viewed as being potentially similar drivers when it comes to 
inefficiency, chaos and authoritarian monopoly.  
 
 
Table 9. Boundaries of Discourse on Consequences of a Genuine 
Private Market System in Naval Defence. 
 
When it comes to the core issue of legitimation in the production of force and 
violence the research findings lay bare for the first time, controversies that are 
framed by highly relativist forms of conceptualisation and discourse. Now 
proactively questioning such notions as ‘efficiency’ and ‘democracy’ as 
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sustainable and adequate rubrics of legitimation, the research has highlighted 
significant levels of uncertainly and/or confusion amongst the elite opinion 
formers surveyed. 
 
 
Table 10. Boundaries of Discourse on Consequences of a Genuine 
State-run System in Naval Defence. 
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It is in this epistemological context that this study’s research has found a 
changed discourse amongst opinion formers concerned with Royal Navy 
modernisation and the broader future of British naval sea power. For while 
many remain critical of developments over the last thirty years, a clear 
majority now accept that enhanced outsourcing, PPPs and privatisation are 
not only set to remain for the foreseeable future, but that many of the 
challenges and opportunities they represent are more similar to older models 
of political economy than many NPM theorists and others concerned with PA, 
governance and even the hollowing out of the state necessarily articulate.  
 
Instead of ‘the state’ or ‘the market’ standing in isolated opposition to one 
another, for many of the respondents surveyed both of these ideal type 
constructs are more powerfully viewed as cosmological wormholes that 
overtime lead back into each other’s consequential realities of governance 
and complexity. It is in this context that Royal Navy outsourcing, PPPs and 
privatisation are indeed more powerfully viewed through the evolutionary 
prism of ‘back to the future’ than any perspective which seeks to argue that 
they represent a fundamental departure, or irrevocable deviation, from that 
which has gone before.  
 
As is clear from the research, NPM and its drivers of change in governance 
have not only facilitated policy networks that ideationally and proactively 
embrace economistic tools such as privatisation and outsourcing, but in so 
doing they have in many ways engaged a rediscovery of older forms of 
differentiated polity and statecraft that echo and resonate with pre-Weberian 
forms of thought and practice. With ‘core state’ actors in and around the UK’s 
senior military service are no longer able to clearly and definitively articulate 
high degrees of certitude when it comes to the superiority of the state over the 
market, or vice versa, it is clear that there are those within the state’s core 
who are not only willing and able to ‘think the unthinkable’ in terms of political 
economy and privatisation but that their existence and outlook is increasingly 
consonant with the general thrust of the ‘hollowing out of the state’ thesis. 
Increasingly devoid of a Weberian narrative that justifies the nation state’s 
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monopoly over the use of force, their boundaries of discourse and uncertainty 
denote an underlying legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1975) in which varying 
modes of governance, accountability and performance are open to ongoing 
and, as yet, unresolved debate.  
 
Operating across formal and informal networks of policymaking and 
implementation which increasingly interlink and reinforce relationships 
between governmental and private sector actors with new and dynamic forms 
of structure, interests and nexuses, today’s Royal Navy opinion formers are 
not simply at the cutting edge of important discourse, but many increasingly 
find themselves searching for new ways with which to make sense of their 
legitimate place in an increasingly complex and uncertain political economy.  
It is in this context that the boundaries of discourse found in and around the 
Royal Navy’s opinion formers strongly resonate with Bevir and Rhodes’ 
‘decentered theory’, as grounded on the idea of situated agency (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006 and 2010). From this perspective, institutions, practices and/or 
socialisation do not simplistically predetermine or predict how people will 
behave, as all courses of purposeful action are necessarily contingent upon 
individual choice and free will. People’s actions are not merely explained by 
their beliefs (or meanings and/or desires), as any one belief is itself 
interpreted and mediated in the context of the wider web of a person’s beliefs, 
and these beliefs are in turn explained by an array of traditions that are 
modified overtime by dilemmas. From this perspective, a tradition (or 
paradigm) is the set of theories against which a person comes to hold beliefs 
and perform actions. A dilemma arises whenever novel circumstances 
generate a new belief that forces people to question their previously held 
view(s).  
 
For Bevir and Rhodes (2006 and 2010) the sort of ideational change and 
uncertainty highlighted in the research is itself a reflection of the dilemmas in 
political economy faced by the respondents. While individual responses to the 
dilemmas of the idealised state or market may be grounded in Royal Navy 
traditions and beliefs which have themselves evolved within the context of the 
Weberian nation-state, overtime, such a paradigm can be mediated, modified 
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and adapted as required by the demands of new realities and circumstance. If 
new realities of provision, funding and partnership are what are required, then 
new forms of ideation, practice and ‘tradition’ will be internalised and 
practiced. 
 
In Rhodes article, ‘The Hollowing Out of the State’, he writes that: “The phrase 
“the hollowing out of the state” suggests that the British state is being eroded 
or eaten away” (Rhodes, 1994: 138) not least from the inside out. Viewed 
from his perspective, the hollowing out thesis primarily concerns a 
fundamental erosion of the centre of the nation state including its Weberian 
core. However, while de jure political power may still remain with a nation 
state, and its capacity to project and utilise its de facto power may vary 
overtime, this does not necessarily preclude a variety of core state capacities 
being transferred or restructured to local and/or regional levels of governance 
under some form of disparate public and/or in part private ‘crown’ (Saward, 
1997). For as the libertarian theorist Paul Birch (1998) acknowledges similarly 
to Rhodes (see Chapter IV above), and many of the respondents in the 
research suggest, the private market‘s capacity to recreate forms of quasi-
state territorial and spacial monopoly are not necessarily or in any way 
inconsonant with the ‘messy’, contingent and ever shifting realities of actual 
history, ideation and practice. When viewed from the broader perspective of 
the history of warfare, the de facto production of force and violence has rarely, 
if ever, been a matter for purely idealised states or free markets. In terms of 
legitimacy and practice, force and violence has often conjoined 
differentiation(s) across the spectrum of political economy (see Chapters III 
and IV above) and geography (Birch, 1998).  
 
Whilst in the minds of many of the opinion formers surveyed, the Westminster 
system has already substantially transitioned from a Weberian bureaucracy to 
self-organising policy networks, and new forms of governance point towards a 
tendency to guide overall policy rather than proscriptively specify detail, so the 
significance and impact of the shift from government to governance and from 
bureaucracy to diffuse networks in and around civil and commercial society 
becomes clear.  
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As if mindful of the implicit failings of idealised states and pure free markets, 
when it comes to epistemology, economy and legitimacy, the research not 
only presents a general skepticism towards politicians and ‘politics as a 
process’, but it also presents a skepticism towards economics and its 
attendant themes of ‘efficiency’ and ‘performance’. Generally supportive of the 
notion that overtime each paradigm leads back to the other, many of the 
respondents seem to default to a resigned acceptance of the ‘messiness’ of 
the human condition and its imperfect, complex and contingent reality.  
 
Whilst since the late 1980s UK governments have seen themselves as 
international leaders of public sector and management reform and that the 
country has arguably witnessed a ‘parade of the paradigms’ which, in addition 
to privatisation, included networks, partnerships, targets, decentralisation and 
diversification (Pollitt, 2013: 468), for Pollitt, ongoing reform has been 
undertaken despite their being little if any hard evidence concerning actual 
outcomes. Arguing that there has often been a lack of sustained interest in 
specific reforms and difficulties in designing and implementing monitoring and 
evaluation programmes (Pollitt, 2013), he cites UK exceptionalism and 
ideology as being key factors.  
 
For Pollitt, UK exceptionalism centres on four key factors that serve to “lower 
political costs and reduce veto points for management reforms” (Pollitt, 2013: 
474). The first is the comparatively ‘light’ legal procedures often required for 
substantive machinery changes. Typically reliant on organisational changes 
and statutory instruments as opposed to major pieces of primary legislation 
(Pollitt, 1984; 2007: 529-43), many programmes such as Next Steps 
agencification (1989-97) have been carried out without a single statute or 
parliamentary debate being required. Second, as one single political party 
after another has formed most British governments, so intra-coalition 
compromises were not necessary between 1979 and 2010. Third, changes to 
the general machinery of government traditionally have not been a matter for 
Cabinet discussion and debate but instead sub-committees often headed by 
Prime Ministers. Fourth, most UK parliaments have been comparatively 
 239 
uncritical: a Prime Minister with a clear majority in the House of Commons has 
usually been able to push through his or her preferred option for reform. For 
Pollitt, these “…four factors are not present to the same combined degree in 
any other OECD country.” (Pollitt, 2013: 475) Together, they “…mean that, in 
the UK, the window of opportunity for large-scale reform is almost always at 
least half-open” (Pollitt, 2013: 475). 
 
Another key motivating factor in ongoing UK public management reform has 
been the issue of ideology. Whilst in the 1960s and 1970s reforms were often 
framed in terms of political coordination problems within government and 
issues of ‘balance’ within cabinets (Pollitt, 2006: 25-44; 2013), overtime, these 
came to be superseded by the idea that management was an important policy 
issue in and of itself and that each new administration should arrive in office 
fully equipped with a ready made reform package. To govern without such a 
platform and its attendant outreach terminology (open public services; joined 
up government) was to invite media and electoral criticism. Away from any 
evidence to the contrary, the view was widely internalised that existing public 
management models were inevitably inadequate and that large gains could 
only be delivered by implementing some form of ‘transformation’. As Pollitt 
notes, even in 2011 “…after 30 years of fervid reform, the old spectre of 
unresponsive, top-down, monolithic public bureaucracy was wheeled out 
again” (Pollitt, 2013: 475). He concludes that overtime, “…management 
became a broad ideology rather than a dusty technical backwater” (Pollitt, 
2013: 475). Moreover, while for Hood this ideology has sported some of the 
characteristics of an organised religion (Hood, 2005: 7-26), for Pollitt: “As 
management reform has become an ideology, so it has also become a 
business – a large, thriving, international business in which careers can be 
made” (Pollitt, 2013: 475). He concludes: “There are now substantial 
organisational interests, both within and without government, with investments 
in perpetual change and reform” (Pollitt, 2013: 476). 
 
Whilst the conjuncture of ideology, vested interest and the factors of UK 
exceptionalism provide a powerful explanatory prism through which to 
conceptualise the motivational and institutional framework of much public 
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management reform over recent decades, the research makes clear the 
extent to which today’s opinion formers in and around the Weberian core state 
experience heighted levels of confusion and uncertainty in the key areas of 
political economy, governance and legitimacy. Although even the most 
forceful personalities, leaders and opinion formers are inevitably shaped by 
their institutional contexts (Cook, 1998) and dilemmas (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2006 and 2010), when it comes to accountability, outcomes and legitimacy, 
more than thirty years of public sector and management reform has resulted 
in ongoing uncertainty, confusion and polarisation for those proactively 
involved in its practice and elite discourse. Although the ideational boundaries 
are broader in the sense that the overall conversation spans and embraces a 
wider area within the compass of political economy (see Chapters III and IV 
above), settlement, agreement and consensus remain as contested and 
elusive as ever. 
 
Whilst twenty-first century Britain can increasingly be viewed as a 
differentiated polity in which a complex maze of interlinked institutions gain 
varying degrees of functional autonomy, and the research has highlighted the 
boundaries of discourse amongst elite opinion formers in and around the 
Royal Navy as being located within a broader historical, literary and ideational 
context, Chapter VI goes on to conclude the thesis by arguing that the 
production of British naval sea power oscillates over the centuries between 
the cyclical peaks and troughs of a regulated private market and the tax-
funded world of variously differentiated public administration.  
 
In challenging Weberian notions of state legitimated monopoly (under 
whichever system of polity and/or governance), and further clarifying the 
conceptual boundaries of discourse, the chapter not only presents a powerful 
critique of NPM and the wider worlds of governance and public administration 
but it does so with reference to the key dimensions of time, economic 
complexity and socio-political power. It is to these issues that the final chapter 
attends. 
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Chapter VI 
Time, Property and Power:  
Legitimation, British Naval Sea Power and the 
Limits of New Public Management Theory 
 
    
“Hiring outsiders to fight your battles is as old as war itself. Nearly 
every past empire, from the ancient Egyptians to the Victorian British, 
contracted foreign troops in some form or another… 
“An important realization in the retelling of military history, from a 
privatized perspective, is the amazing constancy of such actors in 
every era. Our general assumption of warfare is that it is engaged in by 
militaries, fighting for the common cause. This is an idealization. 
Throughout history the participants in war were often for-profit private 
entities loyal to no one government. 
“In fact, the monopoly of the state over violence is that exception 
in world history, rather than the rule” (Singer, 2003: 19) 
 
 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis by arguing that what might have been a 
fanciful idea to many people only thirty years ago, the idea and practice of 
outsourcing, PPPs and privatisation in British naval sea power, has now 
gained widespread support and/or acquiescence in elite opinion forming 
circles. Having previously located such developments in their historical, 
literary and contemporary opinion-forming contexts, the chapter demonstrates 
that British naval sea power oscillates over the centuries between the cyclical 
peaks and troughs of state and market forms of corporatism. It argues that 
from an historical and ideational perspective, there is less that is genuinely 
‘new’ in so-called NPM theory than is popularly realised by its supporters and 
detractors alike. Ultimately, Royal Navy modernisation is more powerfully 
viewed through the prism of ‘back to the future’ and differentiated forms of 
governance, than any perspective that suggests it represents a major 
deviation in political economy from that which has gone before. 
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6.1 New Boundaries of Legitimated Discourse on Force and Violence  
 
To Weber a century ago, the ideal type institutionalisation of the state meant 
that its use of physical force was the core function of its being. Whilst today 
economic and security pressures are unbundling many of these functions to 
the point where force is being re-engaged by the private sector, from a 
Weberian perspective, this trend represents a fundamental failure and 
hollowing out of state legitimacy. Undermining its ‘quintessential function and 
signifier of being’ (Small, 2006: 12), the research data and findings presented 
in Chapter V (above) not only delineates the changed boundaries of elite 
discourse but it does so with reference to the problematic issues of formal and 
informal policy networks, differentiated governance, uncertainty over 
outcomes, and the key dimensions of time, economic complexity and socio-
political power.  
  
Enhanced by the fact that the data generated is derived from elite 
respondents in and around the Royal Navy, never before has the question 
been answered: how do influential agents in and around Weber’s nation-state 
monopoly now conceptualise legitimacy in political economy and what are the 
implications for New Public Management theory? 
 
Overall, the research suggests that elite opinion formers believe an ideal type 
state and an ideal type market would ultimately deliver forms of naval sea 
power that are prone to the symmetrical failings of bureaucracy, inefficiency, 
under provision, poor accountability, low quality and varying degrees of 
adverse monopoly. While many respondents believe greater degrees of 
privatisation could offer theoretical improvements in the areas of efficiency, 
innovation and even peace, both the ideal type state and free market are 
similarly viewed as drivers of inefficiency, chaos and authoritarian monopoly 
(see Table 11 below).  
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Libertarian Free Market                     Command and Control State 
(NPM Ideal Type State Failure          (PA Ideal Type Market Failure 
Perspective)                              Perspective) 
 
 
                                 1. Shared Systemic Ideal Type Failures 
 
Privatisation leads to perceptions of:         Nationalisation leads to perceptions of: 
Bureaucracy                        Bureaucracy 
Inefficiency                        Inefficiency 
Under Provision                  Under Provision 
Poor Accountability                       Poor Accountability 
Low Quality            Low Quality 
Varying Degrees of Adverse Monopoly         Varying Degrees of Adverse Monopoly 
Driver of Chaos              Driver of Chaos 
Driver of Authoritarian Monopoly         Driver of Authoritarian Monopoly      
 
Table 11. Perceptions of ‘Ideal Type’ Failures in State and Market Based 
Political Economies. 
 
When it comes to the core issue of legitimation and the political economy of 
force and violence, the research demonstrates that both the state and the 
market are now increasingly conceptualised in terms of symmetrical 
outcomes. Fundamentally questioning the legitimating rubrics and governance 
of ‘economic efficiency’ and ‘political democracy’, the research exposes high 
levels of epistemological uncertainly amongst the respondents surveyed.  
 
Echoing much of the libertarian literature presented in Chapter IV, the opinion 
formers no longer believe naval sea power is a necessary precondition of 
market activity to be solely funded by taxation. Like Rothbard and Hoppe, they 
believe a state monopoly of naval sea power would ultimately lead to 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness and are open to the idea that because “naval 
sea power requirements are unpredictable some of its costs may have to be 
covered by various private funding arrangements”.  
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Interconnected to the issue of funding is the idea of peace and force being a 
business. Here, echoing Molinari, Spencer, Herbert and Hoppe, the 
respondents no longer see the demonopolisation and privatisation of force as 
necessarily leading to worse outcomes in terms of violence or war. When 
pressed to compare the legitimating rubrics of the state (including democracy) 
and the free market (however defined and interpreted), many respondents 
echo Micklethwait’s point that while conflict may be bad for business, it is ‘only 
bad for some kinds of business’. Like him, they seem to believe that if 
nonaggression and peace were demonopolised, they have no idea whether 
‘entrepreneurs’ in private markets would offer better or worse outcomes 
(products) than ‘entrepreneurs’ in politics. While some believe they would, 
there are surprisingly high levels of uncertainty and/or controversy on this 
point. 
 
While some respondents believe a genuine private market system in naval 
defence would lead to “chaos”, “mercenary forces…ris[ing] up”, “civil war”, 
“anarchy”, “corruption” and “poor areas not being defended”; others believe 
that a genuine state-run system in naval defence would likewise lead to 
“chaos”, “totalitarian mass murder”, “corruption”, “act against the interests of 
peace and people” and “dictatorship” (see Tables 9 and 10 in Chapter V).  
 
Displaying the same epistemological tensions as found in De Puydt’s 
‘Panarchy’, Spencer’s ‘mutual assurance, joint-stock protection society’, and 
Herbert’s ‘voluntary protection associations’ (see Chapter IV), the 
respondents appear similarly to be bounded by a discourse on political 
economy that echoes the ideas of Birch (see Chapter IV) and Rhodes 
(Chapters II, V, and below). Whilst some respondents clearly see full-blown 
states as degenerating overtime only to rediscover bottom up markets (for 
example, the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union led to high degrees of 
‘market anarchy’ in Russia), many conversely agree with Rhodes and Birch 
that bottom up markets, eventually lead back to a rediscovery of differentiated 
polities, tax funded states and diverse forms of governance.  
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Finally, in responding openly to the statement that links a privately produced 
past to a more privatised future for British naval sea power, the respondents 
not only echo Rothbard’s view that it is difficult to predicatively detail such a 
future, but more importantly, Friedman’s belief that state failure will be the key 
driver of the private sector’s ongoing expansion.  
 
Just as Micklethwait believes state failure will provide “bigger and better 
opportunities” for the private sector, and that even if defence is a natural 
monopoly it will still be better provided by the market (Micklethwait, 1987: 6), 
so 76 per cent of the respondents surveyed either agreed with, or ‘agreed with 
caveats’, the statement that: “Just as in past centuries naval sea power was 
often privately provided, for example through the East India Company, so in 
the future more British naval sea power is going to be provided through 
greater privatisation” (see Table 12 below). Whether positive out of belief, or a 
sense of resignation, is unknown. However, what is clear is that it is within 
these ideational boundaries the research finds a changed discourse on 
governance to that of Weber.  
 
                               
                                 Agree/Agree with Caveats    Disagree 
 
All Respondents                 38           12 
 
Total Percentage      76%           24% 
 
 
 
Table 12. Overall Results to the Open-ended Question on Future Political 
Economy of British Naval Sea Power. 
 
For while some elite opinion formers are clearly critical of such developments 
over the last thirty years, a clear majority now accept that enhanced 
outsourcing, PPPs and privatisation will not only continue, but that many of 
the challenges and opportunities they represent are more similar to older 
models of political economy than many NPM theorists and others concerned 
with PA necessarily appreciate. Instead of ‘the state’ or ‘the market’ standing 
in isolated opposition, both of these ‘ideal type’ constructs are now more 
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powerfully viewed as wormholes in political economy and governance that 
overtime lead back into each other’s reality.  
 
It is in this context that Royal Navy outsourcing, PPPs and privatisation are 
indeed more powerfully viewed through the evolutionary prism of ‘back to the 
future’ and a differentiated forms of governance than any perspective which 
seeks to argue that they represent a major departure, or irrevocable deviation, 
from that which has gone before.  
 
For in reality, privatisation dates from the time in Ancient Greece when 
governments contracted out almost everything to the private sector (Parker 
and Saal, 2005). Even in the Roman Republic, private individuals and 
companies delivered most functions including construction, tax collection, 
military supplies and even religious sacrifices (Parker and Saal, 2005). 
Moreover, one of the earliest ideological movements in favour of privatisation 
came under China’s ‘golden age’ of the Han Dynasty. Taoism advocated the 
laissez-faire principle of ‘Wu wei’, or ‘do nothing’, in the belief that the best 
and strongest rulers were virtually invisible (Li and Zheng, 2001: 241). 
 
 
6.2 Timeships and the New Age of ‘Modernisation’ 
 
While policy makers and modern social scientists often neglect an explicit 
treatment of the temporal dimension (Pierson, 2004) and tend to 
decontextualise organisations and services from their broader, historic and 
evolutionary paths, as was pointed out in Chapter II, for Christopher Pollitt 
(Pollitt, 2008) this charge is particularly applicable to NPM theorists as well as 
the promoters of PA. As was stated earlier, Pollitt argues that the NPM 
paradigm has led to the replacement of longer-term administrative 
perspectives with shorter-term political incentives: “…knowledge of how things 
were done in the past seems increasingly irrelevant….The past is left a 
closed, and by implication an uninteresting and irrelevant book.” (Pollitt, 2008: 
9-10).  
 
 247 
From a policy perspective, the point about a closed past is particularly 
applicable to the Royal Navy: an institution that traces its roots back over a 
thousand years to the Saxon fleet (Savage, 1996: 84-107). To ignore the 
broader paths of evolution, policy and governance in its history, is not only to 
ignore an important temporal dimension but significant cycles in political 
economy that powerfully restrain present discourse and policy. While 
contemporary Royal Navy modernisations might appear ‘new’ given the time 
preferences of journalists, politicians and so-called NPM theorists, in reality, 
the research data presented merely reinforces the significance of older forms 
of practice and discourse which pre-date Weber’s monopoly state.  
 
When looking through the prism of a thousand years of Royal Navy history, 
and the actual history of privatisation, all manner of public private partnerships 
and governance not only abound, but they actually make periods of statist 
government look like the deviations from normality. Dependent on cyclical 
paths in political economy that oscillate between frameworks of top down 
statism and bottom up markets, the Navy has an almost uniquely long 
institutional history when it comes to embracing profound organisational 
change at irregular and critical junctures, including periods of economic crisis. 
Having always been dependent on paths of public and private partnership, the 
Royal Navy’s durability has been systematically punctuated by divergent 
organisational frameworks of political economy (Fig.9). For its ‘entrepreneurs’, 
there has always been a tension between the tax funded statism and the 
private market. 
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Figure 9. Cycles of Path Dependent Royal Navy Political Economy  
 
While the Royal Navy’s history emphasises non-linear forms of change within 
the broader boundaries of political economy, when set against contemporary 
notions of ‘modernisation’ and the ‘new’ (Moran, 2003) such language is 
exposed for being historically inaccurate. Away from the so-called NPM and 
PA theories, recent forms of Royal Navy PPPs, privatisation and increasing 
competition from the private sector, in reality, echo much older forms of 
governance, policy networks and differentiated, corporatist, elites and 
practices.  
 
For example, following the settlement of the Norman kings, a naval force was 
established in the mid-twelfth century that included formal command 
structures. Including ships provided by the Cinque Ports alliance (Rodger, 
1997), it was the Normans who established the historic post of Lord Warden 
of the Cinque Ports. A position that still exists today, it was this role that 
oversaw the five strategically important South East English ports of Hastings, 
Romney, Hythe, Dover and Sandwich (Cinqueports, 2013). In 1155, a Royal 
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of emergency (Rodger, 1997). Operating within a political economy of a 
partnership with the private sector these towns received: 
 
“Exemption from tax and tallage, Right of soc and sac, 
 tol and team, blodwit and fledwit, pillory and tumbrel, 
 infrangentheof and outfrangentheof, mundbryce,  
 waives and strays, flotsam and jetsam and ligan.” (Roskell, 1992: 751) 
 
Translated, the Cinque Ports enjoyed: 
 
 “Exemption from tax and tolls; self-government; 
 Permission to levy tolls, punish those who shed blood or flee justice, 
 punish minor offences, 
 Detain and execute criminals both inside and outside the port’s 
 jurisdiction, and punish breaches of the peace; 
 and possession of lost goods that remain unclaimed after a year, 
 goods thrown overboard, and floating wreckage.” (Winchelsea, 2012) 
 
Encouraging a market-oriented approach to the production and maintenance 
of naval sea power, these ports were freed from taxation and allowed high 
degrees of differentiated self-rule and governance, including the production of 
their own laws and court system. 
 
In the 16th century, Spain was Europe’s leading imperial power. In 1588, led 
by King Philip II, the country sent a fleet to invade England commanded by 
the Duke of Medina Sedonia (Hanson, 2004). Tasked to escort a Spanish 
invasion army across the southern area of the North Sea Spain had three 
objectives. The country wanted to stop English support for Dutch rebels in the 
Spanish Netherlands, halt attacks against Spanish possessions in the New 
World and it wanted to convert England back to Roman Catholicism (Hanson, 
2004). Endorsed by the Pope, the Spanish Armada contained a total of 131 
vessels of which a majority were privately armed merchantmen (Hanson, 
2004). While eventually defeated by fire ships, English naval squadrons and 
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by elements of the Dutch navy at the Battle of Gravelines (McDermott, 2005), 
the following year the English sent their own naval force against Spain.  
 
The English Armada was a fleet of naval vessels sent in 1589 to the Iberian 
coast by Queen Elizabeth I. Led by Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Norris the 
expedition was floated as a joint stock company with more than £80,000 of 
capital (Wernham, 1988). Of this, the Queen invested twenty-five per cent and 
the Dutch twelve per cent. The remaining balance, 63 per cent, came from a 
mixture of private merchants, guilds and noblemen (Wernham, 1988). Overall, 
the English Armada had three objectives. First, to destroy the Spanish Atlantic 
fleet. Second, to land at Lisbon and lead the Portuguese in a revolt against 
Spain and to continue south to establish a permanent base in the Azores. 
Third, to seize the Spanish treasure fleet as it returned from crossing the 
Atlantic to Cadiz (Mattingly, 2005). 
 
While logistical confusion and poor weather delayed the English fleet’s 
departure, and the Dutch failed to supply promised warships, more than thirty 
per cent of provisions were consumed in port. When the fleet did set sail, it 
comprised of sixty privately armed merchantmen, six royal galleons, sixty 
Dutch flyboats and more than twenty pinnaces (Wernham, 1988). While fear 
of becoming entrapped in the Bay of Biscay led Drake to move along the 
coast and attack A Coruna in Galicia, this venture resulted merely in the 
destruction of a small number of largely unimportant Spanish vessels. Two 
weeks later, with little to show for their efforts, the English turned their 
attentions to Lisbon. However, rumoured that a disaffected garrison defended 
it, in the event, an expected uprising failed to materialise. It was then agreed 
to concentrate on the establishment of a base in the Azores. However, by now 
the campaign had taken its toll and a sizeable proportion of Drake’s forces 
had been weakened by disease. It was therefore decided that a landing in the 
Azores was impossible and Drake subsequently agreed a final plan to retrieve 
what he could from the overall mission (Wernham, 1988). With only 2,000 
healthy men available and the number of viable ships depleted by storm 
damage, he took twenty ships and set sail for the Spanish treasure fleet. 
Struck by another heavy storm, he eventually decided to plunder Porto Santo 
 251 
in Madeira. However, his flagship, the Revenge, sprung a leak and almost 
foundered as it led the remainder of the fleet back to Plymouth (Werhnam, 
1988). Overall, the English Armada proved to be a costly and largely 
unsuccessful venture. It failed to generate financial gains for its investors or to 
press home England’s advantage from the defeat and dispersal of the 
Spanish fleet the previous year.  
 
In England, a permanent naval service did not come into being until the mid-
seventeenth century when the Fleet Royal came under the control of 
Parliament following the defeat of Charles I in the Civil War of 1642-1651. In 
1649, Robert Blake was appointed General at Sea (Admiral) whereupon he 
oversaw a substantial naval ship-building programme (Chambers & 
Chambers, 1852). Whilst Blake continued to accept a sizeable role for 
privateers and merchant vessels, he not only decided to keep a fleet at sea 
during the winter months but he instituted a range of new techniques by which 
to conduct landings and naval blockades. In 1653, he wrote his seminal 
‘sailing instructions’ and ‘fighting instructions’ which became the foundation of 
English naval tactics for much of the age of sail (Chambers & Chambers, 
1852). 
 
From the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century the dominant economic 
paradigm of Europe was mercantilism. During a period that witnessed the 
emergence of the nation-state (Croxton and Tischer, 2001), economic thinking 
was dominated by the idea that the prosperity of a nation depended on its 
supply of capital and that the volume of international trade represented a fixed 
quantity of wealth (Lipson, 1934). Believing that capital, as represented by 
bullion held by a state, was best increased by a positive balance of trade, 
governments played a deeply protectionist role in their economies. By 
encouraging exports and discouraging imports through tariffs and other 
barriers to trade, they also encouraged huge interventions in their domestic 
economies (Lipson, 1934). This was an age of patent letters and government 
monopolies. Often corrupting and inefficient, endless quotas and price ceilings 
invariably led to black markets. Internationally, mercantilism fuelled European 
wars. By encouraging nations to believe that prosperity was a zero sum game 
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fought over fixed ‘available markets’ (Wallerstein, 1980), the period saw the 
widespread adoption of Niccolo Machiavelli’s realpolitik and the supremacy of 
the raison d’etat (Machiavelli, 1961). This essentially pessimistic view of 
human nature was not only integrated into the work of Thomas Hobbes 
(Hobbes, 1998), but it provided a natural fit with puritan discourse. In order to 
protect assets in North America, England’s Parliament passed the first of the 
Navigation Acts (Elson, 1904: 216-219). Highly mercantilist devices, they 
required that only English ships could transport American goods.  
 
While by the early eighteenth century the Royal Navy had more ships than 
any other navy in the world, it nevertheless suffered from debt. As a 
consequence, the government developed a range of innovative means by 
which its financial position could be rectified. By encouraging the private 
purchase of Navy bonds, the Royal Navy’s cash flow and financial position 
improved (Knowles, 1919). With more resources and better tactics, higher 
morale led to ever-greater success. Following the eventual demise of 
privateering as a result of the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime 
Law (Natalino, 1988: 64; Schmidt, 2005: 75), it was only in the mid-nineteenth 
century that the Royal Navy became thought of as the representation of a 
nationalised Navy. During World War I and II, and for most of the twentieth 
century, it existed as an organisational exemplar of statism and ‘government’ 
right up until the modern era of ‘modernisation’, ‘partnership’ and 
‘governance’.  
 
From a temporal perspective, the overall sweep of Royal Navy history can be 
seen to have had identifiable patterns and trends in terms of its political 
economy. The idea that each event and epoch is unique and cannot be 
classified alongside another is inappropriate. As a set of institutions that has 
survived and evolved over a thousand years, it is interesting to note Meyer 
and Zuckers’ argument (Meyer and Zucker, 1989: 14) that “old organisations 
are less likely to die than are young ones” and that “what little evidence there 
is suggests that performance does not improve correspondingly with age” 
(Meyer and Zucker, 1989: 14). As mentioned in Chapter II (above), to Meyer 
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and Zucker older public sector organisations are particularly vulnerable when 
compared against market-based organisations, for: “As often as not public 
sector objectives are ill-defined and interests in and around public 
organizations are divergent from the outset. Public organisations, therefore, 
carry from their beginnings many of the liabilities that emerge only much later, 
if at all, in private firms” (Meyer and Zucker, 1989: 136).  
 
In seeking to identify the mechanisms and laws of Royal Navy path 
dependency and legitimacy in political economy, the work of Tichy (1980) 
would suggest that its organisation and cycles are ultimately bound by three 
timeless problems (again as mentioned in Chapter II). First, the Royal Navy 
has the technical design problem of how to arrange efficient production. 
Second, it has the political allocation problem of how it distributes resources 
and power. Third, it has the cultural and ideological problem of how it 
maintains and reinforces the normative glue that holds the organisation 
together. For Tichy, none of these problems are ever fully resolved. Instead, 
adjustments are always required and bounded by peaks and troughs that 
denote varying degrees of organisational difficulty. It is only when problems 
simultaneously occur in all three areas that an organisation faces a 
fundamental and systemic crisis. 
 
Viewed from the perspective of cyclical political economy (Fig.10 below), the 
Royal Navy and British naval sea power in general have never strayed into 
any ‘ideal type’ libertarian free market and/or command and control state 
model. In terms of the compass of political economy described in Chapters III 
and IV (above), British naval sea power has instead always tended to depend 
on paths ultimately bound by comparatively narrow discourses of cyclical 
socio-economic and socio-political power. 
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Figure 10. History of British Naval Sea Power in Path Dependent Political 
Economy  
 
Reliant on varying degrees of mercantilism, corporatism and legislative 
favour, ‘privateers’ have always benefited from real and metaphorical letters 
of regulatory ‘marque and reprisal’, just as politicians have always benefited 
from the market’s capacity to create wealth and drive progress. From the 
central direction and funding of the Saxon Fleet, to the public private 
partnerships of the Cinque Ports, the Joint Stock Company of the English 
Armada, the private purchase of Royal Navy bonds, and on through the age 
of the East India Company, privateering and prize money, British naval sea 
power has always tended to transition within the relatively tight tramlines of 
the state mercantilism-corporatism and market mercantilism-corporatism. 
Crucially, both the paradigms have variously blended private monies and 
interests with those of tax funded, sovereign, governance.  
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Conversely, the state’s subsequent outlawing of privateering, the move to a 
solely tax funded navy, and the part-nationalisation of ship building, denoted a 
world less rooted in any ideal type command and control state and more a 
political economy focused on the realities of industrial age state corporatism. 
Noting that in the real world, contemporary outsourcing, PPPs and 
privatisation often require major elements of tax funding and only involve 
limited forms of liberalisation and privatisation in such areas as ship building, 
defence research, dockyard provision and the manning of warships, this is 
less a reality rooted in ideal type libertarian free markets and more a political 
economy rooted in market corporatism (see 6.3 below). While in 2014 
privately funded and provided armed guards may be allowed to work on 
British merchant vessels in some parts of the world they can only do so with a 
license granted by sovereign authority.   
 
From the purview of a thousand years of naval history, there is strong 
evidence that away from the monopolistic and transitory simplicities of 
Weberian legitimacy, or the apparent ‘newness’ of ‘NPM’, ‘governance’, 
‘policy networks’ and even ‘differentiated polities’ there has often been 
influential agents in and around the state who proactively embrace elements 
of private protection and the legitimacy it represents in the key area of force 
and violence. Far from the idea that a re-emergence of private sector 
organisations represents a fundamental and irrevocable failure of the state, 
history suggests otherwise. The state’s capacity to mobilise private sector 
money, expertise and manpower, and vice versa (see 6.3 below), in the area 
of force and violence can equally be viewed as a legitimating signifier of 
power being dispersed and not located in the hands of any single, unitary, and 
therefore potentially unsustainable and de-legitimising authority. Empowering 
adaptation and replication overtime, the state can be viewed as perpetuating 
its authority because it often coordinates differently located, circulating and 
networked elites under a diverse legal arena, based on statute, common, 
mediated and arbitrated law (Benson, 2011), and by enabling a broad range 
of institutional and organisational forms situated within and across all four 
quartiles of the compass of political economy (see Chapters III and IV above) 
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which centre on: cooperative/mutualist; libertarian free market; state 
command and control; corporatist mixture.  
 
 
6.3  Coercion, Power and the Evolution of Statecraft  
 
It was Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations who first argued that: “People of 
the same trade and profession seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices….But though the law cannot hinder people 
of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing 
to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary” (Smith, 
1904, Book I, Chapter X). For Smith, in fearing the uncertainties of open and 
competitive markets and seeking high barriers to entry, entrepreneurs, 
businesspeople and privateers usually try to capture the mantle of the ‘public 
good’ to lobby politicians so that the are granted legislative and regulatory 
favour.  
 
Building on such corporatist relations, Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst (Hindess 
and Hirst, 1977) have gone so far as to argue that there can never be genuine 
or free markets in modern complex societies. The tax-funded coercion and 
statutory interventions of political and business elites are what ultimately 
govern all modern societies. Even the basic unit of modern capitalism, the 
firm, is itself built upon the interventionist statutes of limited liability and the 
politics of company law.  
 
The American political philosopher Ayn Rand displays a similar yet contrary 
view. For her, no society can ever be said to represent a pure ideal type 
construct of the command and control state because every society respects to 
some degree individual rights. Under her philosophy of ‘Objectivism’, property 
rights are not conceived as rights to things but instead the freedom to pursue 
courses of action with respect to material goods. The extent to which 
individuals have a degree of autonomy to pursue particular courses of action 
is the degree to which a society can be said to be capitalist. For basic 
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survival, the a priori existence of property rights means that at some level 
individuals cannot be kept from seeking material goods and therefore they 
must be free to some extent to utilise the goods they have acquired.  
 
If certain goods and services are to be guaranteed to individuals, as state 
welfare theorists suggest, then some people must be coerced to provide for 
others. Apart from the fact that what is guaranteed is conditional upon the 
productivity of some (and hence no guarantee at all), there is in principle no 
limit to what one could claim must be guaranteed. It is in this context that 
Rand concludes: “…this view of rights makes a mockery of the notion of a 
guarantee. For if there is no object to which one may not claim a right, then 
we could conceivably ask the state to guarantee all things equally, to 
everyone” (Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 1986: 169). For Rand, property rights 
are primarily articulated as the right to life. 
 
Just as Smith, Hindess and Hirst argue markets will always drive statism, so 
Rand argues states will always require markets. Echoing the research data, it 
is ultimately impossible to distinguish between the theoretical outcomes of 
both systems. For today’s elite opinion formers, both are viewed not as 
separate ideal types but as deeply interconnected parts of a broader cyclical 
and differentiated statecraft. 
 
 
6.4 Markets, Complexity and the Problematic Nature of 
Property Rights 
 
While Rand, Hindess and Hirst provide powerful insights into the boundaries 
of discourse surrouding state power and the a priori existence of markets, it is 
interesting to note that many commentators often analyse certain institutional 
arrangements as if they were describing an idealised market. For example, 
even though international law dictates that the world’s oceans are not subject 
to private property rights (Tanaka, 2012), Tangredi ignores such a reality 
when he asserts that: “…access to the sea is a metaphor for access to the 
global economy, both functioning in a similar marketplace fashion with a 
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linkage between resources invested and results” (Tangredi, 2002: 4). He 
continues: 
 
“In that sense, access to the sea can be thought of as the perfect 
economic market model. All parties benefit from an efficient market that 
allows free access and supply to match demand, but the profits to all 
parties in an efficient market are not equal. Those with better or more 
desirable products (facilitated by greater knowledge or production 
resources) make greater profits than those whose products are less 
desirable. Freedom of the seas as codified in international law allows 
benefits to be awarded in similar fashion – which drives the historical 
quest of nations for naval power.” (Tangredi, 2002: 4) 
 
Believing the sea, devoid of private property rights, to be representative of the 
“perfect economic market model”, Tangredi goes on to state that while “…the 
international law of the sea may provide for equal access to trade and 
resources…[and]…the means to defend such access against interdiction 
ultimately lie in the possession of an effective navy” (Tangredi, 2002: 4), for 
him: 
 
“To build such a navy – particularly one that can operate globally – 
 requires a level of state resources that is within the reach only of great 
 powers.” (Tangredi, 2002: 4) 
 
In imagining it possible to have a “perfect market” without private property 
rights and simply ignoring the role of privately produced naval sea power, 
Tangredi’s work is illustrative of a linguistic confusion and temporal 
decontextualisation that is all too common. While for many of the free market 
economists outlined in Chapter IV (above), genuine markets can only ever be 
defined by private property rights and can never be equated with 
mathematical notions of perfectionism (Bethel, 1988; Pipes, 2000), to Walter 
Block the world’s oceans are less about a “perfect economic market model” 
and more about what he terms ‘water socialism’: 
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 “Private property rights have benefited every arena of human 
 experience they have touched. And yet, there are vast areas of 
 human existence where private property rights play no role at all: 
 oceans, seas, rivers and other bodies of water” (Block, 2000: 2). 
 
For Block, many of the negative issues often associated with un-owned water, 
endangered species, declining fish stocks and environmental disasters, arise 
because without property rights there is no market to allocate scarce 
resources and incentives to encourage sustainable management. As an 
advocate of “full water privatisation” (Block, 2000: 8), he argues that all aqua, 
including the world’s oceans, should be privately owned. Noting that while 
bodies of water currently flow into each other, he believes only full-blown 
privatisation would encourage the development of technologies to demarcate 
and protect boundaries: 
 
“It takes no great leap of imagination to suppose that scientists and 
engineers would soon be able to offer new technology which could 
distinguish between “mine and thine”.” (Block, 2000: 9) 
  
Just as land has been fenced in recent centuries to delineate private property 
(Andreson, & Leal, 1997), so Block argues such rights at sea would facilitate a 
beneficial revolution across the ‘two thirds of the world’s surface’. For Block, 
private property rights are a prerequisite for the sustainable farming of fish 
and other forms of development. Debating the legal complexities of a river 
changing course, or that overflows and damages someone else’s land, he 
argues that such situations are only problematic because without property 
rights there can be no appropriate precedent and redress in law. 
Representative of a world away from the ideas of Tangredi, Block argues that 
the reason there is no private investment in managing otherwise unruly bodies 
of water is because there are few if any legal and economic incentives to do 
so (Block, 2000: 8-13; Anderson & Deal, 1991; Birgir, 1997: 57-62; Eckert, 
1979). While on the issue of equity, Block acknowledges that one of the major 
objections to water privatisation is the fear it would only benefit the rich, he 
argues capitalist economic development is not a zero sum game: 
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 “Under capitalism, the wherewithal enjoyed by both parties to a 
 transaction, at least in the ex ante sense, is increased. The rich do not 
 increase their income at the expense of the poor; rather, their income 
 rises by enriching the less well to do. It is no accident that the poor in 
 the more capitalist West enjoy a standard of living that is the envy of 
 those at the bottom of the income distribution, and even in the middle 
 of it, in countries infected by coercive socialism” (Block, 2000: 12). 
 
Beyond issues of interconnectedness, legal complexity and equity, Block also 
addresses monopoly and the fear that under a system of private property 
rights the sea would be governed by highly monopolistic and restrictive 
entities. For him, the logical concern would be that X owns an island that is 
surrounded by the sea and yet Z owns the surrounding waters. As a result, X 
could be stranded, essentially unable to move. Putting to the side the 
argument that the primary user of the water surrounding the island would in 
reality likely be X, if Z had first homesteaded the water and later X came upon 
it, it is highly unlikely X would have bought the island without the appropriate 
access and egress rights. If an amicable settlement could not be reached, 
Block suggests a final remedy might be through the use of a helicopter or an 
airplane. 
 
The key point about the ideas of Block and Tangredi is not who is right or 
wrong in this debate, or who has the better argumentation. The point is that 
both view the institutions and political economy of the world’s oceans very 
differently and as such they serve to highlight the deeply problematic nature of 
markets, property rights and the production and enforcement of economic, 
social and legal order. Ultimately, these authors powerfully juxtapose the 
epistemological and conceptual uncertainties highlighted by the research and 
to which NPM and PA theorists fail to attend. What is often called a free 
market in academe is nothing of the kind.  
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6.5  Modernising Governance - Back to the Future 
 
In her book, Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience, (Nowotny, 
1994), Helga Nowotny argues that the present also occupies some of the 
future as well as part of the past. Nowotny argues that the idea of the future, 
which once encapsulated utopian notions of progress, has recently given way 
to more problematic and dangerous notions in which control has to be exerted 
by planning ahead. For her, while the future has become more realistic, “the 
invocation of the future, in the name of which political action was justified for a 
long time, had to be reduced and at least partly transferred to the present”. 
(Nowotny, 1994: 50). 
 
For British elite opinion formers concerned with the Royal Navy and the future 
of British naval sea power, the institutions of Weberian force are no longer 
legitimated solely by a democratically monopolised state. The invocation of 
the future, on which change has been justified and planned over the last thirty 
years, not only draws deeply on the institutional realities of past cycles of 
political economy, but in so doing, its legitimation now more accurately takes 
the form of a democratically demonopolised market corporatism.  
 
Chiming with the work of Rhodes (Rhodes, 1988), the research suggests that 
instead of presiding over a coherent or unitary state, the British government is 
part of an increasingly fragmented and differentiated polity (Marsh, 2008: 
738).  Away from the traditional ‘Westminster model’ (see Chapter II above), 
which focused on the power of the prime minister and the cabinet, today’s 
reality is that the core functions of the British executive are increasingly 
focused on mobilising and integrating disparate resources across the public, 
private and voluntary sectors. By reformulating the core executive in 
essentially functional terms, key questions of naval defence and security are 
recast as merely matters of ‘who does what?’ and ‘who has what resources?’ 
(Rhodes, 1988). 
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From these axiomatic questions flow new forms of formal and informal 
institutional arrangement that interconnect governmental and independent 
agents in innovative and interdependent ways. Often sharing interests in 
particular modes of public policy formulation and implementation, their 
bargaining is negotiated within the context of networks that tend to prioritise 
the interests of established big business, professions and trades unions 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
 
In terms of governance, such networks frequently display significant degrees 
of autonomy from the state. While central government may indirectly and 
inexactly seek to guide what are often self-organising and semi-autonomous 
corporatist networks, an inexorable transition from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ means that a dynamic mix of markets, bureaucracies and 
networks are increasingly re-engineering and, to some extent, ‘hollowing out’ 
key elements of the twentieth century Weberian state (Rhodes, 2007: 1243-
1264). 
 
The research not only serves to underline the empirical shift away from a 
unitary to a variously differentiated polity, in which rule and governance 
increasingly occur in the context of complex institutional and decentralised 
arrangements, but its findings also support Bevir and Rhodes’ (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006 and 2010) assertion that a decentered paradigm of governance 
reflects the methodological realities of ‘situated agency’ (see Chapter V 
above). Institutions, practices and socialisation cannot predetermine people’s 
beliefs and/or behaviour. Instead, ideation and action merely represent 
contingent, negotiated choices. People’s beliefs, traditions and institutions 
change and adapt as required by circumstance. Just as ideation and action 
cannot be explained by a priori beliefs and/or traditions but are instead 
produced, tempered and modified overtime, so the newly emergent situated 
agency of the respondents becomes clear.  
 
While according to Anderson and Giford (Anderson & Giford, 1981) naval 
officials strategically positioned within the early nineteenth century state 
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apparatus lobbied against privateering to promote their monopoly interests 
(see Chapter II), so the research finds that from the perspective of an ‘ideal 
type’ free market, it is the naval officers who are now the most supportive, 
and/or feel the inevitability of free market political economy most strongly: 
over and above the other categories surveyed (see Tables 6 and 7 in Chapter 
V). While it is difficult to infer causal reasoning to the data, the research 
demonstrates that when it comes to embracing the market-oriented paradigm 
it is the naval officers who reflect the most significantly changed ‘situated 
agency’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006 and 2010) and who are most open to the 
discourse and controversies surrounding the hollowing out of the state and 
differentiated governance. More than any other group surveyed, their beliefs, 
traditions and institutions are changing and adapting as required by their 
interpretation of circumstance.  
 
However, far from undermining the state’s quintessential function and signifier 
of being, the changing settlement highlighted in the research can instead be 
viewed as simply redefining sovereign authority within much longer 
established boundaries and paths. In updating the political economy by which 
the state and the market derive their interdependence, the Royal Navy once 
again finds itself modernising, back to the future. In echoing older forms of 
market-oriented mercantilism, differentiation and governance, recent decades 
have not only witnessed predominantly corporatist and regulated forms of 
outsourcing, PPPs and privatisation, but the state and the market have 
conjoined to significantly revise the ways in which force and violence are 
produced and legitimated. 
 
Echoing changes in naval sea power, Britain has again started to witness 
significant changes in the way other aspects of governance and force are 
provided in other key areas. As was mentioned earlier, for every state 
policeman and woman there are now two private security guards (Benson, 
2011). Across increasing swathes of the country a burgeoning private security 
sector abounds. In stores, shopping malls, residential estates and many office 
buildings, private security patrols and guards are increasingly prevalent. While 
in Britain there are now estimated to be more than 1,000 private ‘gated 
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communities’, in the United States of America there are more than 20 million 
people (6 per cent of the population) living in areas with their own privately 
funded patrol services (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). 
 
Today, an increasing number of the UK’s prisons are run by private 
companies (including Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Parc in Wales; HMP 
Altcourse near Liverpool, HMP Lowdham Grange near Nottingham, HMP 
Ashfield near Bristol, HMP Forest Bank near Manchester, HMP Rye Hill near 
Rugby, HMP Dovegate in Staffordshire, HMP Bronzefeild in Middlesex, HMP 
Wolds in Yorkshire, HMP Doncaster and HMP Peterborough), and during the 
last twenty five years private arbitration and mediation services have grown 
rapidly (Prison Reform Trust, 2013). As the country’s publicly funded court 
and prison system reportedly strains to keep up with demand so ever more 
people are seeking legal redress through a range of privately funded and/or 
provided mediation and arbitration services (Medication and Arbitration, 
2013).  
 
Right across the institutional spectrum concerned with the production of force 
and violence, Weber’s monopoly nation state is slowly giving way to 
significant change in political economy and governance that once again 
conjoins legislative favour and market provision. Broadly corporatist, strongly 
differentiated and suggestive of a limited hollowing out of the state, it 
represents a modern extension of an essentially historic and mercantilist past.  
 
 
6.6 Conclusion: Contribution to Knowledge and Future Research on UK 
Exceptionalism in Governance 
 
Neglectful of the complexities and symmetries across the dimensions of time, 
property rights and differentiated power, this study has concluded that the 
NPM and the PA paradigms invariably underestimate the consequential 
similarities, for good and/or bad, of both systems’ outcomes. Moreover, while 
PA views government as the primary owner, driver and/or motivator of reform, 
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and NPM stresses the market, this study has shown that both perspectives 
fail to acknowledge the degree to which core statecraft and governance as 
defined by the production of force and violence is rarely, if ever, a matter for 
either an ‘idealised state’ or a ‘free market’. Instead, force and violence are 
invariably organised within a spectrum that compresses and conjoins varying 
degrees of differentiated and decentred statism with varying degrees of 
differentiated and decentred market; and where in terms of outcomes, both 
these ideal types are more powerfully viewed as leading back into each others 
mode of governance and complexity. 
 
It is in this context that government and governance, centralisation and de-
centralisation, unity and fragmentation, all denote constantly evolving, path 
dependent realities that not only speak volumes about the contingency of the 
human condition but also the limitations of the language of ‘the market’ and 
‘the state’. It is for reasons of complexity and similarity, that today’s opinion 
formers find it so difficult to articulate clear, consequential and epistemological 
differences between notions of market and state failure in areas of naval sea 
power and therefore specify and codify legitimacy in the political economy of 
force and violence. It is because each system ultimately mirrors the other in 
more profound and surprising ways than is popularly and linguistically 
recognised, that the Royal Navy once again finds itself modernising back to a 
future rooted in older forms of discourse in the areas of public management, 
administration and governance. A century on, we are all increasingly living 
with a highly corporatist and mixed political economy that Weber did not fully 
appreciate or foresee.  
 
As a piece of research, this study has contributed to knowledge by informing 
the political economy of New Public Management theory and Public 
Administration. By detailing empirically and framing theoretically the ways in 
which elite attitudes to the political economy of legitimated force are changing, 
the research has challenged what many commentators previously believed to 
be an a priori function of the Weberian nation state, namely, the state’s 
monopoly use of force, with the actual views of those who hold positions of 
power and influence in and around one of its most historic ‘ideal type’ 
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institutions: the Royal Navy. It is in this context that the research has found 
elite opinion formers to be more challenging of the legitimating rubrics of 
‘economic efficiency’ and ‘political democracy’ than has previously been 
understood. 
 
Finally, although it is not within the purview of this study to plan or specify 
future research, an initial recommendation can be made legitimately. In further 
exploring the issues raised by this thesis, it would be interesting to update and 
re-run the research through an international and comparative analysis, and 
one that involves respondents from other military services such as armies and 
air forces. It would not only be useful to gauge the cleavages between 
different nations and their respective military services, therein further testing 
ideas around UK exceptionalism and ideology (see Chapter V above), but 
also to include elite opinion formers from within each nation’s respective and 
international private military sector(s).  
 
As a piece of international research for the early twenty first century, such a 
study would not only inform a range of subjects, including political economy 
and the social sciences, but it may also prove invaluable in the fields of 
international relations and strategic studies. As opinion formers across a 
range of settings and disciplines continue to consider and debate the realities 
and consequences of the shifting sands of governance and statecraft, so 
those institutions and arrangements which come to fill the hollows and gaps of 
the world after Weber will be of profound interest and importance. 
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Appendix I 
 
The Pilot Study 
 
 
The small-scale pilot study was conducted between June and October 2011. 
The twenty opinion formers included the following list:  
 
 
Two national defence journalists  (Guardian and Telegraph) 
Two local journalists    (Portsmouth and Plymouth)  
Two civil servants    (Ministry of Defence and HM Treasury)  
Two officers     (Navy/Marine)  
Two Members of Parliament           (Conservative and Labour)  
Two academics    (Kings College and Oxford)   
Two think tank policy experts  (Left and Right)  
Two MPs     (Labour and Conservative)  
Party political advisers    (Conservative and Labour) 
Electronic media journalists   (TV and Blogger)  
 
 
Designed to inform and assist with the development of the final survey-
questionnaire, the small-scale pilot survey-questionnaire used was structured 
and worded as follows. 
 
 
Section A. Opinions towards Royal Navy Modernisation 
 
Q1. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A1. Today, the British dockyards of the Royal Navy have been largely 
privatised. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the navy and has 
improved the quality of its support facilities.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Q2. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A2. In the modern world there is no reason why the training of Royal Navy 
nuclear submarine personnel cannot be privatised.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q3. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A3. There is no reason for the Royal Navy to actually own its war ships. 
Instead, it would be more efficient if its ships were privatised.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q4. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A4. All Royal Navy personnel training should be contracted out to the private 
sector.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q5. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A5. Today’s Royal Navy is parlously under-funded by government taxation.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q6. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A6. In the future, Britain’s naval sea power should not simply be funded from 
taxation. One can imagine a time when various forms of private money could 
be used to fund naval sea power.   
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Q7. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A7.  In the future, to maximise efficiency and innovation, private property 
rights should be apportioned by the international law of the sea. Today, it is 
inappropriate that most areas of sea are not privately owned.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Section B. Opinions towards the political economy of security and 
defence 
 
Q8. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A8. If a genuine free market in security and defence services existed, 
government would still have to intervene to stop problems of monopoly.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q9. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A9. If a genuine free market in security and defence services existed, 
government would still have to intervene to help protect people from crime, 
violence and threats to their property. 
 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q10. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A10. If a genuine private market in security and defence arrangements 
existed, government would still have to intervene in times of crisis – for 
example to help protect people from such factors as contagious disease, 
terrorism and threat of invasion. 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Q11. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A11.  If a genuine free market in security and defence services existed, this 
would not stop some of it being run by government because security and 
defence are natural public goods.   
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q12. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A12. Because security and defence requirements are unpredictable some 
costs will always have to be covered by taxation – private arrangements 
such as corporate funding, insurance, donation and sponsorship could 
never do it all. 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q13. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A13. If security and defence services were monopolised by the state, private 
security and defence arrangements would still have to be allowed to stop 
problems of monopoly.  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q14. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A14. If security and defence services were monopolised by the state, private 
security and defence arrangements would still have to be allowed to help 
protect people from crime, violence and threats to their property. 
 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Q15. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A15. If security and defence services were monopolised by the state, private 
security and defence arrangements would still have to be allowed – for 
example to help protect people from such factors as contagious disease, 
terrorism and or threat of invasion. 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q16. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A16.  If the production of security and defence were monopolised by the state, 
this would not stop some of it being run by the private sector because security 
and defence are natural private goods.   
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q17. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement: 
 
A17. Because security and defence requirements are unpredictable some 
costs will always have to be covered by private arrangements such as 
corporate funding, insurance, donation and sponsorship. 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Section C. Parameters in the Private Security and Defence Debate  
 
Q18. In security and defence, what would be the consequences of a genuine, 
full blown, private market system? [Open response] 
 
 
 
 
 
Q19. In security and defence, what would be the consequences of a genuine, 
full blown, state system? [Open response] 
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Q20. In security and defence, which is more prone to problems of monopoly?  
 
The state   The Market  
 
 
Q21. How do you react to the following statement?  
 
“Just as in past centuries British naval sea power was often privately provided 
– for example through the East India Company – so, in the future, more 
defence and security is going to be delivered by the private sector.”  
 
Open response: 
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Appendix II 
 
The Respondents 
 
 
Journalists: National Defence Commentators 
1. Defence Editor     The Times 
2.  Defence Correspondent    Daily Telegraph  
3.  Defence and Security Correspondent Guardian 
4.  Defence and Diplomatic Correspondent Independent 
5.  Defence Correspondent   Financial Times 
6.  Defence Correspondent   Daily Mail 
7.  Defence Correspondent   The Sun 
8. Defence Correspondent   Mirror 
9.  Defence Correspondent   BBC 
10.  Editor       Navy News 
 
Politicians: Members of the House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee  
11.  Conservative MP (Chairman)  North East Hampshire  
12.  Conservative MP    Canterbury and Whitstable 
13.  Conservative MP    Salisbury 
14.  Conservative MP    Portsmouth North  
15.  Conservative MP    Beckenham  
16.  Liberal Democrat MP   Colchester 
17.  Labour MP     Dunfermline and West Fife 
18.  Labour MP     Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney 
19.  Labour MP     Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock  
20.  Labour MP     Bridgend  
 
Policy Experts: Senior Policy and Think Tank Players 
21.  Senior Adviser to the PM    No.10 Downing Street 
22.  Defence Adviser to the PM   No.10 Downing Street 
23.  Permanent Secretary    HM Treasury 
24.  Recent Secretary of State for Defence MP for North Somerset   
25.  Chief Executive     Wilton Park 
26.  Director      Adam Smith Institute 
27.  General Secretary     Fabian Society 
28.  Director      RUSI  
29.  Director      Chatham House 
30.  Chief Executive     UK National Defence Assoc.  
 
Academics: Royal Navy, Defence and Security Academics  
31.  Professor of Naval History   Kings College London 
32.  Professor of Naval History   Oxford University 
33.  Professor of Naval History   University of Salford   
34. Professor of Maritime Studies  King’s College London 
35  Senior Lecturer in Naval History  Kings College London  
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36.  Associate Professor of History  Britannia Naval College 
37.  Curator     National Maritime Museum 
38.  Professor of International Security University of Nottingham 
39.  Director Centre for Intelligence/Security Brunel University 
40.  Director, Mackinder Programme  London School of Economics 
     
Military: Senior Royal Naval Service Officers 
41. Admiral       Royal Navy  
42. Vice Admiral     Royal Navy 
43. Admiral      Royal Navy  
44. Admiral      Royal Navy 
45. Admiral      Royal Navy 
46. Major General      Royal Marines 
47. Admiral      Royal Navy 
48. Commander     Royal Navy 
49. General      Royal Marines 
50. Field Marshal/former CDS   Tri-service 
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Appendix III 
 
Telephone Questionnaire on 
 Royal Navy Mondernisation and British Naval Sea Power 
 
 
Section A. Opinions on Royal Navy Modernisation 
 
Q.1 Dockyard Privatisation 
Q1. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A1. Today, the British dockyards of the Royal Navy have been largely 
privatised. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the navy and has 
improved the quality of its support facilities? 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q.2 Privatisation of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service 
Q2. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A2. Today, the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service has been privatised and 
Serco now runs these services. This has led to greater efficiency gains for the 
Royal Navy and has improved the quality of its support services? 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q.3 Private Military Personnel to Defend UK Merchant Ships  
Q3. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A3. It is right that British merchant ships carry private guards to defend them 
from pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean? 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q.4 Privatisation of Royal Navy Personnel Training 
Q4. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement: 
 
A4. All Royal Navy personnel training should be privatised? 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
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Q.5. Privatisation of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
Q4. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A4. Some of Britain’s largest naval ships are in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The 
RFA should be privatised?  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
 
Q.6 Privatisation of Royal Navy Warships 
Q6. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A6. There is no reason for the Royal Navy to actually own many of its war 
ships. Instead, it would be more efficient if its ships were privatised?  
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q.7 Public Private Partnerships in Sea Power 
Q7. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A7. In the future, Britain’s naval sea power should not simply be funded from 
taxation. One can imagine a time when various forms of private money will be 
used to fund the production of naval sea power?   
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
Section B. Notions of market and state failure in the production of 
British naval sea power 
 
Q8 Naval Sea Power as a Public Good 
Q8. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A8.  If a market in naval defence existed this would not stop some of it being 
run by government because naval sea power is a natural public good?   
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Q9 Inadequacy of Private Funding of Naval Sea Power 
Q9. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being ‘strongly 
agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following statement? 
 
A9. Because naval sea power requirements are unpredictable some costs will 
always have to be covered by taxation – private arrangements such as 
corporate funding, insurance, donation and/or sponsorship could never 
do it all? 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q10 Naval Sea Power as a Private Good 
Q10. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement? 
 
A10.  If the state attempted to monopolise naval defence this would not stop 
some of it being run privately because naval sea power is a natural private 
good?   
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q11 Inadequacy of Private Funding of Naval Sea Power  
Q11. On a scale of 1–10, with 1 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 10 being 
‘strongly agree’ can you please tell me what you think of the following 
statement? 
 
A11. Because naval sea power requirements are unpredictable some costs 
will always have to be covered by private arrangements such as corporate 
funding, insurance, donation and/or sponsorship? 
 
 1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Q12 Future of Privatisation in British Naval Sea Power 
Q12. How do you react to the following statement: “Just as in past centuries 
naval sea power was often privately provided – for example through the East 
India Company – so in the future more British naval sea power is going to be 
provided through greater privatisation”?   
 
 
 
 	  
 
 
 278 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Abbot, A. (1997) ‘Of Time and Space’, Social Forces, Volume 75. 
 
Abbot, A. (2001) Time Matters: On Theory and Method, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Adam B., Whipp, R. and Sabelis, I (2002) ‘Choreographing Time and 
Management: Traditions, Developments, and Opportunities’, in R. Whipp, B. 
Adam and I. Sabelis (eds.), Making Time: Time and Management in Modern 
Organisations, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Adams, G. (2000) Uncovering the Political Philosophy of the New Public 
Management, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Volume 22, Number 3.  
 
Alford, J. and Flyn J., (2013) Rethinking Public Service Delivery, London, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Allen, E., and Seaman, C. (2007) ‘Likert Scales and Data Analyses’, Quality 
Progress. 
 
Anderson, G. M., & Gifford, A., (1991) Privateering and the Private Production 
of Naval Power, CATO Journal.  
 
Andres, L. (2012) Designing and Doing Survey Research, Thousdan Oaks, 
California, Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Andreson, T. L., & Leal D. R., (1997) Enviro-Capitalists: Doing Good While 
Doing Well, Lanham MD, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
 
 279 
Andrews, M. and D. Moynihan (2002) Why Reforms Do Not Always Have to 
Work to Succeed: A tale of Two Managed Competition Initiatives, Public 
Performance & Management Review, Volume 25, Number 3.  
 
Arrow, K. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, New Haven, Yale 
University Press.  
 
Arrow, K. (1985) The Economics of Agency, in J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser, 
(Eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston, Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Arthurs, H. W., (1985) Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal 
Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press. 
 
Atkinson, R., & Flint, J., (2004) The Fortress UK? Gated Communities, The 
Spatial Revolt of the Elites and Time-Space Trajectories of Segregation, CNR 
Paper 17, London, Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
Avant, D. (2005) Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, 
New York, Cambridge University Press.  
 
Babbie, E. R., (2005) The Basics of Social Research, Belmont, California 
Thomson Wadsworth. 
 
BAe Systems Investor Brief (30 September 2004) [online]. Available from 
http://production.investis.com/investors/shareholder/comms/2004comms/2004
-09-30/#c2  (Accessed 20 October 2011). 
 
Barber, M (2007) Instruction to Deliver: Tony Blair, Public Services and the 
Challenges of Achieving Targets, London, Politico’s. 
 
Barzelay, M. (1992) Breaking Through Bureaucracy, Sacramento, California, 
University of California Press. 
 280 
 
Baum, J. and Singh, J. (eds.) (1994) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations, 
New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
BBC News (19 October 2010) ‘Defence review: Cameron unveils armed 
forces cuts’ [online]. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
11570593 (Accessed 15 November 2010). 
 
BBC News, (30 October 2011) ‘Somali piracy: Armed guards to protect UK 
ships’ [online]. Available from  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15510467 (Accessed, 17 November 2011). 
 
BBC News (16 January 2012) ‘Royal yacht idea considered by Cameron’ 
[online]. Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16578231 (Accessed, 
12 July 2012). 
 
Beaver, P. (1996) Britain’s Modern Royal Navy, Patrick Stephens.  
 
Beedall, R. (2006) The Recent History of the Royal Navy, Navy Matters 
[online]. Available from http://navy-matters.beedall.com/history.htm 
(Accessed, 4 March 2011). 
 
Behn, R. (2001) Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Brookings Institution 
Press. 
 
Bell, T. W., (1991) Privately Produced Law, Legal Notes No.16, London, 
Libertarian Alliance.  
 
Benson, B. L., (1990) The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State, San 
Francisco, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy. 
 
Benson, B. L., (2011) The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State, New 
York, Independent Publishers Group. 
 
 281 
Berry, M. (18 July 2006) MoD Staff Strike Over Plans to Privatise Training, 
Personnel Today. 
 
Bethell, T. (1998) The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosperity Through the 
Ages, New York, St. Martin’s Press.  
 
Bevir, M., Rhodes, R. A. W. and Weller, P. (2003) ‘Traditions of Governance: 
Interpreting the Changing Role of the Public Sector’, Public Administration, 
Volume 81, Number 1. 
 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W (2006) Governance Stories, Abingdon, Oxford, 
Routledge. 
 
Bevir. M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2010) The State as Cultural Practice, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Birch, P. (1998) Anarcho-Capitalism Dissolves into City States, Legal Notes 
No.28, London, Libertarian Alliance. 
 
Birgir, R., (1997) Fencing the Oceans, Regulation. 
 
Blakely, E. J., and Snyder, M. G., (1999) Fortress America: Gated 
Communities in the United States, Washington DC, Brookings Institution 
Press. 
 
Blanchard, L., Hinnant, C., and Wong, W., (1998) Market-based Reforms in 
Government: Towards a Social Subcontract? Administration and Society, 
Volume 30, Number 56. 
 
Block, W. (2000) Water Privatization, Auban Alabama, Ludwig Von Mises 
Institute. 
 
Boston, J., Martin, J. Pallot, J., and Walsh P., (1996) Public Management: The 
New Zealand Model, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 282 
 
Brewer, J. (1989) The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 
1688-1783, New York, Alfred and Knopf. 
 
Brown, D. (1987) The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, Barnsley, Pen & 
Sword Books.  
 
Buchanan, J. (1978) Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory,  
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Buthe, T. (2002) ‘Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use 
of Narratives as Evidence’, American Political Science Review, Volume 93, 
Number 3.  
 
Carrington, D. (2001) ‘Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service Vessels’ [online]. 
Available from http://website.lineone.net/~david-
carrington/Militaria/RoyalNavy/RMAS.htm (Accessed 10 March 2010). 
 
Cartner, J. A. C., (30 January 2013) ‘Typhon is Not a Private Navy’, Special to 
Piracy Daily [online]. Available from http://gcaptain.com/typhon-private-navy/ 
(Accessed, 18 February 2013). 
 
Chambers, W., & Chambers R., (Eds) (29 May 1852) Admiral Robert Blake in 
Chamber’s Edinburgh Journal, Volume 17, New Series. 
 
Cinque Ports (2013) Cinque Ports [online]. Available from 
http://www.cinqueports.org/ (Accessed 4 January 2013). 
 
Clark, I. ‘The Security State’ in Held, D and McGrew, A. (eds) (2003) The 
Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalisation Debate, 
Cambridge, Polity. 
 
 283 
Clay, J. (1994) Public-Institutional Processes: Beyond Conventional Wisdom 
about Management Processes, Administration and Society, Volume 26, 
Number 2.   
 
Coase, R. H., (1974) The Lighthouse in Economics, Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol.17. 
 
Cockett, R. (1994) Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic 
Counter-Revolution 1931-1983, London, Harper Collins. 
 
Cohen, S., and Eimicke, W., (1995) Ethics and the Public Administrator, The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 537, 
Number 1. 
 
Cohen, S., and Eimicke, W. (1997) Is Public Entrepreneurship Ethical? A 
Second Look at Theory and Practice, Presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. 
 
Committee of the Libertarian Alliance (1981) Purpose and Strategy of the 
Libertarian Alliance, London, Libertarian Alliance. 
 
Conservative Party (1979) Conservative Party Manifesto, London, 
Conservative Central Office. 
 
Contamine, P. (1984) War in the Middle Ages, New York, Basil Blackwell. 
 
Cook, B, J., (1998) Politics, Political Leadership and Public Management, 
Public Administration Review, Volume 58, Number 3.  
 
Cooper, P., J. (2003) Governing by Contract: Challenges and Opportunities 
for Public Managers, Washington DC, CQ Press. 
 
Coser, L., (1977) Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and 
Social Context, San Diego, Harcourt. 
 284 
 
Costello, M. (18 February 2011) ‘Private Fleet to Fight Pirates’, The Times, 
London. 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2003) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
Methods Approaches (2nd ed.), Thousdand Oaks, California, Sage 
Publications. 
 
Croxton, D., and Tischer, A., (2001) The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical 
Dictionary, New York, Greenwood. 
 
Dagdeviren (2006) ‘Revisiting privatisation in the context of poverty 
alleviation’, Journal of International Development, Vol.18. 
 
Daily Telegraph (29 November 2011) ‘Navy and RAF search and rescue 
privatised despite Prince William objections’ [online]. Available from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8921347/Navy-and-RAF-
search-and-rescue-privatised-despite-Prince-William-objections.html 
(Accessed 8 December 2011). 
 
Davies, S. (1987) The Private Supply of ‘Public Goods’ in Nineteenth Century 
Britain, Historical Notes No.3, Libertarian Alliance, London. 
 
Davis, G., Weller, P., Craswell, E. and Eggins, S. (1999) ‘What Drives 
Machinery of Government Change?’ Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, 1950-1997’, Public Administration, Volume 77, Number 1. 
 
Dawes, J. (2008) ‘Do Data Characteristics Change According to the Number 
of Scale Points Used? An Experiment Using 5-point, 7-point and 10-Point 
Scales’, International Journal of Market Research, Volume 50, Number 1.  
 
Defence Management (2006) ‘Availability Contracting’, [online]. Available from 
http://www.defencemanagement.com/article.asp?id=211&content_name=Proc
 285 
urement%20and%20Supply%20Chain%20Management&article=5500 
(Accessed, 4 March 2011). 
 
Defence Management (8 December 2010) ‘RFA privatisation ruled out’, 
[online]. Available from 
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=14962 (Accessed 
11 March 2012). 
 
Delbruck, H. (1975) History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of 
Political History, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press. 
 
De Leon, L., and Denhardt R. (2000) The Political Theory of Reinvention, 
Public Administration Review, Volume 60, Number 2. 
 
Den Uyl, Douglas, and Rasmussen, D. B., (eds) (1986) The Philosophical 
Thought of Any Rand, Illinois, Illinois University Press. 
 
Denham, A. (1997) British Think-Tanks and the Climate of Opinion, London, 
Routledge.  
 
De Puydt, P. E., Panarchy, translated by Adrian Falk, in John Zube (ed) 
(1975) An A.B.C. Against Nuclear War, Peace Plans, Berrima, N.S.W. 
 
Department of Defense, (27 March 1995) ‘DOD is Satisfied that Deal between 
Allison Engine Co. and Rolls Royce Does not Endanger National Security’, 
DoD News Release, Washington DC. 
Dickinson, L. (2005) Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the 
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, William and Mary Law 
Review, 47.  
Dillman, D. A. (1978) Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method, 
New York, Wiley-Interscience. 
 
 286 
Doherty, B. (2008) Radicals for Capitalism: A Freewheeling History of the 
Modern American Libertarian Movement, Washington DC, Public Affairs US. 
 
Dunleavy, P., (1989) ‘The Architecture of the British Central State’, Public 
Administration, Volume 67.  
 
Dunleavy, P., and C. Hood (1994) ‘From Old Public Administration to New 
Public Management’, Public Money and Management’, Volume 14, Number 3.  
 
Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S. and Tinker, J. (2005) ‘New Public 
Management is Dead – Long Live Digital-Era Governance’, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, Volume 16. 
 
Dunleavy, P. J, and L. Carrera (2011) ‘Government Productivity in UK Social 
Security Has Not Grown Across Two Decades to 2008 – Largely Because 
DWP Senior Civil Servants Blocked Any Move to “Digital Era” Services’, 
British Politics and Policy Blog 
(http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/01/26/government-productivity-
in-uk-social-security-has-not-grown), accessed April 2012. 
 
Dunn, W, N. and Miller, D, Y., (2007) ‘A Critique of the New Public 
Management and The Neo-Weberian State: Advancing a Critical Theory of 
Administrative Reform’, Public Organisation Review, Volume 7.   
 
Dunsire, A., and Hood, C. (1989) Cutback Management in Public 
Bureaucracies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Eckert, R, D., (1979) The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the 
Law of the Sea, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press. 
 
Eikenberry, A., and Kluver, J. (2004) The Marketization of the Nonprofit 
Sector: Civil Society at Risk? Public Administration Review, Volume 64, 
Number 2.  
 
 287 
Elson, H. W., (1904) History of the United States of America, New York, The 
Macmillan Company. 
 
Evans, K., and G. Wamsley. (1998) The Blacksburg Manifesto and Agential 
Leadership, in Jay M. Shafritz (Ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Public 
Policy and Administration, Henry Holt and Company. 
 
Evans, T. (ed) (1991) An Arresting Idea: The Management of Police Services 
in Modern Britain, London, Adam Smith Institute. 
 
Evans, T, (1996) Conservative Radicalism: A Sociology of Conservative Party 
Youth Structures and Libertarianism 1970-1992, Oxford, Berghahn Books. 
 
Fairburn, W. A., (1945-1955) Merchant Sail (Six Volumes), Center Lovell, 
Maine, Fairburn Marine Educational Foundation. 
 
Ferguson, N. (2006) The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred, London, 
Alan Lane. 
 
Ferguson, N. (2009) The Ascent of Money, London, Penguin. 
 
First Sea Lord, (2012) Navies in An Age of Austerity, Speech delivered at the 
Maritime Security Challenges 2012 Conference Banquet, Victoria, British 
Colombia, Canada on Tuesday 2 October 2012. 
 
Flynn, M. W., (ed) (1965) Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain by Edwin Chadwick 1842, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press.  
 
Flynn, N. (2007), Public Sector Management (5th Edition), London, Sage.   
 
Foddy, W. H. (1994) Constructing Questions for Interviews and 
Questionnaires: Theory and Practice in Social Research (New ed.). 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 288 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2002) Private Military Companies: 
Options for Regulation 2001-2002, London, The Stationery Office.   
 
Frederickson, H., G. (1997) The Spirit of Public Administration, San 
Francisco, California, Jossey-Bass. 
 
Friedman, D. (1978) Police, Courts and Laws On the Market in The Machinery 
of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism, Chicago, Open Court Publishing.  
 
Friedman, D. (1999) Should Medicine be a Commodity? [online]. Available 
from 
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Medicine_Commodity/Medicine_C
ommodity.html (Accessed 17 December 2010). 
 
Garitee, J. R., (1977) The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering 
Business as Practised by Baltimore During the War of 1812, Middletown, 
Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press. 
 
Gillham, B. (2008) Observation Techniques: Structured to Unstructured, Real 
World Research, London and New York, Continuum.  
 
Glubb, J. (1973) Soldiers of Fortune: The Story of the Marmalukes, London, 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
 
Golembiewski, R. (1991) Refounding Public Administration, The Journal of 
Politics, Volume 53, Number 4.  
 
Competition Commission (1995) British Aerospace Public Limited Company 
and VSEL Plc: A Report on the Proposed Merger, London, Stationary Office 
Books.  
 
Goodin, R., and Tilly, C. (eds) (2006) The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 
Political Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 289 
 
Gould, S. J. (1988) Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books. 
 
Greveld, M. V., (1999) The Rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Griffith, G. T., (1968) The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World, Groningen, 
The Netherlands, Boom’s Boekhuis. 
 
Grimsey, D., and Lewis, M. K., (2004) Public–Private Partnerships: The 
Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and Project Finance, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
 
Grove, E. J., (2005) The Royal Navy Since 1815: A New Short History, 
London, Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Guardian (16 January 2012) ‘New royal yacht proposal backed by David 
Cameron’ [online]. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jan/16/royal-yacht-backed-david-cameron 
(Accessed, 11 July 2012). 
 
Habermas, J, (1975) Legitimation Crisis, Beacon Press.  
 
Haldon, J. (1999) Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, London, 
University College London Press.  
 
Hammond, K. (1996) Human Judgement in Social Policy: Irreducible 
Uncertainty, Inevitable Error and Unavoidable Injustice, New York/Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Hamowy, R. (2008) The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism, Thousand Oaks, 
California, Sage Publications.  
 
 290 
Hansard, (16 February 1981) British Aerospace, [online]. Available from  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1981/feb/16/british-
aerospace#S5CV0999P0_19810216_CWA_335 (Accessed, 4 April 2010). 
 
Hansard, (16 February 1981) British Aerospace, [online]. Available from 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1981/feb/16/british-
aerospace-limited#S5CV0999P0_19810216_CWA_359 (Accessed, 4 April 
2010). 
 
Hanson, N. (2004) The Confident Hope of a Miracle: The True History of the 
Spanish Armada, London, Corgi Adult. 
 
Hart, D, M., (1994) Class Analysis, Slavery and the Industrialist Theory of 
History in French Liberal Thought, 1814-1830: The Radical Liberalism of 
Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer, unpublished Ph.D, King's College 
Cambridge [online]. Available from  
http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/personal/DHart/ClassicalLiberalism/ComteDu
noyer/index.html (Accessed, 12 December 2009). 
 
Hart, D. (2004) Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition, 
[online]. Available from http://homepage.mac.com/dmhart/Molinari/Thesis.html  
(Accessed, 14 June 2010). 
 
Hayek, F. A., (1973) Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol.1: Rules of Order, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayek, F. A., (1979) Whither Democracy: lecture at the Institute of Public 
Affairs Sydney, Social Justice, Socialism and Democracy: Three Australian 
Lectures, Sydney, Centre for Independent Studies. 
 
Healey, D. (1966) Defence White Paper, London, Ministry of Defence.  
 
Hellen, N. (6 January 2013), ‘Private Navy goes to war on Somali pirates’, 
London, The Sunday Times. 
 291 
 
Hemingway, M. ‘Warriors for Hire: Blackwater USA and the Rise of Private 
Military Contractors’, The Weekly Standard, 18 December 2006. 
 
Herbert, A. (1978) The Right and Wrong of Compulsion of the State and Other 
Essays, Indianapolis, Liberty Classics. 
 
Hindess, B and Hirst, P. (1977) Mode of Production and Social Formation, 
London, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
HM Government (2010) ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The 
Strategic Defence and Security Review’, [online]. Available from 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/
documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf (Accessed, 27 October 2010).  
 
Hobbes, T. (1998) Leviathan, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Hobbes, T. (2011) Leviathan, London, CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. (1998) ‘What Can History Tell Us About Contemporary 
Society’ in E. Hobsbawn (ed), On History, London, Abacus. 
 
Hodge, G., and Greve, G., (eds) (2005) The Challenge of Public–Private 
Partnerships: Learning from International Experience, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar. 
 
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, 
Institutions and Organizations Across Nations (2nd edition), Thousand Oaks, 
California, Sage. 
 
Holland, P. H., (1846) Report on the Ashton under Lyne Water Works, 
London, Towns Improvement Company. 
 
 292 
Hood, C, (1991) ‘A Public Management for All Seasons?’, Public 
Administration, Volume 69, Number 1.  
 
Hood, C., (2005) Public Management: The Word, the Movement, the Science, 
in Ferlie, R, Lynn, L, Pollitt, C, (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Administration, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
 
Hood, C, and Dixon, R, (2013) A Model of Cost-cutting in Government? The 
Great Management Revolution in UK Central Government Reconsidered, 
Public Administration, Volume 91, Number 1.  
 
Hoppe, H-H., (1989) A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, 
Politics and Ethics, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Hoppe, H-H., (1993) The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies 
in Political Economy and Philosophy, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Hoppe, H-H., (1995) Economic Science and the Austrian Method, Auburn 
Alabama, Ludwig von Mises Institute.  
 
Hoppe, H-H., (1999) The Private Production of Defense, Essays in Political 
Economy, Auburn Alabama, Ludwig von Mises Institute. 
 
Hoppe, H-H., (2002a) Democracy: The God That Failed, New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, Transaction Books. 
 
Hoppe, H-H., (2002b) The Myth of National Defense: Essays in the Theory 
and History of Security Production, Auburn Alabama, Ludwig von Mises 
Institute. 
 
Howard, M. (1976) War In European History, London, Oxford University 
Press.  
 
 293 
Hughes, O. (2003) Public Management and Administration: An Introduction, 
New York, Palgrave. 
 
Independent (6 December 2009) ‘Navy supply fleet ‘to be privatised as MoD 
seeks £200m cuts’’, [online]. Available from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/navy-supply-fleet-to-be-
privatised-as-mod-seeks-163200m-cuts-1835048.html (Accessed, 10 March 
2010). 
 
International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, United 
Kingdom (2003) ‘Dockyard Privatisation Case Study’, Silver Spring MD, 
International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers. 
 
Isenberg, D. (2004) A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic 
Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq, London, British-American 
Security Information Council  
 
Isenberg, D. (2007) ‘Private Military Companies in Iraq’ published in 
Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military 
Companies, edited by Chesterman and Lehnardt, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Jeffrey, N., and Megginson, W. (2001) From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Study on Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 39, 
Number 2. 
 
Jessup, P. C., & Deak, F, (1976) Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law, 
Vol.1, The Origins, New York, Octagon Books. 
 
Jowit, J. (23 November 2011) ‘National Road Charging is Inevitable, Warns 
Head of UK Motoring Group’, The Guardian.   
 
Kaboolian, L. (1998) The New Public Management: Challenging the 
Boundaries of the Management Vs. Administration Debate, Public 
 294 
Administration Review, Volume 58, Number 3. 
 
Kay, A (2005) ‘A Critique of the use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies’, 
Public Administration, Volume 83, Number 3. 
 
Kellner, P. (13 April 1987) Thatcher’s Flawed View of the Past. The 
Independent. 
 
Kelley, M. ‘Record Cases in Contract Probe; Crackdown Aims at ‘Second 
Insurgency’’, USA Today, 15 Aug 2007. 
 
Kelly, R. M. (1998) An Inclusive Democratic Polity, Representative 
Bureaucracies and New Public Management, Public Administration Review. 
Volume 58, Number 3.  
 
Kert, F. M., (1997) Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in 
Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812, St. John’s, Newfoundland: International 
Maritime Economic History Association. 
 
Keynes, J. M., (1973) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, Vol.7, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, London, 
Macmillan. 
 
King, C. S., Stivers, C., and Nank, R., (1998) Citizenship and its Discontents: 
The Political and Economic Context, in Government in US: Public 
Administration in An Anti-government Era, Newbury Park, California, Sage 
Publications. 
 
Kingdon, J. (1995) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (2nd edition), 
New York, Harper Collins College Publishers. 
 
Kinsey, C. (2006) Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of 
Private Military Companies Series, Contemporary Security Studies, London, 
Routledge.  
 295 
 
Knowles, L. (1919) ‘Samuel Pepys and the Royal Navy’, Lees Knowles 
Lectures Delivered at Trinity College Cambridge, [online]. Available from 
http://archive.org/stream/samuelpepysandro00tann/samuelpepysandro00tann
_djvu.txt (Accessed, 17 December 2012). 
 
Kuhn, T. (1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press. 
 
Kwok, J, (2006) ‘Armed Entrepreneurs: Private Military Companies in Iraq’, 
Harvard International Review, Vol.28, No.1. 
 
Labone, R. (2006) River Class Experience Provides Valuable Lessons for 
OPV (H) Project, Armed Forces International [online]. Available from 
http://www.armedforces-int.com/categories/naval-vessel-support/river-class-
experience-provides-valuable-lessons-for-opv-h-project.asp (Accessed, 15 
November 2011). 
 
Lane, F. C., (1979) Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and 
Violence Controlling Enterprises, Albany, SUNY Press. 
 
Lapsley, I., (2009) ‘New Public Management: The Cruelest Invention of the 
Human Spirit?’, ABACUS, Volume 45, Number 1. 
 
Legislation (1983) British Shipbuilders Act [online]. Available from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/15/contents (Accessed, 1 May 
2010). 
 
Li, B., and Zheng, Y. (2001) 5000 Years of Chinese History, Inner Mongolian 
People’s Publishing Corporation.  
 
Likert, R. (1932) ‘A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes’, Archives of 
Psychology, Number 140. 
 
 296 
Lipson, E. (1934) The Economic History of England, Volume II: The Age of 
Mercantilism, London, A&C Black. 
 
Lloyds List, (30 August 2010) ‘UK to consider Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
Privatisation’. 
 
Lloyds Loading List (21 February 2011) ‘London Insurance Firms Plan Private 
Navy’, [online]. http://www.lloydsll.com/freight-directory/london-insurance-
firms-plan-private-navy-xto-fight-
piracy/20017851055.htm;jsessionid=A571A6C2B52F29CADC5E2600021ACF
B0.cb1a6af26f4f089d0d4cce62279dcbca5a310b19 (Accessed, 12 June 
2012). 
 
Long, R. T., (2008) Market Anarchism as Constitutionalism, in Long and Tibor 
Machan, Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country? 
Aldersot, Ashgate.  
 
Lynn, L. (1996) Public Management as Art, Science and Profession. Chicago, 
Illinois, The University of Chicago. 
 
Lynn, L. and C. Hill, (2008) Public Management: A Three-Dimensional 
Approach, Washington DC, Sage/CQ Press. 
 
M6 Toll Road (2012) ‘M6 Toll Road’ [online]. Available from 
http://www.m6toll.co.uk/ (Accessed, 28 September 2012). 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolò (1961), The Prince, London, Penguin. 
 
MacIntyre, D. (1975) The Privateers, London, Paul Elek. 
 
Maclay, E. S., (1899) A History of American Privateers, New York, D. 
Appleton and Company. 
 
 297 
Mandel, R. ‘The Privatization of Security’ International Students Association, 
CIAO, March 2000, Accessed 28 March 2011. http://www.claonet.org/isa/mar01 
 
Marcus, G. T., (11 February 1997) Purchase of Devonport Royal Dockyard, 
Halliburton Press Release, Dallas, Texas, Haliburton. 
 
Marcussen, M. (2007) ‘Central Banking Reform Across the World: Only by 
Night Are All Cats Grey’, in T. Christensen and P. Laegreid (eds.), 
Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector 
Reforms, Aldershot, Ashgate. 
 
Marsh, D., and Rhodes, R. A. W, (Eds) (1992) Policy Networks in British 
Government, Oxford, Clarendon Press.  
 
Marsh, D. (2008) British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
Volume 10, Number 4. 
 
Massey, A., and Pyper, R. (2005) Public Management and Modernisation in 
Britain, Basingstoke, Palgrave.  
 
Massey, A., and Shidlo, G., (November 2010) Privatisation, Private Equity and 
Executive Remuneration: Privatising QinetiQ, Public Money & Management, 
Volume 30, Number 6. 
 
Mathiason, N. (2 March 2003) ‘The First Privatised War’, The Observer. 
 
Mattingly, G. (2005) The Armada, New York, Mariner Books. 
 
McCulloch, J. J., (1977) The Production of Security, Occasional Paper No.2, 
New York, Centre for Libertarian Studies. 
 
McDermott, J. (2005) England and the Spanish Armada: The Necessary 
Quarrel, New Haven Connecticut, Yale University Press. 
 298 
 
McDonald, T. (ed.) (1996) The Historic Turn in the Social Sciences, Ann 
Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 
 
McElroy, W. (2000) ‘Murray N. Rothbard: Mr. Libertarian’, [online]. Available 
from http://www.wendymcelroy.com/rockwell/mcelroy000706.html [Accessed, 
7 June 2011]. 
 
Mediation and Arbitration (2013) [online]. Available from 
http://wwwmediationandarbitration.co.uk/ (Accessed, 2 March 2013). 
 
Meek, N. (1999) The Plausibility of Large-Scale, High-Tech, Voluntarily-
Funded Emergency Organisations: The Example of the Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution, Economic Notes No.86, London, Libertarian Alliance. 
 
Megginson, W. L. and Netter, J. N, From State to Market: A Survey on 
Empirical Studies on Privatisation, Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 
XXXIX, June 2001, pp. 321-389. 
 
Merco Press, ‘BAE wins £59m contract for Falklands patrol ship maintenance 
HMS Clyde’, 2 May 2011, South Atlantic. 
 
Merkle, J. (1980) Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International 
Scientific Management Movement, Berkley, California University Press. 
 
Neuman, W. L. (2006) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches, London, Pearson, Allyn and Bacon.  
 
Meyer, M. and Zucker, L. (1989) Permanently Failing Organizations, Newbury 
Park, Sage. 
 
Micklethwait, B. (1987) Taking Free Market Defence Seriously, Foreign Policy 
Perspectives No.7, London, Libertarian Alliance. 
 
 299 
Milanes, Alexander 1999: Notwehr. Zur strategischen Operationalisierung 
legalisierter Gewalt. In: Sighard Neckel/Michael Schwab-Trapp (Hrsg.), 
Ordnungen der Gewalt. Beiträge zu einer politischen Soziologie der Gewalt 
und des Krieges. Opladen. 
 
Miller, D. (ed) (1991) Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, London, 
Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Mills, C. W., (1963) Power, Politics and People, New York, Ballantine. 
 
Ministry of Defence (1990) Options for Change, London, Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office. 
 
Ministry of Defence, (July 2004) Delivering Security in a Changing World: 
Future Capabilities, London, Cm 6269. 
 
Moe, R., and Gilmour, R, (1995) Rediscovering Principles of Public 
Administration, Public Administration Review, Volume 55, Number 8. 
 
Molinari, G. (1849a) ‘De la Production de la Securite’, Journal des 
Economisters. 
 
Molinari, G. (1849b) Les Soirees de la Rue Saint-Lazare: Entretiens sur les 
lois économiques et défense de la propriété, Paris, Guillaumin et Cie.  
 
Molinari, G. (1887) Les Lois Naturelles de L’Economie Politique, Paris, 
Guilaumin. 
 
Moore, M, (1995) Creating Public Value, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Moran, M. (2001) ‘Managing Reform: Controlling the Medical Profession in the 
Era of Austerity’, in M. Bovens, P. T’Hart and G. B. Peters (eds) (2001) 
 300 
Success and Failure in Public Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.  
 
Moran, M. (2003) The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-
Innovation, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Munn, P. and Drever, E. (2004) Using Questionnaires in Small-scale 
Research: A Beginner’s Guide, Glasgow, The SCRE Centre. 
 
Murray, A., (1997) ‘Privatisation’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, Volume 
86, Number 341. 
 
Natalino, R. (1988) The Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements 
and Documents with Commentaries, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff.   
 
National Audit Office, (1987) Sale of Royal Ordnance plc, London, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
 
Niskanen, W. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago, 
Aldine-Altherton.   
 
Nott, J. (1981) Defence White Paper, London, Ministry of Defence. 
 
Nott, J. (2004) Here Today, Gone Tomorrow, London, Methuen. 
 
Nowotny, H. (1994) Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience, 
Cambridge, Polity Press. 
 
O’Brien, K. A. (2007) What Should and Should not be Regulated? In 
Chesterman, S. & Lehnardt, C (Eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise 
and Regulation of Private Military Companies, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
OECD (1995) Governance in Transition: Public Management Reform in 
 301 
OECD Countries, Paris, OECD/PUMA. 
 
Office of National Statistics, (2012) Measuring National Wellbeing: What We 
Do PDF [online]. Available from 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_258996.pdf (Accessed, 4 April 2012). 
 
Oppenheim, A. N. (2000) Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement, London, Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd. 
 
Ormorod, D. (1990) The Reign of Edward II, New Haven, Yale University 
Press. 
 
Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) Reinventing Government: How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector, New York, Perseus 
Books. 
 
Osborne, D., and Plastrik, P. (2000) The Reinventor’s Fieldbook: Tools for 
Transforming Your Government, San Francisco, California, Jossey Bass. 
 
Osborne, S, P., (2006) ‘The New Public Governance?’, Public Management 
Review, Volume 8, Number 3. 
 
Ostrom, V. (1974) The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, 
Alabama, University of Alabama Press. 
 
Parker, D., and Saal, D. S, (2005) International Handbook on Privatization, 
Cheltenham, Gloucester, Edward Elgar. 
 
Pelton, R. Y. (2007) Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror, New 
York, Three Rivers Press. 
 
Percy, S. (2007) Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International 
Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
 302 
Petrie, D. A., (1999) The Prize Game: Lawful Looting on the High Seas in the 
Days of Fighting Sail, Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press. 
 
Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
 
Pint, E. M., Bondanella, J. R., Cave, J., Hart, R., & Keyser, D., (2000) Public-
Private Partnerships: Background Papers for the U.S-U.K., Conference on 
Military Installation Assets, Operations and Services, Santa Monica, 
California, Rand.  
 
Pipes, R., (2000) Property and Freedom: The story of how through the 
centuries private ownership has promoted liberty and the rule of law, New 
York, Knopf. 
 
Pirie, M. (2012) Think Tank: The Story of the Adam Smith Institute, London, 
Biteback. 
 
Political Compass, (2011) Political Compass, Accessed, 15 January 2011, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_compass 
 
Pollitt, C., (1984) Manipulating the Machine: Changing the Pattern of 
Ministerial Departments, 1960-83, London, Allen and Unwin. 
 
Pollitt, C, (1993) Managerialism and the Public Services, Oxford, Blackwell.  
 
Pollitt, C., (1998) ‘Managerialism Revisited’, in G. G Peters and D. Savole 
(eds) Taking Stock: Assessing Public Service Reforms, Montreal, McGill-
Queens University Press. 
 
Pollitt, C., (2003) The Essential Public Manager, Maidenhead, Berkshire, 
Open University Press. 
 
 303 
Pollitt, C. (2003) Time, Policy, Management: Governing with the Past, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Pollitt, C., (2006) Performance Management in Practice: A Comparative Study 
of Executive Agencies, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: 
J-PART, Volume 16, Number 1. 
 
Pollitt, C., (2007) New Labour’s Re-disorganisation: Hyper-modernism and the 
Costs of Reform – A Cautionary Tale, Public Management Review, Volume 9, 
Number 4. 
 
Pollitt, C., and Bouckaert, G, (2011) Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis – New Public Management, Governance and the Neo-
Weberian State, 3rd Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Pollitt, C., (2013) ’40 Years of Public Management Reform in UK Central 
Government – Promises, Promises…’, Policy & Politics, Volume 41, Number 
4. 
 
Prison Reform Trust (2013) Prison Reform Trust [online]. Available from 
http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/PressPolicy/News/vw/1/ItemID/179 
(Accessed, 8 February 2013). 
 
Puddefoot, G. (2009) The Fourth Force: the Untold Story of the Royal Fleet 
Auxiliary Since 1945, Pen & Sword Books, Barnsley, South Yorkshire. 
 
Pugh, P. (2002) The Magic of a Name: The Rolls-Royce Story, Part 3, A 
Family of Engines, London, Icon Books. 
 
Quettevile, H. (2000) ‘French Mercenary is Behind Nudist Coup’, The Daily 
Telegraph. 
 
Ragin, C. C. (1994) Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of 
Method, Thousand Oaks, California, Pine Forge Press. 
 304 
 
Rand. A., (1964) The Virtue of Selfishness, New York, New American Library. 
 
Rand, A., (1967) Capitalism the Unknown Ideal, New York, New American 
Library. 
 
Rawls, J., (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap 
Press. 
 
Rayment, S. (15 January 2006) ‘Navy Too Small to Defend Us, Warns First 
Sea Lord’, Daily Telegraph. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1988) Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-
Central Governments of Britain, London, Routledge. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1994) The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing 
Nature of the Public Service in Britain, The Political Quarterly, Volume 65, 
Issue 2.  
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. and Dunleavy, P. (1995) Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core 
Executive, London, Macmillan. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997) Understanding Governance, Policy Networks, 
Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Buckingham, Open University 
Press. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (2007) ‘Understanding Governance: Ten Years On’, 
Organizational Studies, Volume 28, Number 8. 
 
Robertson, G. (1998) Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the 
Modern World, London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. 
 
 305 
Rodger, N. A. M., (1997) The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 
Vol.1: 660-1649, London, Harper Collins. 
 
Rosamond, J., (6 May 2005) ‘Job Axe Fears Over Bid to Privatise Navy 
Bases’, The News, Portsmouth. 
 
Roskell, J. S. (1992) The History of Parliament, House of Commons 1386-
1421, Stroud, Volume 1. 
 
Rothbard, M. N., (1965) The Anatomy of the State, Rampart Journal of 
Individualist Thought, Volume 1, Number 2. 
 
Rothbard, M. N., (1970) Power and Market: Government and the Economy, 
Kansas City, Sheed Andrews and McMeel.     
 
Rothbard, M. N., (1973) For a New Liberty, New York, The Macmillan 
Publishing Company.    
 
Rothbard, M. N., (1977) Preface to Gustave de Molinari’s ‘The Production of 
Security’, Alabama, Ludwig Von Mises Institute, [online]. Available from 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard115.html  (Accessed, 14 March 
2011) 
 
Rothbard, M. N., (1995) Gustave de Molinari, First Anarcho-Capitalist in An 
Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, Volume 2: 
Classical Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
 
Royal Navy, (2013) Royal Navy Protecting Our Economy page [online]. 
Available from http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/About-the-Royal-Navy/What-the-
Navy-Does/Protecting-our-economy (Accessed, 7 January 2013). 
 
Rusbridger, A. (22 December 1987) ‘Adam Smith Institute’s Sense and 
Nonsense’, The Guardian. 
 306 
 
Russell, L. (1970) The French Corsairs, London, Robert Hale. 
 
Savage, A. (1996) The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles: The Authentic Voice of 
England from the Time of Julius Caesar to the Coronation of Henry II, 
Godalming, Colour Library Direct Ltd. 
 
Savas, E. S. (2000) Privatization and Public–Private Partnerships, New York, 
Chatham House. 
 
Saward, M, (1997) ‘In Search of the Hollow Crown’ in: Weller, Patrick; Bakvis, 
Herman and Rhodes, R. A. W (eds), The Hollow Crown, Countervailing 
Trends in Core Executives, Basingstocke, Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Say, J-B. (1803) Traité d'économie politique, ou simple exposition de la 
manière dont se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les richesses, 
Paris, Deterville. 	  
Say, J-B. (1855) A Treatise on Political Economy translated from the 4th 
edition of the French by C. R. Prinsep, New American Edition by Clement C. 
Biddle, Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 
 
Scahill, J. (2007) Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful 
Mercenary Army, New York, Nation Books.  
 
Scammell, G. V., (1982) The English Trading Companies and the Sea, 
London, Trustees of the National Maritime Museum. 
 
Schatz, A. (1907) L'Individualisme économique et social: Ses origines, son 
évolution, ses formes contemporaines, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin. 
 
Schmidt, D. E. (2005) The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy 1898-2005, 
New York, Algora Publishing.  
 
 307 
Schubert, A. Private Initiative in Law Enforcement: Associations for the 
Prosecution of Felons 1774-1856, in V. Bailey (ed) (1981) Policing and 
Punishment in Nineteenth Century Britain, London, Croom Helm. 
 
Schultz, K. (1995) ‘The Politics of the Business Cycle’, British Journal of 
Political Science, Volume 25.  
 
Schumacher, G., (2006) A Bloody Business: America’s War Zone Contractors 
and the Occupation of Iraq, St. Paul, MN, USA, Zenith Press. 
 
Schumpeter, J. (1949) ‘Economic History and Entrepreneurial History’, 
Chicago and the Entrepreneur: Postulates and the Patters of Entrepreneurial 
History, Cambridge MA., Harvard University Research Centre in 
Entrepreneurial History, Harvard University Press. 
 
Schutt, R. (2006) Investigating the Social World, Newbury Park, California 
Sage Publications.  
 
Sechrest, L. J., (2001) Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for 
Private Profit, Independent Institute Working Paper Number 41 [online]. 
Available from 
http://www.independent.org/pdf/working_papers/41_privateering.pdf 
(Accessed, 4 February 2011). 
 
Serco Marine, (2012) Serco Marine page on SD Victoria [online]. Available 
from http://www.sercomarine.com/Images/SD%20Victoria_tcm29-38291.pdf 
(Accessed, 5 January 2012). 
 
Seymour, R. (29 March 2012) ‘A short history of privatisation in the UK: 1979-
2012’, The Guardian. 
 
Silbun, J. (15 January 2012) ‘Typhon Fights Back Against Pirates’, Daily 
Telegraph’, [online]. Available from 
 308 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/9016188/Typhon-fights-
back-against-pirates.html (Accessed, 27 January 2013). 
 
Singer, P. W., (2003) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military 
Industry, New York, Cornell University Press.  
 
Small, M. (2006) Priatisation of Security and Military Functions and Demise of 
the Modern Nation-State in Africa, Occasional Paper Series, African Centre 
for the Construcitve Resolution of Disputes, Durban, South Africa, Vol.1, No.2.   
 
Smith, A. (1904 – First Published 1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London, Methuen and Co.   
 
Smith, M., and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2001) The Core Executive in Britain, 
London, St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Smith, R, (2003) Focusing on Public Value: Something Old and Something 
New, Victoria, Australia, Monash University. 
 
Spencer, H. (1851, 1970) Social Statics, New York, Robert Schalkenbach 
Foundation. 
 
Stebbins, R., A. (2001) Exploratory Research in the Social Sciences, 
Thousand Oaks, California, Sage. 
 
Stivers, R, E., (1975) Privateers and Volunteers: The Men and Women of Our 
Reserve Naval Forces 1766 to 1866, Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute 
Press. 
 
Stoker, G, (2006) ‘Public Value Management: A New Narrative for a Network 
Government?’, American Review of Public Administration, Volume 36, 
Number 1.  
 
 309 
Swain, E. (ed) (December 2005) Has Partnering Delivered? First Base: The 
Magazine of Team Portsmouth, Portsmouth, Team Portsmouth. 
 
Swell, W. (1996) ‘Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology’, in T. 
McDonald (eds.), The Historic Turn in the Social Sciences, Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Talbot, C. and Johnson, C. (2007) ‘Seasonal Cycles in Public Management: 
Disaggregation and Re-aggregation’, Public Money & Management, February, 
Volume 27, Number 1.  
 
Tame, C. (1989) ‘On the Side of the Angels: A View of Private Policing’, 
Political Notes No.40, London, Libertarian Alliance. 
 
Tame, C. R., (2004) Gustave de Molinari 1819-1912: An Ongoing 
Bibliography, Brussels, Institut Economique Molinari. 
 
Tanaka, Y. (2012) The International Law of the Sea, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Tangredi, S. J., (2002) Globalization and Maritime Power, Washington DC, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 
 
Taulbee, L. (1998) Reflections on the Mercenary Option, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, Volume 9, Number 2.  
 
Taylor, C. and Lunn, J. (13 October 2010) Strategic Defence and Security 
Review, House of Commons Library Research Note [online]. Available from 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-
05592.pdf  (Accessed, 5 November 2011). 
 
Terry, L. (1998) Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism and the Public 
Management Movement, Public Administration Review, Volume 58, Number 
8. 
 310 
 
The Sun (29 February 2012) ‘Skint Navy surrenders Nelson’s HMS Victory’ 
[online]. Available from 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4161201/Skint-Navy-surrenders-
Nelsons-HMS-Victory.html (Accessed 3 March 2012). 
 
Thelen, K. (2003) ‘Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis’, in J. 
Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Theakston, K. (1995) The Civil Service Since 1945, London, Blackwell. 
 
Thompson, F., and L. R. Jones. (1994) Reinventing the Pentagon: How the 
New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal, San Francisco, 
California, Jossey Bass. 
 
Thomson, J. (1994) Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-building and 
Extraterritorial Violence in Modern Europe, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Tichy, N. (1980) ‘Problem Cycles I Organizations and the Management of 
Change’, in J. Kimberley, R. Miles and Associates (eds.) The Organiziational 
Life Cycle, San Francisco, Jossey Bass.  
 
Tilly, C. ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Evans, P. B., 
Ruschemeyer, D and Skocpol, T. (eds) (1987) Bringing the Sate Back In, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Toynbee, P., and Walker, D., (2008) Unjust Rewards, London, Granta Books. 
 
Tracey, J. (1990) The Rise of Merchant Empires, New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Traynor, I. (2003, December 10) The Privatisation of War, The Guardian. 
 311 
 
Tucker, B. R., (1969) Instead of a Book by a Man Too Busy to Write One: A 
Fragmentary Exposition of Philosiophical Anarchism, New York, Haskell 
House. 
 
Tullock, G. (1976) The Vote Motive, London, Institute of Economic Affairs.  
 
UK Parliament (17 January 2007), ‘Defence Training Review’ [online]. 
Available from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070117/deb
indx/70117-x.htm (Accessed, 28 February 2010). 
 
UK Parliament (15 March 2010) [online]. Available from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110315/text
/110315w0003.htm (Accessed, 14 September 2011). 
 
UK Parliament (15 December 2010) ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’ 
[online]. Available from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/101215-
wms0001.htm (Accessed, 17 June 2011). 
 
Van Wart, M. (1998) Changing Public Sector Values, New York, Garland 
Publishing. 
 
Varone, F. (2008) ‘Le temps administrative et la Nouvelle Gestion Publique’, 
in R. J. Schweizer et al. (eds.), Verwaltung im 21 Jahrhandert: 
herausfoderungen, probleme, losungwege, Frieberg, Universitatsverlag 
Frieburg.  
 
Verkuil P. R., (2007) Outsourcing Sovereignty Why Privatisation of 
Government Function Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do About It, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
 312 
Verney, D. (1991) Westminster Model in V. Bogdanor (ed) The Blackwell 
Encylopedia of Political Science, Oxford, Blackwell. 
 
Wallerstein, I. M., (1980) Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the 
Consolidation of the European World Economy 1600-1750, London, 
Academic Press. 
 
Warwick, P. (1975) ‘A Re-evaluation of Alternate Methodologies in Legislative 
Voting Analysis’, Social Science Research, September, Volume 4. 
 
Wayne, L. British Arms Merchant With Passport to the Pentagon, The New 
York Times, New York, New York Times Company, 16 August 2006. 
 
Weber, M. (1904) 1949, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Translated 
by Edward Shils and Henry Finch, New York, Free Press.  
 
Weber, M. (1919) Politics as Vocation [online]. Available as PDF from 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf (Accessed, 12 
March 2012). 
 
Weber, M. (1922/1968). Economy and Society, in G. Roth, C. Wittich, (eds)., 
G. Roth, & C. Wittich, Trans.) New York, Bedminster Press. 
 
Weber, M. ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. W. (eds) (1946) 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
Wernham, R. B., (1988) The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis 
Drake to Spain and Portugal, 1589, Petersfield Hampshire, Navy Records 
Society. 
 
White, Warmsley, Goodsell, Wolf and Rohr (1990) Refounding Public 
Administration, Newbury Park, California, Sage Publications. 
 
 313 
Whitehouse, I. (2002a) A Private Service: The Possible Privatisation of 
Britain’s Armed Forces, The Naval Review. 
 
Whitehouse, I. (2002b) A Private Service: The Possible Privatization of 
Britain’s Armed Forces, London, Libertarian Alliance. 
 
Williams, D. (2000) Reinventing the Proverbs of Government, Public 
Administration Review, Volume 60, Number 6. 
 
Williams. G. (1966) History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque, 
New York, Augustus M. Kelley. 
 
Wilson, J, Q., (1980) The Politics of Regulation, New York, Basic Books. 
 
Winchelsea (2012) Liberties of Winchelsea [online]. Available from 
http://www.winchelsea.net/pdf/Liberties_of_Winchelsea.pdf (Accessed, 15 
August 2012). 
 
Wise, L, R, (2002) ‘Public Management Reform: Competing Drivers of 
Change’, Public Administration Review, Volume 62, Number 5. 
 
World Bank, (1992) Governance and Development, Washington DC, World 
Bank. 
 
Worsham, J, Eisner, M and Ringquist, E., (1997) Assessing the Assumptions: 
A Critical Analysis of Agency Theory, Administration and Society, Volume 28, 
Number 4. 
 
Yescombe, E. R. (2007) Public–Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and 
Finance, Burlington, MA, Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier.  
 
Ziman, J. (2000) Real Science, What it is and What it Means, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
